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1. Introduction 
 
This research paper is a discussion about when and how external actors should intervene in 
third countries to prevent mass violence or genocide. Massive human rights violations in 
the Balkans and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s have prompted a lively debate about the 
legitimacy and desirability of the use of force by third parties to prevent mass atrocities. A 
fierce argument started between supporters of sovereignty and non-intervention on the one 
hand, and advocates of universal human rights, who want to have human rights guaranteed 
by military action as a last resort, on the other. Legal, political and moral grounds are 
framing the controversy about the right or even duty of the international community to 
protect endangered civilians faced with mass atrocities in violent conflicts. 
The slogan ‘never again’ was often used after World War II to justify military action in 
reference to the Holocaust and a future prevention of genocide. Military interventions on 
humanitarian grounds have proven in the past to be half-hearted and were unsatisfying for 
all parties involved, not least for the civilians suffering from gross human rights abuses by 
abusive states. In 1999, the members of NATO responded to the crisis in Kosovo with a 
bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The reasoning of the 
intervention was based on the moral right and duty to protect the Albanian population of 
Kosovo. This action was widely perceived as ‘legitimate but illegal.’1 In 2000, the 
Canadian government took the lead in setting up an International Commission that worked 
on a concept labeled ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in order to prevent genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in the future. 
Still, some nine years after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, during which an estimated 
800,000 people were slaughtered over the course of one hundred days without any external 
attempt from the international community to stop the violence – despite the presence of 
UN troops on the ground –, the crisis in Darfur began in 2003. The Western public did not 
take notice of the atrocities for approximately one year and even after it had had attracted 
the attention of the international community, the crisis was not approached adequately. The 
events in Darfur call into question the credibility of world leaders’ claims to prevent mass 
atrocities and stop crimes against humanity. 
One of the main questions is, how severe a crisis needs to be in order for military 
action to be taken. Even with a majority of states in favor of a forceful intervention, it lies 
with the permanent five members (P5) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to 
                                                
1 The former judge Richard Goldstone, a distinguished South African jurist, was head of the International Independent 
Commission of Inquiry on the Kosovo War and reviewed the 78 days of the NATO air strike. 
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pass or block a resolution that allows counter-action and stops the worst suffering. Not 
only the institutional set-up of the United Nations but also the commitment of the world 
powers to act and protect civilians remains a challenge. Only if these challenges are 
tackled in the 21st century, we may overcome the bloody century behind us. 
 
1.1. Scope of the Study 
 
To narrow the topic, a specific focus is given to the debate on the Responsibility to Protect, 
a concept set up in 2001. To understand the idea of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), it 
is important to know its background which is based on the concept of human security. In 
comparison to traditional security concepts that focus on the state, human security puts the 
individual or the community in the center of attention. Darfur is used as an example in this 
research paper as it is one of the most obvious and prominent cases thus far in the 21st 
century, in which a state, in line with its auxiliaries, has acted against its own population. 
Important is the overall reaction of the international community on the Darfur conflict, in 
particular the response of the UN Security Council. The overall applicability of the R2P 
concept in its current shape will be discussed. 
 
1.2. Research Questions 
 
The central research question of this paper is threefold: 
1) Has the humanitarian crisis in Darfur reached such an extent since 2003 as to consider it 
to be an R2P situation? 
2) Why has there been no protection of civilians in Darfur by the international community? 
3) Are there systematic problems inherent in the concept of R2P or is Darfur an 
exceptional case? 
 
1.3. Hypotheses 
 
Based on the research questions, this research paper’s hypotheses are as follows: 
- 13 - 
1) The Darfur conflict has indeed been an R2P situation since the violent clashes in 2003. 
Although the humanitarian crisis had not yet been declared as genocide,2 the committed 
crimes against humanity and the failure of the Government of Sudan to protect its citizens 
constituted an R2P situation. 
2) Western advocacy for an intervention in Darfur, in particular on the part of the US, 
came too late and brought about a deadlock in the UN Security Council. Instead of 
focusing on realistic scenarios on how to protect civilians in Darfur, the debate dealt with 
terms like genocide and inhibited effective action on site. 
3) As long as the UNSC is not reformed and proposals by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) are not integrated into the concept of R2P, 
civilians will not be protected in case of genocide or crimes against humanity, as the 
example of the Darfur conflict proves. Accordingly, international actors have not learned 
their lesson from the crimes committed in the 1990s. 
 
1.4. Relevance of the Topic 
 
The value of this study is underscored by intense debates since the introduction of R2P in 
2001 on how to link intervention and sovereignty and to prohibit atrocities, like those that 
were committed in Bosnia or Rwanda, in the future. The endorsement of R2P at the World 
Summit Outcome in September 2005 introduced a new approach to preventing crimes 
against humanity, but it is still unclear whether it receives the broad support it needs to be 
accepted in international law and by powerful states.  
This paper is relevant for the academic community and research institutions because 
R2P has induced the international community to face emerging humanitarian crises at the 
onset of a conflict. This work will exemplify the complexities that the international 
community faces in a conflict situation like Darfur. Further clarification or even 
remodeling the concept of R2P will be necessary to prevent mass atrocities in the future. 
 
1.5. Methodology 
 
The methodological basis of this work is analytical and qualitative research. The study 
uses an analytical approach because it suggests an intermediary level of analysis, where 
                                                
2 The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur concluded in a report to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 25 
January 2005 that although the Government of Sudan pursued no genocidal intent, the crimes committed “may be no less 
serious and heinous than genocide.” 
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neither description or storytelling nor grand scale theorization will dominate. In this 
research paper, the problem of R2P’s applicability and feasibility will be addressed 
critically. Finally, qualitative research is used to bring together empirical evidence and the 
complex theory of human security. 
A case study collects empirical data to verify an abstract theory, requiring the detailed 
and extensive study of a case related to a person, community, organization, or event.3 
According to John Mitchell, the aim of case studies is to “impart a sense of concreteness to 
an otherwise overwhelmingly abstract account,”4 for which reason case studies are also 
very popular in the social sciences. Moreover, case studies relate empirical findings to 
theory, because they must “demonstrate how events and actions are linked to one another 
in theoretically significant ways.”5 
There are different categories of case studies and they are applied depending on the 
purpose and type of case study. Two different types of case study apply to Darfur in this 
research paper: a critical case study, which illustrates whether a hypothesis is right or 
wrong; and an exemplifying case study, which provides an appropriate context in which to 
answer research questions.6 Critics argue that case studies are of limited significance 
because they lack a systematic handling of data, are too voluminous in their coverage and 
offer no basis for scientific generalization. Since behavioral patterns cannot be simulated 
for the investigator’s eye, however, general circumstances can only be studied in a real-life 
context such as Darfur. 
Additionally, the author carries out a qualitative content analysis following the 
methods proposed by Philipp Mayring. Through this systematic approach the gathered 
material, including a variety of texts as well as photos and films, can be assessed. It is 
important that the context of the documents used is systematically presented and classified. 
Parts of the texts have to be put into a broader context so that conclusions can be drawn,7 
which was achieved through the use of both primary and secondary sources of written 
texts.8 
The literature research for this thesis was conducted over the course of approximately 
one year, from autumn 2008 to autumn 2009. On the one hand, resolutions of the UN 
Security Council as well as documents from other UN bodies, including reports from the 
UN Secretary-General and the UN Development Program (UNDP), resolutions of the UN 
                                                
3 Bryman Alan (2004), Social Research Methods. Second edition. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 48-52. 
4 Mitchell, John C. (1984): "Case studies", in: Ellen, R.F. (ed.): Ethnographic Research: A Guide to General Conduct. 
London: Academic Press, p. 237. 
5 Mitchell 1984:240. 
6 Bryman 2004:51; Mitchell 1984:238. 
7 Mayring, Philipp (2000), “Qualitative Content Analysis”, Forum: Qualitative Social Research, Vol. 1(2). 
8 Alemann, Ulrich v. (1995), Grundlagen der Politikwissenschaft. Opladen: Leske & Budrich. 
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General Assembly (UNGA), and the 2005 Millennium Summit were considered to be 
important. Further reports that had a major influence on R2P and human security, such as 
those from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) or 
the Commission on Human Security (CHS), are also covered. Finally, human rights reports 
and briefings that are issued on a regular basis by respected NGOs such as Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) or advocacy think tanks like the International Crisis Group (ICG) were 
taken into consideration to examine the Darfur conflict due to their valuable insights into 
the situation on the ground. 
On the other hand, secondary literature like monographs, anthologies and, in 
particular, academic journal articles has also been used. The latter provided valuable 
material on human security, R2P and Darfur because they include up-to-date information 
where books do not keep pace with the latest development. Considering the highly 
divergent perspectives involved in an issue like the Darfur crisis, the author has made an 
effort to crosscheck the arguments and findings against information obtained from as many 
different sources as possible. 
 
1.6. Chapter Outline 
 
Following this introductory chapter, the theoretical aspect of this research paper, human 
security is introduced (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 presents the concept of Responsibility to 
Protect, its appearance, establishment and interpretation. In Chapter 4, the conflict in 
Darfur is outlined as this paper’s case study. Chapter 5 discusses whether R2P should have 
been applied in Darfur. The question whether the concept of R2P has systematic and 
inherent deficits is covered in Chapter 6. Finally, the conclusions of this research paper 
will be presented in Chapter 7. 
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2. Human Security 
 
To many, there is little doubt that (in and of itself) 
the traditional state-based security paradigm is 
failing in its primary objective - to protect people.9 
 
 
Human security is an evolving paradigm that gained momentum after the end of the Cold 
War. This chapter will first give an overview of the origins of human security, followed by 
a discussion of the broad and narrow senses of human security as it has developed over the 
past fifteen years, and will lead to the introduction of human security as a theory. Finally, 
criticism of this concept will also be covered.  
 
2.1. Traditional Perception of Security 
 
Traditionally, the focus of international relations (IR) has been on the nation state. For a 
long time, it was held that IR should explain security relations among states, in particular 
among powerful actors. The nation state, according to Walter Lippman’s classical 
definition by, has to be “secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to 
sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them 
by victory in such a war.”10 This belief led to a realist point of view comprised of the 
following four main points: (1) states are preoccupied with physical safety; (2) states act 
autonomously; (3) national development is a means to foster state autonomy and safety; 
and (4) ruling state leaders have to be prepared to meet threats from external forces to 
maintain autonomy and safety.11 Thus, national interest and sovereignty were important 
concepts for nation states. 
After World War I, a liberalist perspective became more popular with the foundation 
of the League of Nations; ruling the state was not seen as a strict domestic matter anymore 
but rather in the context of the international system of states. With the economic turmoil of 
the 1930s and World War II, the positions changed again. During the time of bipolarity 
between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union, realism was prevailing IR. 
Definitions like Ian Bellamy’s dominated the discourse: “Security itself is a relative 
                                                
9 Owen, Taylor (2004b), “Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal of a 
Threshold-Based Definition”, Security Dialogue Vol. 35(3), p. 374. 
10 Lippman, Walter (1943), US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. Boston: Little Brow, p. 51. 
11 Morgan, Patrick (2007), “Security in International Politics: Traditional Approaches”, in: Collins, Alan (ed), 
Contemporary Security Studies. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 16. 
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freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a 
consequence of any war that should occur.”12 The use of force, the nation state and military 
might stood at the center of attention. The Cold War led to a strong link between the 
academic community and policy makers in the United States, particularly during the 1950s 
and 1960s. Deterrence theory, focusing on the use of nuclear weapons and applied policies 
to make sure that the potential aggressor would refrain from assault, marked a ‘Golden 
Age’ of security studies.13 States were deemed to be rational entities led by national 
interest and the aim of maximization of power. The abstraction of deterrence, however, 
became too complex in the 1980s, and the internal logic was lost.14 
While security studies continued to be attached to military academies, security theory 
became university-based. This turn to academia is important for contextualizing the further 
development and the broadening of security studies after the Cold War. In Europe, this 
development was imported from the US; research was closely connected to government-
funded institutions, which were to influence state policies.15 In contrast to this 
development, a critical peace research evolved in Europe in the late 1960s, particularly in 
Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavia. These research institutions centered their 
attention on peace and perceived security as a problem, not as the solution. In general, 
however, a realist view prevailed during the Cold War and traditional state-centered 
security studies reached its peak.16 
The realist worldview has ironically hidden the threats that individuals have to face 
because these threats are typically not a matter of nuclear attacks but rather of proxy wars 
that have consequences like disease, hunger, poverty and violence. With the end of the 
Cold War and the beginning of the process of globalization,17 non-military security moved 
to the center of attention. A liberal internationalist approach became the dominant 
perspective in the practice of international relations not least because practical implications 
of traditional security concepts had failed to protect individuals or communities. As a 
consequence, security was extended horizontally and came to include ecological, 
economic, social and societal dimensions.18 International pressure for interventions in 
                                                
12 Bellamy, Ian (1981), “Towards a Theory of International Security”, Political Studies Vol. 29(1), p. 102. 
13 Waever, Ole/Buzan, Barry (2007), “After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present and Future of Security Studies”, in: 
Collins, Alan (ed), Contemporary Security Studies. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 387. 
14 Freedman, Lawrence (1988), “International Security: Changing Targets”, Foreign Policy Vol. 110(2). 
15 Waever/Buzan 2007:391. 
16 Owen, Taylor (2004a), “Challenges and Opportunities for Defining and Measuring Human Security”, Human Rights, 
Human Security and Disarmament 03/2004, p. 16. 
17 Although some historians argue that globalization dates back as far as the 15th century, in fact only the post-Cold War 
period could reach out to the whole world. See: Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974), The Modern World-System, 3 vols., New 
York/London: Academic Press; Braudel, Ferdinand (1979), Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Centuries, 3 vols., 
Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
18 Debiel, Tobias/Werthes, Sascha (2005), “Human Security – Vom politischen Leitbild zum integralen Baustein eines 
neuen Sicherheitskonzepts?”, S + F, Vol. 23(1), p. 9. 
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states considered being threats to peace and security in the region increased. A human-
centric focus emerged that later became institutionalized as ‘human security.’ Security 
studies moved away from inter-state relations to issues threatening people’s lives by 
broadening and deepening the understanding of security. 
 
2.2. The Development of Human Security as a Concept 
 
The ideas behind human security can be traced back to the 1980s. Fen Osler Hampson 
outlines three fields of origin for human security, all of which relate to the individual as the 
reference object: the rule of law, the safety of peoples and sustainable human 
development.19 Human security established itself as a new and independent concept in the 
post-Cold War world when traditional models of state security started to change as 
dissatisfaction with their application grew; the individual moved to the center of attention 
and the new security paradigm was sought to address the new global menaces. Thus, the 
new security paradigm could establish itself due to the end of the Cold War and the all-
embracing influence of globalization. 
The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report New Dimensions of Human Security 
used and shaped ‘human security’ for the first time and introduced the idea within a larger 
part of the international community. Since its first appearance, the term human security has 
changed in its understanding. Still, it “has begun visibly to influence, change, and 
challenge global politics, institutions, and governance”20 – not least the academic 
community. Proponents of human security agree that the concept “challenges the 
traditional state-centric view that the state is and should be the primary object, or referent, 
of security.”21 Within human security, people are the reference object. Advocates of human 
security, however, disagree about what kind of threat should be tackled first. The following 
table outlines a brief history of the concept of human security. 
The UNDP introduced the term human security with the following definition: 
“[H]uman security is the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and 
pervasive environmental, economic, food, health, personal and political threats.”22 Three 
different approaches have been used to categorize the threats: (1) temporal security from 
                                                
19 Hampson, Fen Osler (2001), Madness in Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 17-18. 
20 Oberleitner, Gerd (2005), “Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?”, Global Governance, Vol. 11, p. 185. 
21 Kerr, Pauline (2007), Human Security, in: Collins, Alan (ed), Contemporary Security Studies. New York: Oxford 
University Press, p. 94. 
22 UNDP (1994). Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security. New York: Oxford University 
Press, p. 383. 
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both long-term and short-term threats; (2) debate about freedom from fear and freedom 
from want; and (3) potential threats to human security, outlined above in the definition of 
the UNDP.23 It is seen as vital by Oberleitner that “the security of the individual [is] on the 
same level as the security of the state.”24 A shift in the security construct thus took place 
from the state to the individual level. Ordinary people’s day-to-day concerns were to be in 
center stage. Instead of the Westphalian order and the principle of non-intervention, which 
has a strong state-centered approach, the people’s vulnerability is in the spotlight. 
Moreover, Hampson and Penny argue that the conception of human security represents a 
link between human rights and international security, as stated in the UN Charter.25 
 
Figure 1: Human Security vs. Traditional Security 
 
 Human Security Traditional Security 
Actor States, regional and international 
organizations, NGOs 
The state 
Scope To protect individuals and 
communities 
To protect the state from external 
aggression; deterrence 
Referent The individual is at the center The state has priority 
Source: Own illustration 
 
Soon, however, a disagreement on the meaning of human security unfolded, 
concerning whether a broad or narrow approach was preferable. After the broader UNDP 
definition, the Commission on Global Governance, established in 1992, presented their 
1995 report, which gave a stronger focus to military issues and added that “ways to 
safeguard people against domestic threats of brutalization and gross deprivation”26 must be 
found. Furthermore, the integrity and viability of the life-support systems responsible for 
the set-up of communities had to be guaranteed. This report hinted on a substantive issue 
because the nature of war was changing. By the 1960s, most violent conflicts had already 
changed from inter-state to intra-state wars. The Cold War mindset had thus far inhibited a 
proper analysis of the phenomenon of intra-state conflicts, and many wars until 1991 were 
classified as proxy wars in the ideological confrontation of the bipolar world. According to 
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 121 conflicts have taken place in 81 locations since 
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the end of the Cold War. The highest number (51 active conflicts) was recorded in the 
years 1991 and 1992, but the post Cold War era witnessed a steep decline in the number of 
conflicts. In 2005, 31 ongoing armed conflicts were identified in 22 locations – but only 
five conflicts were classified as a war, which corresponds to at least 1,000 battle-related 
deaths within one year.27 Although the number of armed conflicts has declined, millions of 
people around the world have to face insecurity on a daily basis because of violent conflict. 
While the concept of human security has faced criticism in academia because it is not a 
coherent policy, it has been applied in practice. The UN in particular used human security 
as a policy tool, but some states also took the initiative in using it as a leitmotif in their 
foreign policy. ‘Middle powers’ like Canada realized this new approach was a chance to 
strengthen their own position in the international community although their military power 
was constricted. 
Within the UN, human security has been cause for debate. In March 2000, UN 
Secretary-General (UNSG) Kofi Annan presented his thoughts to the UN member states 
about the future development of the UN with regard to the September 2000 Millennium 
Summit in the report We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century. 
In his report, the Secretary-General referred to two competing paradigms, both of which 
are strongly related to human security. On the one hand he spoke of the ‘freedom from 
want’ as a broader approach that encompasses a wide range of human development aspects 
as well as threats like HIV/AIDS and extreme poverty; Annan did not mention the term 
human security in this respect. On the other hand he referred to the ‘freedom from fear,’ 
which comprises a narrow security agenda that aims to attain “the protection of 
communities and individuals from internal violence.”28 
In September 2000, the Canadian Government took the initiative to establish the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which in December 2001 
released the report The Responsibility to Protect. Furthermore, the idea to establish a 
Commission on Human Security (CHS) was born at the Millennium Summit and came into 
being in April 2001 thanks to the initiative of the Government of Japan. Sadako Ogata, the 
former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and Amartya Sen, a Nobel Laureate for 
Economics co-chaired the latter commission. The CHS report Human Security Now: 
Protecting and Empowering People supported a very broad conception of human security, 
focusing particularly on the personal empowerment and dignity of human beings. The CHS 
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defined human security as protecting “the vital core of all human lives in ways that 
enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment.”29 The CHS therefore went a step further 
in the debate by focusing on the specific needs for the living conditions of the individual. 
In the center of attention stood the idea of vital freedoms, which are to be understood as 
“inalienable fundamental rights and freedoms that are laid down in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments.”30 A variety of other 
countries supported such a broad understanding of human security, among them South 
Africa. 
The idea of human security became popular in UN institutions. In 2003, Annan 
established an Advisory Board on Human Security. In addition, the UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime in Vienna set up a Human Security Branch. The High-Level Panel (HLP) on 
Threats, Challenges and Change, which the Secretary-General later initiated in 2003, went 
back to a narrow approach to what the HLP called a “comprehensive system of collective 
security.”31 The HLP extended the concept of collective security to threats like HIV/AIDS, 
but did not take the step to the individual level. The state remained the main basis of 
security concerns – not surprisingly, human security is not mentioned in the report at all. 
Annan gave flexibility to the member states by allowing them to develop different 
approaches, which consequently fuelled equivocation. 
The European Union (EU) also took part in the evolution of human security. The 
report A Secure Europe in a Better World, which was introduced by Javier Solana, the 
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and which the 
European Council adopted in December 2003, clearly demonstrated their participation.32 
This step by the EU represented an interesting link between state security and human 
security, a sort of hybrid framework that brought the traditional military sphere together 
with socio-economic factors. Practical results of this report are the implementation of 
human security in regional EU co-operations such as the Euro-Med cooperation and the 
European Neighborhood Policy. 
In his own report In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human 
Rights for All, the UN Secretary-General surveyed the achievements of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) in March 2005. Human security is only mentioned once in 
the overall report due to the reservations some UN member states have regarding human 
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security.33 Still, he called on the member states “to perfect the triangle of development, 
freedom and peace.”34 The World Summit took place later the same year; the resulting 
Outcome Document embraced the responsibility to protect and asked the UN General 
Assembly for further elaboration in regard to human security. 
There have been many attempts to define human security, whereby two conceptual 
schools can be identified: an understanding in the broad and in the narrow sense. In the 
following, these two schools will be discussed. Finally, the author will offer an analytical 
framework comprised of seven points, upon which the concept of human security is built 
in this research paper. 
 
2.2.1. Human Security in the Broad Sense 
The UNDP definition of human security has created a very broad, holistic understanding of 
security. The authors of the UNDP report stated that “[w]ithout peace, there may be no 
development. But without development, peace may be threatened.”35 This statement must 
be seen in the context of a traditional understanding of security, which, according to the 
critics, should be opened up. States and international organizations alike were interested in 
including their agenda in the evolving concept of human security in the second half of the 
1990s, which led to a very broad meaning and a variety of definitions. In its broad 
conceptualization, human security not only includes freedom from fear but also freedom 
from want; underdevelopment and the infringement of human values are key issues that 
must be kept in mind as security threats. Secretary-General Annan described human 
security in the wider sense in a press release: 
 
Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It 
encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each 
individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her own potential.36 
 
Annan’s report We the peoples also makes use of this broad understanding. Hampson and 
Penny argue that in this regard, human security “provided a strong philosophical 
foundation for the MDGs”37 that were agreed upon at the Millennium Summit in 
September 2000. Wolfgang Benedek provides an alternative but supportive definition of 
human security, stating that it “is understood to mean the security of people against threats 
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to human dignity.“38 This broad school was purposefully separating itself from the former 
security conceptions prevalent during the Cold War. On this basis, Taylor Owen further 
defends the broad school, arguing that 
 
[a]lthough critics rightfully point to a potential ambiguity from grouping so many threats under one 
heading, clarity emerges if three key attributes of the broad conception are considered: its scope of 
coverage, its system-based approach to understanding causal relationships, and its focus on the vital 
core of the individual.39 
 
Supporters of a broad understanding take Owen’s defense up and argue further that a 
holistic approach to human security helps to allow an integrated and interdisciplinary 
analysis and policy design. Supporters do not see a need in itself to prioritize certain issues 
in human security because there is not a single policy agenda and the actors are too 
multiple and heterogeneous. On such a basis, Ramesh Thakur argues that 
 
human security is concerned with the protection of people from critical life-threatening dangers, 
regardless of whether the threats are rooted in anthropogenic activities or natural events, whether they 
lie within or outside states, and whether they are direct or structural.40 
 
Thakur defends his point of view by stating that there is value in inclusive definitions 
while admitting that the concept is analytically not that precise anymore. Like other 
proponents of a broad understanding, Thakur is aware of the inherent vagueness in such a 
conceptualization, but argues that the broad understanding is necessary to overcome and 
broaden the state security paradigm. Ferreira and Henk also believe that the new concept of 
human security should take precedence over other types of security and should 
 
include all conditions necessary for the survival, livelihood, and dignity of individuals along with the 
protection of their fundamental freedoms and human rights, guaranteeing them the enjoyment of good 
governance, education, health care, and access to the opportunities necessary to fulfill human 
potential.41 
 
Sabina Alkire goes even further by stating that the objective of human security is “to 
protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that advance human freedoms and human 
fulfillment.”42 She thus includes social or psychological aspects of vulnerability as critical 
for reaching a long-term flourishing of human security when those issues can be 
successfully resolved. In addition, some scholars like Jorge Nef hint at the complexity that 
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is behind violent conflict. Nef points out five interconnected sub-systems: culture, 
economy, ecosystem, polity and society. According to Nef, the complex interplay of these 
five systems makes it possible to capture all of the possible significant variables in violent 
conflict.43 The list of possible threats faced by individuals is long. These threats include 
organized crime, natural disaster, human trafficking, health and poverty. The UN has 
tackled these threats through various resolutions such as UNSC resolution 1308 (2000) on 
HIV/Aids or climate change in UNGA resolution 63/281 (2009) on climate change. The 
traditional state-orientated definition of security would not have considered such issues as 
a threat to security. 
It is important for a broad understanding of human security to be inclusive but clear. 
To remain clarity is an enormous task but can be accomplished if different types of 
security are pointed out, as the CHS does, to address causality and to find a certain 
threshold in order to separate human security from human development.44 
 
2.2.2. Human Security in a Narrow Sense 
A broad understanding of human security prohibits a clarification of the concept and plays 
into the hands of critics who are anxious to dismiss the entire concept. Thus, a narrow 
approach to human security maintains ‘freedom from fear’ while excluding ‘freedom from 
want,’ as suggested by the UNDP in its report. The narrow approach is clearly separating 
itself from international development and from the broad sense of human security by 
focusing exclusively on violent threats. This shift to a narrow understanding of human 
security is reflected in the UN Secretary-General’s report On the Protection of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict to the UNSC in 1999.45 Kofi Annan wrote about the multi-dimensional 
threats that civilians face in a war. He mentioned a range of threats, among them forced 
displacement and the denial of humanitarian assistance, which the Security Council must 
address to fulfill its duty to maintain peace and security.46 This report indicated Annan’s 
initial support for a narrow, violence-based conceptualization of human security. These 
concerns had an impact on the UN Security Council, which passed resolutions 1265 
(1999), 1738 (2006) and 1894 (2009)47 to protect civilians in armed conflicts; resolution 
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1314 (2000), 1612 (2005) and 1882 (2009) on children and armed conflicts; and resolution 
1325 (2000), 1820 (2008) and 1888 (2009) on women, peace and security. 
As mentioned above, the narrow interpretation of human security focuses on freedom 
from fear. Potential threats are limited to those directly related to violent conflicts like 
landmines or small arms. The Human Security Network, which includes countries like 
Austria, Ireland and Norway is in favor of this approach. Canada in particular takes a 
leading role and supports this kind of policy, as reflected in the 2001 ICISS report 
sponsored by the Canadian Government.48 
Proponents of a narrow definition argue that only a narrow understanding of human 
security is useful for academic and practical purposes. On the one hand, the narrow 
definition includes violence, which is not covered by traditional security concerns – 
violence either by the state against its own citizens or by non-state actors. On the other 
hand, the narrow definition excludes threats that undermine analytical clarity but closes the 
door to some threats. The focus of the academic debate on human security, however, 
would get lost when too many threats are included. In practice, human security has been 
successful in its narrow framework as exemplified by the Statute of Rome, which created 
the International Criminal Court (1998) or the Ottawa Treaty (1997), which completely 
banned all anti-personnel landmines. The international community pushed through the two 
agreements, which are, according to human security supporters, understood as part of the 
narrow concept of human security. 
Andrew Mack, one of the main proponents of a narrow school, believes that political 
violence and war are the main threats to communities and individuals, who run a high risk 
of being jeopardized by states or political actors. Mack is convinced that issues such as 
poverty or underdevelopment are a challenge to mankind. He argues, however, that the 
lack of analytical clarity poses a problem. Mack states that  
 
[t]here may be some advocacy value in expanding the human security threat agenda in such a manner, 
but it comes at a real analytic cost. If the term ‘insecurity’ embraces almost all forms of harm to 
individuals – from affronts to dignity to genocide – it loses any real descriptive power.49 
 
According to Mack, human security can be grounded on our common political and moral 
values and the concept can be broadened, but its use as an analytical tool then ultimately 
disappears.50 It is thus better to focus on organized violence against individuals or 
communities.51 Sexual violence has become a very important issue among these threats, as 
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it has become a central weapon in conflicts. The narrow understanding of the concept of 
human security therefore aims to guarantee freedom from fear, is closely linked up to 
traditional security, and places the emphasis on the individual. 
Yet critics of this narrow understanding claim that people do not die mainly as a direct 
consequence of violence, but rather due to structural violence or distributive injustice, like 
a lack of clean water or medical care.52 Mary Anderson already noted in the mid 1990s, 
however, that humanitarian approaches were not sufficient to tackle conflicts in an 
appropriate way. “Good work” alone would be inadequate as 
 
in the post-Cold War intra-societal conflicts […] mark a number of societies, [such that] NGO 
interventions – even when they are effective in humanitarian, development, or human terms – very often 
exacerbate the local tensions and suspicions that underlie the violence of the societies they seek to 
help.53 
 
With this statement Anderson underlines that humanitarian organizations focusing on 
‘freedom from want’ may have the opposite effect on civilians in violent conflicts. 
While it may sometimes seem that the two different schools of thought on human 
security are polarized, they are in fact not. Often, it is not a question of the intensity of a 
certain threat but of agreeing on appropriate policy responses.54 
 
2.2.3. Eight Points to Depict Human Security 
From its ambiguous understanding, the concept of human security is defined in various 
ways. One of the key issues for human security is to define the threats that humans are 
confronted with. Sabina Alkire divides the definitions of human security into three groups: 
(1) focus on the threat of war, internal conflict and domestic violence; (2) focus on the 
threats from preventable diseases and socio-economic hardship; and (3) combination of 
both of the former definitions.55 
The following presents a survey of the most important points human security should 
address as well as its limits. This limited scope of human security lines up with S. Neil 
MacFarlane’s idea of “conceptual added value and policy consequences”56 for human 
security. At the same time, MacFarlane warns against a simple re-labeling of issues like 
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human development or human rights in order to gain increased attention.57 Hence, eight 
points can be identified that help to clarify how human security shapes a new view on 
security and brings about a qualitative change. 
First, the state has to serve its own population. As a source of legitimacy, the state’s 
record of treating its own citizens is of importance. Consequently, states must maintain 
certain human rights standards and provide welfare to ensure a basis for their sovereignty 
and legitimacy. These standards apply to physical security, including the rule of law and an 
individual sense of security, as well as to material security, which includes the legitimacy 
of the public service or legitimate employment.58 In case the state is not willing or able to 
maintain minimum standards of human rights, the use of military force authorized by the 
UNSC as a last resort may be considered for human protection – this is where R2P comes 
into play. This intervention will not weaken the state’s sovereignty as long as its own 
population is treated in an appropriate way; on the contrary, after the Statute of Rome 
defined the minimal human rights standards, illegitimate interventions became foreclosed 
because they lack justification. R2P is also linked to articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, 
which assign a central role to the respect of universal human rights; the states have to 
fulfill their obligation to respect these rights. The peaceful solution of a conflict must 
always be given preference, not least because in many cases it is easier to solve and 
manage a conflict that way than a country destroyed by war. 
Second, states do not have intrinsic moral authority.59 States are only the means to an 
end, for political entities have been developed to guarantee the protection of individuals. 
Otfried Höffe writes about “the universal legal and political imperative [that] remains the 
task of contemporary society.”60 This idea thus challenges the traditional understanding of 
sovereignty, because state-power itself can be seen as a potential threat for the individual 
in terms of repression – the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia or the current regime in North 
Korea are examples. The state has to look inward to its own people, who form the basis of 
its legitimacy.  
Third, the individual is the center of attention and the object of reference. As Graham 
and Poku argue, security should not only be concerned with “individuals qua citizens” but 
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with “individuals qua persons.”61 Communities as well as sub-national, national or other 
groups are also referents of security, but the individual takes priority. The emergence of 
global threats requires a shift from a national to an individual security framework. 
Fourth, human security has the normative aim of protecting people against dangers that 
are critical and threaten their lives. Edward Newman addresses the problem that it is 
“possible to identify every thinkable threat” if the individual is the dependent variable.62 
Although criticized by many proponents, human security should therefore limit itself to 
physical threats faced by civilians. Otherwise, the concept will become too weak from an 
analytical point of view to be applied. 
Fifth, security is commonly viewed as the absence of physical violence, although 
human insecurity also encompasses human rights violations and the material consequences 
of conflicts. The most common reason for death is not directly related to the battlefield; 
instead, the indirect effects of war are the primary cause of death. Terror, ethnic cleansing 
or genocide deliberately target civilians, but hunger, disease and lack of health care and 
shelter are also threats.63 Human security in this research paper therefore concentrates on 
‘freedom from fear.’ The ‘freedom from want’ is not addressed, because it is impossible to 
have a situation in which human dignity is not harmed in some way; the ‘freedom from 
want’ potentially includes everything. Still, Roland Paris criticizes this point, stating that 
‘fear’ cannot be defined either. Thus, policy makers often speak of a ‘climate of insecurity’ 
to tackle this criticism. 
Sixth, the absence of violence is not the ultimate goal. Justice and sustainability are 
also included: these features must be kept in mind when constructing peace agreements or 
during crisis management.64 
Seventh, a bottom-up approach is necessary to grasp the local situation. Mediators 
must conduct intensive interviews to comprehend the roots of insecurity; knowledge and 
understanding of the particular context and circumstances of the local situation have to be 
kept in mind.65 Hence, human security gives a voice to otherwise marginalized groups.66 
Finally, a variety of new threats have had to be faced since the end of the Cold War, or 
they have at least been newly recognized during the past two decades. A good example is 
the phenomenon of displaced persons, which is a typical aspect of today’s conflicts. To 
tackle these phenomena includes the protection of civilians as a principal goal of the 
                                                
61 Graham, David T./Poku, Nana K. (2000), Migration, Globalisation and Human Security. London: Routledge, p. 17. 
62 Newman 2004. 
63 Kaldor/Martin/Selchow 2007:279. 
64 Kaldor/Martin/Selchow 2007:279-280. 
65 Kaldor/Martin/Selchow 2007:285. 
66 Hampson, Fen Osler (2004), “A Concept in Need of a Global Policy Response”, International Security Vol. 35(3), p. 
350. 
- 29 - 
international community; in addition further concepts have to be included such as conflict 
prevention, peace support operations, political accountability and public safety to solve 
conflicts and tackle the challenges faced. 
On this basis, human security can prove to work in practice. In the fight against 
landmines, human security has been successful in mobilizing the key actors to come to an 
agreement. Debiel and Werthes speak about multinational policy clusters that define 
problems and are able to formulate solutions for them – such as the ICISS or the CHS.67 
Furthermore, it is vital to underscore that human rights and human security are two 
different concepts, although they are sometimes confused. While human rights depict the 
legal entitlements of individuals, the word ‘security’ in human security refers to a certain 
level of urgency that is linked to an imminent disaster.68 Theorizing human security and 
actually putting it into practice must be differentiated; in other words, there is a gap 
between the concept or idea and the political practice of human security.69  
 
2.3. Human Security as a Theory 
 
Classical international relations theories have traditionally been complex and puzzling. 
Theory in IR is comprised of a set of statements that try to explain a particular set of 
events. Sometimes these theories seem to be impervious because they try so hard to be 
coherent that in the end they are not able to explain reality. The long-standing traditions of 
realism, liberalism/idealism and radicalism had to carry an ideological burden, and made 
sure that IR and international security were comprehended according to their framework.70 
To better understand classical IR approaches, a useful distinction can be made through 
the application of two theoretical approaches, explanatory theory and normative theory. 
The first tries to comprehend why an event takes place and gives us an understanding of 
why unexpected incidents happen. Most explanatory theorists try to emulate the natural 
sciences and accordingly apply scientific methods. They even assume that it is possible to 
predict future developments, which is obviously proven by the unexpected end of the Cold 
War. The second category, normative theory, is based on moral assumptions about how 
things ought to be and how they might realistically change.71 Both theories are too limited 
in their perspective, because it is necessary to know what the world is like as well as what 
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it ought to be like. This research paper is, therefore, based, as suggested by Reus-Smit and 
Duncan, on both explanatory and normative theory in order to combine their strengths.72 
Both have important dimensions in international relations: a hybrid form is applied here. 
With the end of the Cold War, neo-realism lost its predominant position in IR. 
International security, a subfield of IR, moved from pessimism to optimistic, cosmopolitan 
conceptions; new paradigms like human security became more popular.73 But key 
assumptions of realist IR like anarchy, sovereignty and the inevitability of war were also 
questioned in a constructivist turn in the early 1990s.74 A general shift from realist 
perspectives toward either liberal ones like human security or toward radical ones like the 
critical security approach of the Copenhagen school took place. 
Human security has been an influential re-conceptualization of security on a viable 
theoretical basis since the Cold War and has gained popularity in the academic community 
as well as in policy-making circles. The strength of human security lies in its normative 
framework, which can claim universality – the security and protection of the individual. At 
the same time, human security also relies on an explanatory conception because it is very 
closely linked to practice, as its application by various international actors proves. 
From the beginning, UNDP’s introduction of the term, human security has been used 
to deconstruct traditional national security discourses and to reshape the understanding to 
security. New parameters like the economy, the environment and health must be included 
in order to gain a holistic picture of security. The concept of security has to be broadened 
in order to deal with earlier marginalized factors that have an important impact on people’s 
everyday lives. In the words of the UNDP, ‘people-centered’ perspective is needed.75 The 
reference object is no longer the state as suggested by classical security studies, but 
includes all human lives, which makes the mandate of human security universal. Human 
security proponents vigorously underline this fact, because rogue states all too often have 
threatened their own populations rather than protecting them. This debate ties in with a 
longstanding debate about security’s object of reference that dates back to Kant’s idealist 
philosophies during the Enlightenment. 
Mack argues that “in the last one hundred years, far more people have died at the 
hands of their own governments than have been killed by foreign armies.”76 For this reason 
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he rejects realism because he believes that the realist paradigm is simply not able to deal 
with the threat a state can pose to its own people. Realism had been developed to explain 
inter-state wars, of which there is only a small minority today. According to Mack, the 
origin of human security is liberalism, as its foundations are the Universal Human Rights 
Declaration, the Geneva Convention and the UN Charter.77 
In the theoretical discourse the debate about the definition of security is of importance. 
Ken Booth argues that security derives “from ways in which different political theories 
conceive the structures and processes of human security, the entities that make up social 
and political realities, the major threats to privileged values and groups, the agents who can 
change things, and so on.”78 David Roberts expands on this thought further by stating that 
security does not lose all its meaning by including concepts such as human security. 
Security rather depends on “what security means to those defining it. […] What constitutes 
security is as political a debate as any other”79 and therefore suggests human insecurity. 
This point of view will hardly find mainstream acceptance as Roberts further argues that 
“[t]he epistemologies and ontologies of Neo-realism and Realism are not equipped to 
conceive of security beyond their own terms of reference.”80 Nonetheless, human security 
is used as a viable IR theory in the field of international security. 
Still, human security’s main task is to be accepted by overcoming the constraints in 
mainstream academia and by that finding solutions how to best protect people. Owen 
argues that these constraints result from the “sheer dominance of the traditional security 
paradigm,”81 but also because of the failure thus far to reach a consensus on whether 
human security should have a broad or a narrow conception. The more useful approach 
seems to be one that is narrow and manageable, to reduce the ‘laundry list’ of threats,82 as 
explained in the previous sub-chapter. It is necessary to follow certain criteria when 
applying human security; these will create a threshold of severity that defines the 
conditions for when to act. R2P, which was issued by the ICISS and is dealt with in 
chapter 3, provides a good example of when to monitor and identify situations in which a 
security infrastructure is needed to deal effectively with a threat. Human security can be 
seen as a ‘bridging concept’ that brings in line the need for stabilization in the short run 
and the need to improve the structural conditions in the long run.83 
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2.4. Criticism of Human Security 
 
The debate on human security has produced a wide range of literature. Unpopularity or 
ignorance certainly do not form obstacles for this evolving concept as multiple actors use it 
both in theory and in practice. The problem, however, is that nearly every threat humanity 
faces can easily be included under the umbrella of human security. In case the scope of the 
concept becomes very wide almost everything can be perceived as a security threat, and 
urgency and collective responsibility are therefore lost.84 When issues like development, 
inequality or poverty are included, the substantive meaning is lost. All too often human 
security is fiercely criticized as having “no clear theoretical grounding”85 and as not useful 
out of confusion.86 
Criticism has accompanied human security since the very beginning; in particular, its 
analytical ambiguity and political inappropriateness have been controversial. Edward 
Newman argues that human security is normatively attractive but analytically weak. In 
case the individual is the dependent variable, Newman criticizes that virtually everything is 
a security threat. Moreover, Newman sees as arbitrary, the inclusion of certain threats 
while leaving others out.87 At the same time, the more harms that are labeled as security 
threats, the harder it is to gain any analytical value and to differentiate between the threats. 
This research paper has thus outlined seven points to conceptualize human security and to 
avoid a ‘shopping list’ of threats. 
It is hard for human security to solve this chicken-and-egg dilemma. There remains 
doubt whether a proper theoretical grounding should be developed first or whether theory 
should be adjusted according to factual experience. Solving this question is important 
because Owen argues that real world application has been one realism’s great successes.88 
This research paper attempts to overcome this critique by limiting the threats according to 
R2P threshold of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing in 
order to bridge the normative gap between theory and practice. 
Critics further hold that although the political power constellation after the Cold War 
has changed, it would be wrong to claim that everything has changed. Inter-state wars are 
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still a threat to security, some regions of the world still experience security dilemmas, and 
non-proliferation remains an important issue.89 This line of critique is correct in that inter-
state wars still take place, but all available statistical data prove their decline. Non-
proliferation is indeed an issue, which may be misinterpreted within the framework of 
human security; for this purpose, a range of theories is at hand to explain the nuclear policy 
of states. 
Moreover, human security may be used for humanitarian interventions that rest on a 
‘cosmopolitan’ belief system.90 Thomas and Tow argue, however, that such interventions 
are merely an ideological instrument of neo-imperialism that justify Western policy 
initiatives and interventions based on national interests.91 Understanding the state poses a 
further problem in human security. Human security must recognize the Janus-faced nature 
of the state in order to understand that it can be both the cause of insecurity as well as the 
‘protector.’ It would be fatal for human security to look for a cosmopolitan alternative 
instead of reconstructing failed states.92 These idealist thoughts from the early 1990s were 
removed and are no longer on the human security agenda. Some others criticize that 
middle powers like Canada and Japan have put human security at the top of their foreign 
policy agendas in order to reinforce their position in the international community, because 
in traditional military terms they stood no chance. Here, normatively argued, an arm’s race 
is no longer the only way to make one’s voice heard in the international arena – a ‘soft’ 
security approach also receives attention. On the other side of the coin, human security 
may be viewed as a part of human development and human rights, it has only been re-
labeled. Paula Liotta uses the term ‘vulnerability’ rather than threat when discussing 
human security, because the term can otherwise be broadened to include insecurities that 
are not linked to immediate violence.93 
Two main concerns are stressed. On the one hand it is seen as problematic that human 
security in a broad sense uses a holistic approach that undermines effective causal analysis. 
The combination of “elements as diverse as violent conflict, poverty and social well-being 
lacks the degree of analytical separation necessary for the analysis of dependent and 
independent variables.”94 On the other hand, human security is criticized by Bah as already 
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too broad a concept, which makes it extremely difficult for policymakers to know what to 
prioritize.95 
 
2.5. Human Security in Africa 
 
For Africa, the new paradigm of human security is of significance. In the post-Cold War 
era, 70% of the people in violent conflicts in Africa have been civilians.96  The UN 
Security Council took a step forward in August 2003 when it authorized the deployment of 
ECOWAS in Liberia (ECOMIL) through resolution 1497, to counteract the “effects on the 
humanitarian situation, including the tragic loss of countless innocent lives, in that country, 
and its destabilizing effect on the sub-region.” Shortly afterwards, UNSC resolution 1509 
(2003) authorized the use of force by UN peacekeeping-missions to protect civilians, 
which has to be seen in light of human security realms. The UN had learnt its lesson from 
the infamous deployment of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), which 
had lacked the mandate and manpower to stop the disastrous events.97 
In contrast, conflicts like the one in Darfur still represent an enormous challenge to 
Africa and the African Union as well as to the international community and, in particular, 
the UN. First it is necessary to create a situation in which humanitarian organizations are 
able to access the area and to meet the basic needs of the people after they have been 
attacked and displaced. Organizations like the UNHCR are often accused of failing to 
provide aid in a transparent, effective way. In the case of Darfur, there is a lack of 
leadership; the Government of Sudan (GoS) successfully puts pressure on Western actors 
whose concern over displaced Darfuris is diminishing.98 The international community is 
still not able to effectively deal with IDPs, and the camps remain ill equipped and insecure.  
 
2.6. Conclusions 
 
With the end of the Cold War the world has changed. The field of security has undergone a 
dramatic shift. New concepts like human security rest on the core principle that the center 
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of attention should no longer be on the state but rather on the individual. Thousands of 
people still die every year because of the violent threats with which they are confronted. 
These deaths, however, are not because of inter-state wars but rather results from intra-
state or civil war and the resulting diseases or famines. It is important to note that not all 
threats should and can be included in human security because thousands of potential risks 
are possible. Individuals and communities must be rescued from the most serious harms 
they face, in particular physical violence and its direct consequences. 
The initial broad focus of human security has to be seen in the context of the break-up 
of the traditional state-based security view that dominated during the Cold War period. 
Until now, a broad understanding of human security is pushing its agenda although the 
analytical clarity is missing and easily human security and human development can get 
confused. A narrow concept proves to be more useful for conceptualizing and applying 
human security. In case an abusive state is not able or willing to protect the citizens on its 
territory or even supports measures against them, the international community is required 
to act. The ICISS has framed this idea as the ‘Responsibility to Protect,’ which will be 
dealt with in the next chapter. 
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3. The Development of the Responsibility to Protect 
 
As human security gained in importance during the 1990s, the debate on averting mass 
atrocities, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide also gained relevance. 
This chapter first discusses the roots of R2P and humanitarian intervention. Then, the work 
of the ICISS and its 2001 report is shown and interpreted. Thirdly, the World Summit 
Outcome of 2005 is presented, in which all UN member states endorsed R2P. Fourthly, the 
status of R2P in international law – whether it is a concept, norm, or principle – will be 
discussed. Finally, the author will outline R2P’s relation to the UN Security Council. 
 
3.1. Debate on Humanitarian Intervention 
 
Humanitarian intervention has become a key cause of controversy in international 
relations. The issues involved in humanitarian intervention, like sovereignty, human rights, 
justice, or power, create a very broad scope for dispute. For some, the suffering of those 
who cannot protect themselves should be stopped, while others point to the fact that some 
form of self-interest will always play a role in humanitarian intervention, and therefore 
making it unjust and fallacious. 
The idea of humanitarian intervention has deep roots and has always been 
controversial in some way. When the European sea powers started to colonize the world, 
the question of taking military action for the safety of alien people grew important. The 
Spanish tried to justify their conquest of Latin America; Francisco de Vitoria (1492-1546), 
known as one of the ‘fathers of international law,’99 pointed out that an intervention was 
necessary to save indigenous people. The right authority must remain in the state but in 
case a state commits grave offences against its people, the stage to war is justified.100 
According to Alex Bellamy, this “natural law approach to the Just War tradition […] 
remain[s] intact in one form or another.”101 In the 16th century, the English also argued that 
they had to intervene in the Netherlands to save the Dutch from Spanish tyranny. Hugo 
Grotius (1583-1645), the famous Dutch jurist and philosopher, expanded on de Vitoria’s 
ideas. He maintained that in fact an intervention is possible albeit he did not call it that 
way. It is justifiable, according to Grotius, to resort to war when a state is maltreating its 
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own subjects. This idea became a legal principle known as liberum ius ad bellum, an 
acceptable justification to engage in a war and was further developed by contract theorists 
like John Locke. 
Sovereign states in the modern sense started to emerge with the Peace of Westphalia in 
1648. The Westphalian system brought an end to the religious wars in Europe, states were 
placed on an equal footing with each other, and sovereignty was linked to political rulers, 
who were above the law. Significantly, states were no longer supposed to intervene in each 
other’s internal affairs. Often, however, sovereignty meant immunity from any outside 
inquiries or sanctions. Political rulers were able to perpetrate crimes against their own 
population and were garnered indifference from the outside. 
Only from the 19th century on did states begin to question the strict prohibition of 
intervention, mainly due to the events surrounding the French Revolution. Important 
landmarks were the foundation of the Red Cross by Henri Dunant and the first Geneva 
Convention in 1864, which provided the protection of civilians to a certain extent during 
the time of war. Recognized ‘humanitarian interventions’ did indeed take place in the 19th 
century although they were all driven by strategic interest and were characterized by the 
defense of Christians in the Ottoman Empire through European powers.102 
With the dawn of the 20th century, the first massacres and atrocities became apparent 
which accompanied this bloody century in its entirety. The British started with the set-up 
of the first concentration camps during the Boer War in 1901. The Germans followed with 
the brutal repression of the Herero rebellion in South West Africa, which is also known as 
the first genocide of the 20th century.103 The first huge massacre was Turkish killing of 
Armenians in 1915. Stalin, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong killed millions of innocent 
civilians directly or indirectly. Nothing has been more absurd, though, than the Shoah by 
the Nazis, annihilating some six million Jews in a systematic state-sponsored and well-
organized manner. In addition, they murdered Slavs, Roma and Sinti, homosexuals and 
other so-called ‘subhuman people.’ All of these crimes mentioned have one thing in 
common. The world was sufficiently provided with information about the cruelties but 
political leaders kept indifferent towards the fact that civilians were being slaughtered in 
some countries in the world. Rather, they tended to look on their own economic and 
security interests. 
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In 1929, the Kellog-Briand Pact outlawed war as an instrument for state policy with 
the exception of self-defense or the sanction of the League of Nations. This principle was 
also taken up in the UN Charter. The foundation of the United Nations in 1945 rested on 
the experience of the horrors in World War II and the desire to avert them in the future.104 
On this basis, the UN Charter was set up to guarantee international peace and security. The 
preamble of the Charter reaffirms the “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person [and] in the equal rights of men and women.”105 The UN 
member states were guaranteed territorial integrity in article 2.4 and political independence 
within the domestic jurisdiction in article 2.7 of the Charter. Sovereignty remained mostly 
untouched by external constraints. It is, however, the responsibility of the UN Security 
Council to protect people from gross and systematic human rights violations and to halt 
genocide, which basically enables the UNSC to overrule the principle of non-intervention 
within the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charta.106 The character of the Cold War with 
its system of bipolarity and the institutional set-up of the Security Council, which allowed 
the five permanent members107 to veto any UNSC resolution, has often resulted in a 
blockade of the most powerful institution in the UN family. Furthermore, the UN grew 
from 51 members in 1945 to 159 at the end of the Cold War because of decolonization. 
The newly created states feared that powerful states, or even worse, their own former 
colonial masters, would undermine their authority and thus enforced a traditional view of 
sovereignty. In addition, they were proud of their newly gained sovereignty and cautious 
concerning their fragile status as henceforth independent states in the world community. 
As a consequence, the interests of states and not those of people were at the center of the 
narrowly read interpretation of the UN Charter. 
During the Cold War a couple of ‘humanitarian interventions’ could be observed, 
although they were interestingly not based on humanitarian grounds.108 India intervened in 
1971 unilaterally in East Pakistan on the grounds of self-defense. The army of West 
Pakistan committed mass murder in what is today known as Bangladesh, but India was 
mainly interested in weakening West Pakistan.109 On the same basis, Vietnam invaded 
Cambodia in 1978. Despite the fact that the horrors of the Pol Pot regime, which 
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annihilated some 1.7 million Cambodians in only four years,110 were widely known, 
Western countries condemned the intervention. At the same time the West did not oppose 
against Tanzania’s overthrow of Uganda’s dictator Idi Amin in 1979, although many 
similarities to the case of Cambodia can be seen.111 In the same year France initiated a 
coup d’état in the Central African Empire of Jean-Bédel Bokassa after a massacre against 
school children to reestablish a republic and bring the former president David Dacko back 
to power.112 In all four cases, the respective governments acted against their own 
populations and were involved in serious human rights violations. The intervening 
countries mostly had (geo)strategic and national interests in mind, nonetheless they argued 
with self-defense. 
Many observers believed that with the end of the Cold War, the UN could fulfill the 
role it was designated for its Charter. With the intervention in Iraq to free Kuwait in 1991, 
a new chapter of humanitarian interventions was opened. US-President George H. W. Bush 
announced a “New World Order […] where the United Nations, freed from cold war 
stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom 
and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.”113 In a way this hope 
expressed by Bush was achieved, because the strict and narrow understanding of state 
sovereignty of the Cold War years was over, the importance of human rights increased 
enormously. In another way this is doubtful because of a change in the nature of war from 
an inter-state to an intra-state level. Being confronted with ‘new wars,’ earlier 
understandings of conflict were confused. Actors have become active on both the global as 
well as the local level; the public and private sphere got mixed up. Massive human rights 
violations are used to strengthen the own agenda, organized crime profits from continued 
violence.114 
Since 1990, humanitarian interventions took place in 20 states with deployment of 
troops to protect civilians, although other motives were involved as well.115 The 1990s saw 
efforts to establish consent on how to tackle humanitarian crisis. Bernard Kouchner, the 
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co-founder of Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), in particular, vindicated ‘the right to 
intervene’ to protect endangered individuals but he met a lot of suspicion by UN member 
states. Under extreme circumstances coercive policies might be indispensable. In case 
diplomatic efforts fail and violence is on its way, the moral and political need arises for the 
international community at large to act and safe the threatened population.116 
Although a ‘humanitarian intervention’ might have an honorable basis, many fear out 
of their own history a mission civilisatrice117 out of their own history and therefore an 
unjust interference into internal affairs by powerful states. Throughout the 1990s a fierce 
argument had raged about humanitarian intervention. In particular the ‘right’ to intervene 
was questioned by arguing that it is by definition arbitrary. Controversy is generated by the 
fact that rescue missions lie in the reach of power of the interveners and not of those who 
are ‘rescued.’ An asymmetric power structure by the potential intervener is easily formed. 
Those who are going to be protected probably have never asked for help or protection – 
but will be dependent on the intervening power. As Deutscher has put it, “[u]nilateral 
action will always be seen as self-interested and suspect.”118 In other words, it is easy to 
doubt the purity of the interveners’ motives and to denounce their intents as self-serving 
agendas hiding behind the pretense of humanitarianism.119 Therefore, James Pattison 
argues that Security Council authorization is needed to make an intervention legal because 
a humanitarian intervention will be most likely be illegal.120 In contrast, Fernando Tesón 
brings up the argument that there is a legal right to intervene in customary international 
law, both authorized and not authorized. Examples given are from ECOWAS and its 
interventions in Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1997).121 Pattison dissents Tesón with 
what he calls the ‘Trojan Horse,’ that humanitarian intervention is used all too easily as an 
abusive intervention guided by self-interest.122 The UN-approved intervention in Haiti in 
1994 caused debate about that. Although it was seen as a threat to international peace and 
security by the UNSC, the magnitude of the threat was minimal. In fact, the only problem 
was the non-democratic regime and the president that was ousted in 1991 with a military 
coup d’état. Other countries with a similar situation, however, were not considered such a 
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grave threat by the UNSC.123 Simon Chesterman has called this behavior of the UNSC as 
deciding upon “ambiguous resolutions and conflicting interpretations”124 of definitions like 
the threat of international peace and security. Therefore, also UNSC resolutions are 
politicized and action under Chapter VII depend on the national interest of great powers 
instead of a coherent reading of the Charta. 
During the 1990s, the UN Security Council authorized military actions in Somalia, 
Haiti, Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. All those missions were characterized by the failure 
to protect the local population. In Somalia, the US-led intervention in 1992 had almost a 
purely humanitarian basis. Since the shocking incident that 18 US soldiers were dragged to 
death through the Somali capital Mogadishu in October 1993, no US soldier has been sent 
to a UN mission in Africa. This trauma strongly influenced the events in Rwanda. 
Although the White House was aware about pre-genocidal incidents of Hutus against 
Tutsis, no action was taken or concern raised in the UNSC. Rwanda itself was ironically a 
non-permanent member of the UNSC while approximately 800,000 Tutsis and moderate 
Hutus were slaughtered in only 100 days in early summer 1994. The Canadian general 
Romeo Dallaire who was in charge of the UN forces during that time in Rwanda estimated 
that 5,000 troops would have been enough to intervene and avert the killings.125 A year 
later the UN failed again to protect civilians in the Bosnian town Srebrenica. Although the 
UN declared the town a ‘safe area,’ Serbian units massacred more than 8,000 Bosniaks in 
July 1995. These two events smudged the reputation of the United Nations around the 
world; the organization was discredited for ‘collective failure.’ UN action in the 1990s was 
consequently being perceived “as too little too late, misconceived, poorly resourced, 
poorly executed, or all of the above.”126 
This view did not change with the controversial debate on the humanitarian 
intervention in Kosovo. In the light of allegedly gross violations of human rights, many 
actors in the West together with Kofi Annan claimed that another Rwanda or Srebrenica 
must not be allowed to take place. Nonetheless no agreement in the UNSC was found 
because Russia threatened to play the veto card. Therefore, NATO started to operate 
against Yugoslavia with bombings on humanitarian grounds to avoid mass killings by the 
Yugoslav army against Kosovar Albanians. The Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo (IICK) declared the NATO bombings of 1999 ‘illegal but legitimate,’ arguing that 
it would be necessary to establish a set of criteria defining a threshold for using force so 
                                                
123 Hehir 2008:19. 
124 Chesterman, Simon (2002), Just War or Just Peace?. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 5. 
125 Dallaire, Romeo (2003), Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. London: Random House. 
126 Evans, Gareth/Sahnoun, Mohamed (2002), “The Responsibility to Protect”, Foreign Affairs Vol. 81(6), p. 100. 
- 42 - 
that, in case the Security Council is blocked in extreme emergencies, an intervention will 
be legitimate despite lacking UNSC authorization.127 
Adam Roberts has summed up the debate on intervention: 
 
Legal prohibitions on forcible military intervention in the territory of sovereign states have a long 
history and are one of the key foundations of the system of sovereign states. The undoubted fact that 
their effect was limited does not negate their fundamental importance. They helped to establish the 
principle that non-intervention was the norm; and when interventions did occur, those responsible 
generally felt it necessary to produce detailed justifications based on the special and pressing 
circumstances of the case at hand.128 
 
The debate on humanitarian intervention is therefore closely linked to international law, 
the UN system and its Charta. In the decade after the Cold War, optimism concerning 
human rights enforcement was predominant. The human security agenda strongly 
influenced UN organizations, humanitarian organizations and NGOs that pressured 
powerful states to act in case of humanitarian emergencies. Until today, a narrow reading 
of international law that has been predominant that although there might be a moral duty to 
intervene even militarily but there is no right to conduct an intervention on the ground of 
humanitarian concerns. Humanitarian interventions can be both, a threat and a blessing to 
citizens and states. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 re-opened the debate on 
humanitarian intervention and the century-long debate on sovereignty, justice and human 
rights and dignity continued. 
 
3.2. The ICISS and its 2001 Report 
 
Conscience-shocking atrocities shattered the world throughout the 1990s. With the 
‘humanitarian intervention’ in Kosovo in 1999 it became obvious that new strategies are 
necessary to tackle the obstacles the post-Cold War world was confronted with. The 
response of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was an 
article in the influential weekly The Economist to solve the ambiguities the international 
community faced. Annan claimed that 
 
[s]tate sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined – not least by the forces of globalization 
and international cooperation. […] When we read the Charter today, we are more than ever conspicuous 
that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.129 
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The Secretary-General argued for an individual sovereignty that states have to serve their 
citizens and each individual has its own sovereignty enshrined in the UN Charter. 
Furthermore, Annan called for a framework that should redefine and clarify the problem of 
internal humanitarian crisis, including also the use of force. This article of Annan did not 
have much impact on the controversy about Kosovo; yet it outlined the debate ahead in the 
following years of the dilemma between inaction in Rwanda 1994 and unilateral action in 
Kosovo 1999.  
In response to the dilemma of intervention, the Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd 
Axworthy initiated an international commission on behalf of the Canadian Government to 
bridge the concepts of state sovereignty and intervention. The International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty130 was introduced in September 2000 and had 
twelve months of research and debating at its disposal before it would present its practical 
findings. Former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans and Algerian diplomat 
Mohamed Sahnoun chaired the commission,131 which was set up outside the UN for 
political reasons and was sponsored by Canada.132 Annan stated three concerns that should 
be tackled: 1) humanitarian intervention should be not an arbitrary smoke screen for 
interference in sovereignty; 2) it should not encourage secessionists; and 3) the selection 
criteria which will be applied in cases of humanitarian emergency.133 The Secretary-
General asserted that “armed intervention must always remain the option of last resort.”134 
In the 1980s the Brundtland Commission developed the term ‘sustainable 
development’ to amalgamate economic development and environmental protection. 
Foreign Minister Axworthy expressed the hope that the same would happen with the 
concepts of intervention and sovereignty.135 Indeed, Evans soon coined the term 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ in November 2000 to create a positive connection between the 
two terms in a deliberate way.136 R2P was received favorably at the Commissions’ 
roundtables, because it shifted the focus from military intervention to the victim’s 
perspective.137 Altogether, the ICISS was convened five times and a series of eleven 
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regional roundtables in all parts of the world was organized. In addition to the meetings, 
also other workshops were organized to involve influential actors around the globe, to 
reach out and achieve a broad consensus. According to Bellamy, mainly Evans, Ignatieff 
and Thakur were those who actually wrote the final report.138 
Evans himself points out that the ICISS made four main contributions to the debate. 
Firstly and most important the Commission was able to turn the debate from ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ to a responsibility that protects endangered people. Secondly, and linked to 
the first, is a new understanding of sovereignty. Instead of controlling its own people, a 
state has primarily a responsibility to protect individuals. Thirdly, Evans is convinced that 
the Commission set out clear criteria what the R2P in practice should mean and that it 
would be much more than military intervention. Finally, in case coercive action is 
necessary, it has to be legal and legitimate.139 However, in the course of the debates the 
Commission did not succeed in getting through criteria to guide the Security Council how 
to deal with interventions. This point was seen as important because it restored the hope 
that the tarnished accountability of the UNSC would improve. Moreover, the primacy of 
the Security Council was doubted and it was suggested that also regional organizations 
should legitimately get the possibility to intervene – even without the consent of the 
UNSC. A successful example was the intervention of ECOWAS in Liberia, which later 
was endorsed retroactively by the Security Council. 
In mid-August 2001 the report of the ICISS was completed. A month later the report 
should have been presented but the release was delayed by 9/11 until December 2001. It 
was clearly stated that R2P should not be related in any way to the ‘war against terrorism’ 
because these two approaches rest on two completely different belief systems; the first 
grounds on human security while the latter is based on traditional concerns of state security 
and realpolitik.140 Annan appreciated the report as “the most comprehensive and carefully 
thought-out response we have seen to date” about intervention and state sovereignty.141 In 
contrast to humanitarian intervention which non-Western countries associate with strong, 
powerful countries imposing their will on the weak, R2P considers “the point of view of 
those seeking or needing support and acknowledges that the primary responsibility to 
protect rests with the state concerned.”142 Hence, the new concept was able to bridge the 
division between intervention and sovereignty, the report underlined. In the future, the 
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relationship between the two concepts would be complementary and not contradictory 
anymore. A dual responsibility was set up, also called ‘sovereignty as responsibility.’ The 
host state is responsible for the protection of its citizens internally but in addition external 
actors, too, carry a responsibility to observe the situation and intervene in case of 
humanitarian emergencies.143 The individual should be guaranteed the most basic human 
right, the right to live.  
The state has the duty to act as a moral agent and cannot rely on realpolitik anymore. 
Overall, the report strongly reflected the concept of human security as the individual has 
been brought into focus, the dignity of communities to live without insecurity as well as 
the international community’s responsibility to protect individuals and communities that 
would not be able to defend themselves. Moreover, article 24 of the Charter was put to the 
center, as the UN Security Council should maintain international peace and security.  
The report of the ICISS was a step ahead because not only intervention but also 
prevention and rebuilding were added to a continuum of steps. This conception has been 
described as an agreement, which rests on three pillars, although it is not identical to the 
ICISS concept.144 Thus, three dimensions of R2P were developed, which the international 
community is morally obliged to carry: to prevent, to react and to rebuild. The three pillars 
of R2P have to be seen as a whole set of strategies in order to tackle humanitarian 
emergencies like genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. It is 
important to state that the primary responsibility rests within the state; only if the host state 
“manifestly fails” to protect its vulnerable population, the international community is 
required to conduct measures. 
 
3.2.1. The Responsibility to Prevent 
The first pillar of R2P, the responsibility to prevent, is the most important one according to 
the ICISS.145 The overall goals are to save lives and prevent atrocities because military 
reaction from the outside to massive human rights violations within a state will imply 
additional harm for individuals. Therefore, the responsibility to prevent dedicates its 
commitment to the root causes of a conflict in order to avoid direct prevention efforts in 
the future. Moreover, the point is brought up that prevention is saving money. It is far 
cheaper to respond in a preventive way with than coercive action or post-conflict 
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reconstruction. In particular, neighboring states have an interest in prevention, as Evans 
and Sahnoun argue, because the consequences of internal conflicts in the neighborhood 
easily generate a refugee problem and a destabilization of the whole region, which is not in 
the national interest.146 
The problem is, however, that the potential root causes for violent conflicts are 
enormously multifarious. Thomas Weiss argues that the responsibility to prevent “is a 
superficially attractive but highly unrealistic way” to add an additional layer of prevention 
to humanitarian intervention; on the contrary, prevention “obscures the essence of the most 
urgent part,” which is intervention.147 Evans on the other hand argues that the world’s 
worst cases of genocide were widely known but the signs were not taken seriously enough 
to take the necessary steps.148 The ICISS identified four key dimensions of the 
responsibility to prevent: a political, an economic, a legal and a military dimension.149 
The emphasis of the responsibility to prevent is on non-military means. Such measures 
include 1) positive economic incentives like human rights observers, trade missions, 
development cooperation or cultural exchange; 2) negative sanctions in the military sector 
like arms embargoes or ending military co-operation; 3) negative sanctions in the 
economic sector as financial sanctions, restrictions on access to resources like oil or 
diamonds; and 4) diplomatic and political measures such as suspension from regional or 
international bodies.150 
It seems to be possible to predict with certain accuracy both that and where mass 
atrocities might occur. Although it is hard if not impossible to say exactly when it will 
happen, the chronic danger of mass killings remains.151 Bearing that in mind, it remains 
critical that a mechanism is developed to enable R2P to identify the probability of 
genocide and to react in the earliest possible stage. 
Two main problems have been identified by the Commission: one relates to states that 
will resist external interference by arguing that it is intervention and the other involves the 
legitimization of rebels by a third-party intervention. To solve this problem ICISS has 
recommended international actors to be sensitive and cautious. Bellamy additionally points 
out that it is not clear how signs of an early warning system would translate into a 
commitment of states and what the actual reaction would be like.152 Moreover, Bellamy is 
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skeptical that the ICISS dedicated only nine of its 85 pages to prevention while the 
majority, 32 pages, is devoted to intervention.153 
 
3.2.2. The Responsibility to React 
The second pillar of R2P is the responsibility to react, it therefore relates to the question 
when to intervene. The ICISS struggled hard to come to terms about this issue and the 
report sets a “high threshold” that should limit interventions only to “extreme cases,”154 
which basically means large-scale loss of life and ethnic cleansing, underway or 
anticipated. In the future, situations like in Rwanda 1994 but also in Kosovo 1999 should 
be obviated. In the first case the UNSC had not reacted at all, while in the latter Russia and 
China threatened with a veto. Such situations hopefully will not occur again in the future 
with the suggestions of the ICISS. In the first place the responsibility for individuals lies 
within the sovereign state. The second layer of responsibility is the domestic authorities 
and in case the first two are failing the responsibility is referred to the international 
community.155 The ICISS has come to the conclusion that if the Security Council fails to 
act, the UN General Assembly should be addressed. If that fails too, regional organizations 
bear the responsibility to act; otherwise coalitions of the willing may also be created to 
protect the threatened people.156 Interestingly, Evans and other supporters of R2P have 
never referred to the possibility of a coalition of the willing after the war in Iraq in 2003. It 
became obvious that such an approach would undermine the concept of R2P. Nonetheless, 
the international community should not only have the right but also the duty to intervene 
even militarily and stop the mass atrocities or genocide in case the responsibility to prevent 
fails. This would finally fulfill the duty which is already stated in the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) that genocide, which is 
“never invoked, even in the clearest of cases”157 has to be prevented. Now, the ICISS was 
able to shift the focus of the debate from the outside intervention towards the people 
suffering from violence.158 
However, a consensus on how the responsibility to react should look like has by far 
not been reached. The crucial question has been who would be supposed to act and how. 
China was throughout the course of the ICISS discussions against any kind of force that 
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would be beyond the scope of the UNSC. Russia supported R2P but it was in favor of 
China’s stance that no action should be taken without UNSC approval because it would 
otherwise subvert the Charter.159 This comes unsurprisingly because the P5 and other 
major powers will not accept a military intervention although all criteria of R2P might be 
met. In contrast, Deutscher argues that R2P is a pro-sovereignty doctrine.160 
With the pressure from important UN member states, R2P was watered down in 
crucial areas by the Canadian Government and Ramesh Thakur to reach a consensus. 
Bellamy points out three important areas where R2P was weakened in substance: 1) an 
unauthorized intervention would not be possible; 2) a just cause threshold and 
precautionary principles were put aside; and 3) a limited use of the veto by the P5 was 
dropped.161 These three points in the area of the responsibility to react are missing in the 
use of R2P today. Enormous possibilities to deal with violent conflicts and halt mass 
atrocities would have presented themselves in case these three points had been 
implemented. 
Still, the report presented additional ‘operational principles’ to guide decision makers 
by means of six principles that should be followed. The ICISS has insisted that ‘right 
intention’ and ‘just cause’ justify military action only when the primary motive is to avert 
or halt human suffering. It was planned to add “serious violations of humanitarian law” as 
a just cause, which had to be dropped later because of the pressure of critics.162 
Additionally, the ‘right authority’ according to international law has to approve action – a 
clear link back to the UNSC. This is the most controversial principle because in the 
Kosovo crisis the Council was blocked and therefore the ICISS was also looking for 
alternatives. In the end, the UNSC was the only legitimate authority to decide on peace and 
war.163 Moreover, it should be the ‘last resort,’ all other options must have been explored 
beforehand without success to declare military action necessary. The overall objective has 
to be humanitarian and apply ‘proportional means’ in scale, duration and intensity. Finally, 
the chance of success of an operation has to be within ‘reasonable prospects’ because 
otherwise the consequences might be even worse than inaction.164  
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3.2.3. The Responsibility to Rebuild 
The idea of the responsibility to rebuild is a long-term commitment by the potential 
interveners. The ICISS has put a focus on three areas: 1) security; 2) justice and 
reconciliation; and 3) development.165 After the end of the Cold War, ‘nation-building’ has 
become a normal component in peacekeeping missions or in, as they are also called, 
‘peacekeeping plus.’ The question has remained open, however, which practical guidance 
interveners should apply to rebuild post-conflict societies.166 
The effects of mass violence usually continue when a conflict is officially declared 
over by the parties involved. Coordination between the international actors is necessary for 
the commitment for mid-term and long-term goals and to avoid shortsighted thinking. Yet, 
international organizations on site work against each other and fight for influence and 
attention, as the example of Kosovo proves, instead of cooperating with each other 
efficiently. The World Summit in 2005 achieved an agreement on creating a Peacebuilding 
Commission (PBC) to avoid mistakes from the 1990s and to improve the coordination 
between the different actors – but there is hardly any improvement to be seen during the 
last years. Skepticism, however, towards the installation of the PBC has turned into 
cautious optimism in 2008 according to Evans.167  
In the following, the most important issues for rebuilding are discussed. An important 
task at the outset of a post-conflict situation is to guarantee the re-establishment of law and 
order, which is often summed up as ‘security sector reform.’ This is a police rather than a 
military task and crucial to lead a war-torn society back to normality. Refugees and IDPs 
have to be guaranteed a return to their homes. Former combatants have to go through a 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process. Often, however, 
disarmament is more symbolic than real. The reintegration into society is the most 
sensitive and difficult part of DDR because victims and perpetrators may have to live next 
to each other and work together.  
Without justice, post-war society will face difficulties in the long run. Nevertheless, it 
is often placed more weight on reconciliation than on demanding accountability. After 
conflicts, states often seem fragile and justice is not in the center of attention; on the 
contrary, it is even seen as a danger in terms of undermining peace agreements because 
some of those who led the peace negotiations usually are war criminals themselves.168 
Instead of a lustration process, the installation of truth commissions or the payment of 
reparations, often postponement is applied as a strategy to deal with the crimes committed 
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during the conflict. Sometimes, also traditional justice approaches are a viable alternative 
although the International Crisis Group (ICG) has identified risks of such approaches in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, where international actors implemented traditional justice in the 
post-conflict period.169 Karen Brounéus, too, is skeptical and writes about risks of 
retraumatization for women in truth and reconciliation processes at traditional Gacaca 
courts in Rwanda.170 Whichever approach in a post-conflict situation is taken, individuals 
responsible for large-scale war crimes have to fear a warrant with the advent of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).  
Other key words in rebuilding are ‘good governance’ and ‘local ownership’ which are 
responsible for immediate restoration of government services. Conflicting positions can be 
observed when it comes to elections that should legitimate governments in the post-
conflict stage. Richard Haass observed that “electocracy is not to be confused with 
democracy”171 and Timothy Garton Ash further states that while “[f]ull liberal democracy 
contributes to peace; partial half-baked democratization can increase the danger of war.”172 
Democratization may be a successful tool to stabilize and legitimize governments although 
political culture, a bottom-up approach and grass roots movements are necessary to make 
them work. From the beginning on, it is important that peacebuilding is not exclusively 
externally driven but includes also local actors, which is often a challenge as the examples 
of Afghanistan or Iraq have proven recently. 
The concept of rebuilding is also criticized as ‘quasi-imperialism’ of the UN like in 
Bosnia or Kosovo as Roland Paris argued.173 New UN missions were consequently 
remodeled to tackle the criticism of neo-colonialism and support a ‘light footprint’ 
approach that in brief can be summed up as “external support for indigenous efforts.”174 
The local capacity should be supported as much as possible and the presence of 
international staff should be limited at the same time. Yet the problem remains that as the 
cases of Afghanistan and the DRC show that spoilers gain legitimacy and the light 
footprint may be an excuse for donors to reduce their level of engagement so that the local 
staff ends up as chronically under-financed.175 
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In comparison to the first two dimensions of R2P, prevention and reaction, the 
responsibility to rebuild has the advantage that donor countries are more willing to commit 
themselves – at least in the first years after a conflict. Yet, rebuilding will always remain a 
long and costly endeavor.  
 
3.2.4. Criticism of R2P 
The report of the ICISS was widely recognized as a new guideline of the debate on 
intervention. At the same time it faced huge criticism out of different reasons. From the 
beginning, it has been foreseeable that not all political or academic actors would endorse 
R2P. It was obvious that a compromise of different positions would have to be reached in 
the international arena and that therefore some actors would have had to give up some of 
their positions and believes. In this subchapter, criticism from the academic community 
will be covered on the one hand; on the other hand criticism from governments and 
international organizations will be considered. 
Louise Arbour argues that policy makers might be easily tempted to believe in a rigid 
progression of the three pillars. In reality, a mix of tools is required because otherwise 
dangerous loopholes will arise. She brings up the example that during a violent conflict, 
too, capacity building for human rights is necessary.176 One of the critics was Adam 
Roberts who pointed out that the operational recommendations of the responsibility to 
prevent were too vague – the same problem remains with the actualization of the 
responsibility to rebuild.177 David Chandler brought up keen criticism by denouncing R2P 
as diminution of sovereignty, or a “fundamental downgrading” as he calls it. According to 
Chandler only the terminology has changed while the idea of coercive international 
interference remains.178 
Indeed, a widespread hostility towards humanitarian intervention by skeptical 
governments has become apparent, in particular by countries in the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM). The mere association of R2P with ‘humanitarian intervention’ built up 
barriers that were hard to remove for R2P supporters. The main task remained to adopt the 
report by the international community. 
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3.3. The World Summit Outcome 2005 
 
After the presentation of the report it seemed to be not very likely that UN bodies would 
incorporate R2P. From the P5, only France and the UK were in support of the 
Responsibility to Protect. China and Russia were unconvinced, while the US did not want 
to have any criteria that would dictate when and where to use force.179 The US-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 prompted the UK and also the US to argue that this would be a 
case for R2P. Evans rejected that claim, bitterly calling them “false friends” of R2P. 
Criticism towards R2P was only fuelled by such debates, and opposition was rising. At the 
same time the Canadian Government was taking initiatives to mobilize the civil society for 
the cause of R2P, to create political will within governments and focus on operational 
questions. Importantly, R2P was not sold as an entire new thing but rather as a 
combination of pre-existing policies.180 
In November 2003, Kofi Annan announced, despite all criticism and influenced by the 
lobbying of the Canadian Government, the establishment of the High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change to find practical measures for effective collective action to 
face threats to peace and security. The High-Level Panel (HLP) presented its report A 
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility in December 2004, which went much 
further than the ICISS and proposed 101 recommendations for a serious reform of the UN, 
in particular to reshape the UN Security Council. The HLP also referred to R2P: 
 
The panel endorses the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, 
exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of 
genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law which 
sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.181 
 
The HLP therefore turned the debate on the concept of R2P towards an institutional reform 
of the UN. R2P was understood as a means to strengthen the security system under the UN 
Charter.182 Clearly, the report focused also on the use of force. It did not want to find 
alternatives to the UN Security Council but it wanted to reform the Council and set up 
guidelines. Besides, the P5 were asked to refrain from their veto power in cases of 
genocide or mass atrocities.183  
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Also the Secretary-General reflected on tensions that R2P causes for many states. In 
March 2005, Kofi Annan published his report In Larger Freedom and wrote, “while I am 
well aware of the sensibilities involved in this issue […] I believe that we must embrace 
the responsibility to protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it.”184 At the same time 
Annan tried to bring the debate on R2P away from intervention towards a commitment of 
all states to human security and the rule of law. Although the Secretary-General embraced 
R2P in the context of promoting human rights, he refrained from calling it a norm or 
concept.185 Annan’s move provoked criticism by states supporting R2P. It demonstrated 
how difficult the negotiations about the World Summit Outcome would become half a year 
later, where R2P advocates wanted to include the responsibility to protect in the final 
document. 
Many conceptions of the notion of R2P were on the table during the drafting process 
of the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit. Kofi Annan opened the largest 
gathering of world leaders in history at the UN headquarter in New York City on 14 
September 2005. One of the central concerns for the Secretary-General was an agreement 
about the Responsibility to Protect: “at the end of his tenure, he wanted to witness the 
transition from principle to operational action.”186 At the beginning in 2005, the final draft 
on R2P was perceived as an interest of the European Union, Canada and Japan. 
According to Strauss, it was US Ambassador John Bolton who changed the dynamics 
by last-minute demands as other countries like China or Russia raised objections again.187 
One of the big debates about R2P included phrases like the unwillingness or inability of 
states to protect their own people because nobody was able to define that on a legal basis. 
Others stressed that mass atrocities had already been dealt with in the UN Charter and no 
new principle had to be introduced.188 In the end, two paragraphs about R2P were 
incorporated in the World Summit Outcome: 
 
138. Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, 
including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and 
will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help 
States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning 
capability. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and 
VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, to help protect populations from war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and 
decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, 
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on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
 
The Outcome Document was adopted without voting, but all heads of states in fact 
agreed on the version adopted. The wording of the two paragraphs shows how much 
comprise was involved in the production of the text. In paragraph 138 the responsibility on 
a national level is dealt with, while paragraph 139 addresses the responsibility of the 
international community. Both stress the need of non-military means, as many states were 
afraid of undermining their sovereignty. The focus, however, had changed in comparison 
to the ICISS report. R2P was now divided in two parts. First, the state’s obligation to 
protect those living within its own borders is stressed. Proponents of R2P strongly 
underline this point because in the first place it is the state itself that is supposed to deal 
with potential problems. The second part of R2P part addresses the rest of the world in 
case a state fails to master the risk of mass atrocities within its own borders or represents 
the cause of the threat itself. The adopted version used the word ‘responsibility’ of the 
international community through the UN instead of an obligation to act and the UNSC 
should be ‘prepared’ and not take a “shared responsibility to take collective action” as the 
draft document has stated. Therefore, there are claims to call the Outcome Document an ‘à 
la carte interventionism’ because equivocation will continue to be possible.189 
The World Summit made clear that the Genocide Convention, the Statute of Rome and 
the ICC define the range of influence of R2P; this means that R2P attained a rather precise 
legal meaning.190 Originally, one important point of R2P was the criterion of legitimacy to 
make the Security Council more responsive concerning mass atrocities by removing the 
veto of P5 members and introduce an obligation to act in case of a humanitarian 
emergency. Thus, the risk of ‘coalition of the willing’ being formed would have been 
reduced – but in the course of negotiations it was excluded.191 
The overall outcome of the Outcome Document on R2P was therefore a “mixture of 
political and legal considerations, which reflects the continuing division and confusion 
about the meaning of the concept.”192 The text of the two paragraphs try to include the 
different positions but the compromise led to a rather lame and confusing phrasing or as 
Stahn has put it, “[i]t almost seems to suggest that the drafters of the Outcome Document 
had some doubts whether their own proposal was consistent with international law and the 
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Charter.”193 Some proponents of R2P were quite disappointed with the outcome of the 
summit and labeled the new principle ‘R2P lite.’194 Bellamy argued that it were not 
humanitarian principles that had guided the World Summit but forces interested in 
weakening the tenets of the ICISS recommendations and consequently weakening the 
overall concept of R2P.195 Other supporters like Evans were happy that the concept of R2P 
was endorsed at all. 
Kofi Annan wrote in The Wall Street Journal that the Summit Outcome Document was 
indeed disappointing in parts but for him was the acceptance of a collective R2P of all 
member states “most precious” and he expressed his hope that “it will be acted upon when 
put to the test.”196 At the World Summit all in all 21 member states used the term R2P 
whereby the different statements reflected the continuing differences about how to 
understand it. The main opponents are, according to Strauss, the Russian Federation, India, 
Pakistan and Cuba.197 One year later, at the 61st session of the UNGA, only 13 countries 
addressed R2P, among them eight countries198 that pledged the international community to 
take responsibility for Darfur. In 2006 two UNSC resolutions made reference to R2P. 
Resolution 1674 called for the protection of civilians in armed conflicts and the UNSC 
endorsed the approach of the Outcome Document. In the same year the Council referred in 
resolution 1706 to the situation in Darfur and called on the GoS to protect its civilians, 
citing R2P. 
At the 62nd session of the UNGA in September 2007, only eight member states made 
reference to R2P. In particular Australia stressed the need for R2P and also for the 
development of a plan of action concerning the situation in Darfur.199 In October 2007 the 
UN Secretary-General informed the UNGA about his decision to appoint a Special Adviser 
for the Responsibility to Protect at the level of an Assistant Secretary-General in the UN 
system in order to operationalize the concept. Consequently Ban Ki-moon appointed 
Edward Luck as a Special Adviser “who will focus on the responsibility to protect”.200 The 
Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, that is responsible for issues like R2P, 
dismissed the appointment in a resolution about the budget in February 2008, because 
some countries insisted that such a step would be premature. The Secretariat yielded and 
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appointed a Special Adviser on a temporary pro-bono basis to appease critical member 
states.201 The constraints were so strong that although Luck got the position, the phrase 
R2P had to be removed from his title. One of the main opponents remained China but also 
delegates from Latin America, Africa and the Arab region claimed that R2P was rejected 
in 2005. Linked to that, also Francis Deng from Sudan was limited to the title ‘Special 
Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide’ to the UNSG and had to remove the additional 
phrase ‘and Mass Atrocities.’ Consequently, Deng has been limited in his scope of action 
because of the narrow interpretation of his authority as the definition of genocide is not 
entirely clear.202 
In early 2009, UNSG Ban Ki-Moon, after having “instructed the Organization to begin 
to take the initial steps to ensure that the system has the flexibility and capacity to help 
Member States meet their commitments”203 and proposed himself an implementation 
strategy for R2P, suggesting its realization. The concept's scrutiny in the UNGA with a 
resolution has been the most recent comprehensive appraisal by the international 
community in July 2009.204 
 
3.4. The African Union’s Step Ahead? 
 
The Constitutive Act of 2002 created a newly form of cooperation between African states, 
the African Union (AU), in 2003. Thereby it replaced the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), which had been established during the period of decolonialization in 1960. The 
OAU was often criticized for its inactivity towards political leaders who took care 
primarily for themselves, their families or clans and therefore for money but at the same 
time sacrificed the lives of tens of thousands through violence or famine. The principle of 
sovereignty, non-intervention and the fixedness of borders were the framework of the 
OAU in order to assure their own imperial powers. In reality, nearly every African state 
was used by either the United States or the Soviet Union, most often by both, to act in the 
national interest of the two super powers. 
The change to a new institution was motivated by the belief that the OAU had not been 
able to tackle problems in Africa appropriately. The whole continent was dependent on 
external forces during the time of the OAU; therefore African leaders wanted to take their 
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problems into their own hands in a more efficient way in order to show and prove that 
Africa was mature enough to deal with the challenges at hand. Thus, the AU approved the 
establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF), which should consist of nearly 20,000 
troops by 2010, and should be deployed on the authority of the AU African Assembly or 
the AU Peace and Security Council.205 The Bush administration tried, like Clinton did, to 
improve the peacekeeping capabilities around the world and in particular in Africa. In 
2005, about 14,000 African troops were trained, including personnel for AMIS. Also 
France and the UK run initiatives to support pan-African conflict prevention through 
regional peacekeeping efforts. Still, a critical mass of specialized and combat-ready troops 
for the AU is missing although this would be a requirement to stop death squads. It is 
important to stress that the AU has changed its policy towards its members and suspended 
Mauritania and Togo in 2005 after attempts to overthrow democratically elected 
governments.  
In addition, state leaders were influenced by the work of Francis Deng and the report 
of the ICISS, which made most African states change their mind.206 The Constitutive Act 
of the AU is therefore interesting for this paper because it represents a drastic change in 
Africa’s efforts concerning conflict management. Although the principle of non-
intervention was reaffirmed in article 4(g) of the Declaration of African Heads of States 
and Governments, the AU at the same time was given the right to decide about 
humanitarian interventions in grave circumstances like genocide or crimes against 
humanity. Article 4(h) and article 4(j) formalize the request of AU member states for 
intervention. Clearly, article 4 is in its sub-clauses contradictory and has caused a lot of 
debate, but viewed in a positive light unilateral action is rejected while collective action of 
the AU is favored.207 
From a Western perspective, however, where many actors, in particular the US, 
claimed that genocide is going on in Darfur, the declaration has not changed much. The 
AU members even rejected the findings of UN officials on the situation in Darfur. 
Obviously there is still a different understanding of the classification of events in Darfur 
and a traditional understanding of sovereignty remains, although the institutional 
possibilities have broadened. While some proponents of R2P have argued that the African 
Union was with its Declaration a regional forerunner of R2P, Bellamy makes clear that the 
AU’s understanding of R2P, which is also called ‘Ezulwini Consensus,’ cannot be 
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compared with the one of the ICISS or the HLP. The AU insists on priority on the regional 
level in contrast to the global level on which the UNSC acts. As a consequence the work of 
the Security Council should be limited in the eyes of AU member states to prohibit 
interference into “internal” African affairs by great powers.208 Viewed in this light, the 
AU’s step forward has to be questioned. This issue will be discussed in chapter 6. 
 
3.5. R2P as a Concept in International Law 
 
Although the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution of the World Summit 
Outcome, it is not binding for the member states and does not create new rules of 
customary international law. Often, however, resolutions of the UNGA have the function 
of a starting point in the development of international law. 
R2P is often referred to as an “emerging norm of international law.” This wording was 
rejected during the negotiations for the World Summit Outcome. Thus the legal effect of 
R2P is not clearly indicated and is still disputed in the UN. Moreover, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) makes clear in its statute that only international treaties, custom and 
general principles of law are sources of international law.209 Consequently, from a 
normative point of view, R2P cannot be seen as a legal norm yet because there are too 
many different understandings between the actors and the actual propositions on the 
concept.210 
Overall, R2P can be divided into a concept, a principle or a norm as Bellamy points 
out.211 R2P is referred to, most of the time, as a concept – by critics and supporters of the 
concept alike. It is therefore still an idea that requires further development in order to be 
operationalized. On the other hand, the World Summit Outcome Document did not call 
R2P a concept and did not ask the UNGA to take further decisions on a clarification of 
R2P. Moreover, the UN and regional organizations have put R2P already into practice. 
Others have referred to R2P as a principle, like the ICISS or the HLP. In comparison to a 
concept, a principle implies a common understanding and consensus. Typically, principles 
in international law are not challenged or violated – like sovereignty. R2P, however, is still 
not generally accepted and the principle of sovereignty will not be given up by many 
states, among them China and a lot of NAM countries. A third possibility is to refer to R2P 
as a norm, which raised an intensive debate in the academic community. Scholars of 
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international law argue that it was impossible to implement a norm four years after its 
emergence in 2001. It seems certain that the drafters of the Outcome Document tried to 
give some legal meaning to R2P, the result, however, is still uncertain.  
It is commonly accepted that genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity are entrenched in international law and respected legal standards. 
Furthermore, it is argued for example by Louise Arbour that R2P appends the obligation to 
protect civilians from such crimes. Thus, all states would have the duty to take action in 
the advent of genocide. R2P has the chance to fill the gap between legality and legitimacy 
in case it will be established as a norm of customary international law.212 That would imply 
that R2P would really have to be taken seriously by the heads of states around the world 
because the failure to implement R2P would determine legal sanctions. A military 
intervention would get a realistic threat to massive human rights violations contributing to 
the prevention of crimes against humanity. 
R2P could also be considered a ‘third generation’ right like the right to development. 
That means that new approaches have to be developed to amend existing rights in a 
particular context to make them more acceptable for states critical of the idea.213 Moreover, 
R2P redefines sovereignty because borders are not sacrosanct anymore and the monopoly 
of force within a state’s own boundaries has no monopoly anymore. With R2P, state 
sovereignty entails not only rights but also responsibilities. It depends on the state itself 
whether its sovereignty is enjoyed fully. Therefore, R2P can be called a novel vision 
because the idea of human security is linked with certain duties for the state.214 This 
linkage is based on the legal concept of solidarity and in a positive understanding the 
responsibility is an obligation for states to inhibit gross human rights violations. 
 
3.6. The Role of the UN Security Council in R2P 
 
International law still has not found consensus on how to deal with humanitarian 
interventions or R2P, whereby two different readings can be identified, an international 
legal positivism and a naturalist, human rights-based approach. The former originates from 
the idea that sovereign states have to agree voluntarily to treaties which in the course of 
time turn to customary rule, while moral considerations have no validity in this point of 
view. In contrast, the latter asserts that neutral analysis of custom and treaty of 
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international law is impossible and hence the best moral theory, which is a human rights-
based approach and sees the individual as a subject, should be taken as a source of 
interpretation.215 
These two understandings also reflect the debate on how the UN Charta should be 
interpreted. In article 2(4), the Charta stresses the territorial integrity and political 
independence of any state – with the exceptions of unilateral or collective self-defense 
under (article 51) and UNSC enforcement under Chapter VII (article 42). It is widely 
recognized among experts in international law that UNSC authorization is necessary to call 
an intervention legal. Representatives of natural law like Fernando Tesón challenge this 
view, arguing that the consent of the UNSC is not necessary to undertake a humanitarian 
intervention on a legal basis.216 Since the end of the Cold War it is widely accepted that 
reinforcement under Chapter VII is taken by the UNSC to tackle “any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” Coercive military action is regulated in articles 
39, 41 and 42 of the UN Charta, whereby its interpretation is clear concerning external 
threats to states. It is not so obvious when it comes to internal threats to civilian security 
although since the 1990s the UNSC has often responded to extreme violence in a nation 
state as numerous examples have shown. At the same time there have been other examples 
as Rwanda where the Council failed to act. 
One of the important points the ICISS brought up was the suggestion that the P5 have 
to agree on thresholds that would suspend the threat of a veto. This was weakened by the 
fact that the P5 powers still play the veto card when a self-claimed vital national interest is 
at stake, but the commission members knew that otherwise the proposal would be outright 
objected.217 After the World Summit, R2P weakened this position in paragraph 139 even 
further as there were no obligations imposed on the international community and in 
particular on the UNSC; rather the council was asked to be committed to “standing ready” 
when it should be necessary to act.218 
In addition it was planned to set up a hierarchy of responsibilities. Originally, it is the 
state, which has the primary and foremost duty to protect its people. In case this state is not 
able to stop crimes against humanity or even fuels them, in the first place, it is the 
international community, which has the moral responsibility to act and decide through the 
UNSC on actions to prevent or halt violent conflicts. If the council is blocked by one of the 
veto powers, the responsibility is carried on. Secondly, it would be the UNGA, the most 
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representative UN body that has to deal with the matter, although it is facing its own 
criticism. Thirdly, it would be regional bodies like the EU or the AU to deal with such 
matters. In the fourth position comes the ICISS-proposed ‘coalition of the willing’ to stop 
mass atrocities, but after Bush’s use of this term to get support for the 2003 Iraq war, such 
a coalition became somewhat equivocal. The last level in the hierarchy would be an 
individual state – it has to be clear that all other efforts have failed before this step can be 
taken.219 All those plans outlined above were removed from the Outcome Document of 
2005 because the UNSC has remained the sole authority for allowing coercive measure. 
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Figure 2: Map of Sudan 
 
 
 
Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartographic Section in April 2007. 
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4. The Darfur Conflict 
 
Darfur can be described as a typical northeastern African civil war, where many different 
overlapping conflicts intermingle. Until 2004, Darfur was one of the least known places in 
the world – ever since it has gotten into the international consciousness. Eruptions of 
violence have taken place already for decades, in particular in the 1980s. Local disputes 
increased in 2001 and in February 2003 when Darfur rebels attacked a military airport of 
the government escalating the simmering low-intensity conflict dramatically. This was the 
start of what today is widely referred to as the Darfur crisis. The local governance broke 
down, provincial elites supported rebels while the GoS recruited militias. The effect was 
mass atrocities, displacement and famine. It is generally estimated that more than 200,000 
people were killed in Darfur, in addition 2.7 million have been displaced.220 The Darfur 
conflict is classified according to international law as a “non-international (internal) armed 
conflict.”221 Still, the rest of the world is avoiding effective efforts to end the killing. Thus, 
Darfur is taken as a case study in this paper because although mass killings, that some even 
have referred to as genocide, have taken place, the principle of R2P had no effect. And as 
Feinstein has put it, “The Darfur problem is an immensely difficult one. No solution is 
guaranteed to work.”222 
 
4.1. Introduction to Darfur 
 
Darfur is located at the western edge of Sudan and is divided into three states – North, 
West and South Darfur. All in all, it occupies a vast area of 510,888 km2, which is slightly 
more than the territory of Spain. Darfur shares a common border with Chad in the west, 
Libya in the northwest and the Central African Republic in the southwest. It is hard to give 
an exact figure of the population in Darfur; the WHO was estimating 6.7 million people in 
the region out of Sudan’s total 39.1 million people in 2004.223 Darfur is literally means 
“homeland or abode (‘dar’) of the Fur.”224 It has a complex society stretched between the 
desert and savanna, ranging through several climatic-vegetational zones because of the 
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1,140 km long north-south extension. Three main Black African groups can be identified: 
the Fur with about one million people and the Masalit and Zaghawa with approximately 
350,000 people each.225 Other large ethnic groups in Darfur consist of Arab or migrants 
with Arab-descent; the main tribes are Rizeigat, Mahariya, Irayqat and Beni Hussein. 
There are camel-herding nomadic tribes in the north called Abbala while the groups in the 
east and south herd mainly cattle and are referred to as Baggara. To make the situation 
even more complex, ‘African’ Zaghawa raise camels and cattle as well. In total, a wide 
variety of tribes with dozens of smaller subdivisions and clans can be identified in 
Darfur.226 The Zaghawa groups of Darfur also have links to the Zaghawa in the 
neighboring country Chad. As the Chadian president Idriss Déby is himself a member of 
this ethnic group, the conflict in Darfur flashed over also to the boarding regions of Chad 
and made the Darfurian conflict international.227 
According to Vehnämäki, Darfur has not been the most deprived area in Sudan 
although it was certainly marginalized. The most fertile ground for conflict is the political, 
religious, and physical oppression that Darfur had to face for decades, further fuelled by 
economic and social injustice.228 Around Darfur, there are other areas of conflict as well, in 
particular in the East and the Northeast. The All-Nuba Conference in December 2002 
aligned the Nuba with the SPLM/A, who fought a civil war from 1984 onwards in 
Southern Sudan to gain self-determination. The Beja people in the East frequently suffer 
from malnutrition and epidemics and are oppressed by Khartoum. Next to Darfur, there are 
obviously many other conflicts in Sudan. Vehnämäki summarizes it as follows: „Although 
the conflict in Darfur is essentially a Darfurian catastrophe, its links to the civil war and 
other skirmishes in Sudan should not be neglected either.“229 Causes of the conflict are 
wide-ranging and include desertification, an increase in population, marginalization, rising 
expectations into a globalized world.230 
 
4.2. History of Darfur 
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To understand the present situation in Darfur one has to take into account the historical 
roots of the conflict.231 These roots can be traced back into the colonial period when Darfur 
was incorporated into the British colony Sudan in 1916. While it had been an independent 
Muslim sultanate before, it became a neglected attachment for a 40-year-long colonial 
interlude. Geographic isolation and a lack of natural resources left the region at the 
periphery of the country, which was dominated by the riverine north. In the process of 
state-formation after the independence of Sudan in 1956, the centralistic ideals of the 
ruling elite in Khartoum were supported by the myth of historical unity.232 They found 
their expression in a political and socio-economical marginalization of Darfur because the 
GoS failed to invest in infrastructure, education and economic development. Prunier claims 
that meager financial situation was contingent on the peripheral location of Darfur and not 
on a racial or cultural context.233 This situation was typical for Sudan as a tiny elite in 
Khartoum accumulated wealth and power. It was seen as a necessity in Khartoum to be 
united against the impacts of the civil war in Chad and the involvement of Libya.234 The 
strategy of ‘divide and rule’ was used to prevent opposition and marginalize the rest to stay 
in power.235 As a consequence Darfur remained extraordinarily poor. With the civil war in 
neighboring Chad, Arab tribes in Darfur were armed to support their clans but they used 
their equipment also against their African neighbors to seize land.236 
In particular the northern areas could not be cultivated anymore with the rainfall 
diminishing. It forced the semi-nomadic tribes to become fully nomadic to move 
southwards in search of grazing land and consequently impaired pasturelands that 
belonged to sedentary peasants.237 The situation worsened for the Darfuris with the 
droughts in the mid 1980s, forerunner of the persistent desertification. In November 1983, 
Ahmad Ibrahim Diraige wrote as governor of Darfur the shocking ‘famine letter,’ but only 
nine months later the Sudanese President Gaafar Nimeiry called Darfur a ‘disaster zone.’238 
Mainly as a result of the willful neglect of the government in Khartoum, the death toll of 
the 1984/5 famine is estimated to be more than 100,000 people.239 
This fuelled the anger of ‘African’ farmers who claimed that the ‘Arab’ nomads did 
not prevent the catastrophe. So, the ‘Africans’ tried, also with gunpowder, to stop the 
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‘Arabs’ from getting any grazing land, claiming that the ‘Arabs’ were stealing their 
livestock.240 Furthermore, the Sudanese Government applied policies in the mid 1980s that 
politicized and militarized the different groups in the region. Politicians in Khartoum used 
these developments in their own interest. As a result, the nomads came into a violent 
conflict with the local farmers. To facilitate access to pastures, an Arab militia arose, later 
known as the Janjaweed. While Daly claims that the remoter origins of the Janjaweed are 
uncertain,241 Human Rights Watch argues with grievance how the Arab militia came into 
being: “[D]esperately poor men, most of whom identify themselves as Arabs, from land 
severely scarred by desertification and water shortages.”242 The overall development shows 
that just no one cared about the people in Khartoum. At best, Darfur was a pawn in the 
power game between Sudan, Chad and Libya.  
During the conflict in Darfur between 1987-1989, groups of Arab origin and sedentary 
Fur fought for water and grazing land. The Fur had to suffer from raids against hundreds of 
their villages and estates were burnt down.243 The most notorious carnage was the 
‘Massacre of Ed-Da’ein’ in 1987 where thousands of people, belonging to the African 
ethnic group called Dinka, were burnt alive in cargo-trains.244 After a short democratic 
interlude offering access to political participation for the region, a coup d’état followed by 
Omar Hassan al-Bashir in 1989, who had strong support from the Arab militia, which has 
been incorporated as Popular Defense Forces (PDFs) into the military arm of the National 
Islamic Front (NIF), which is until today the ruling party in Sudan, but known as the 
National Congress Party (NCP). These events gave rise to an ideology which declared the 
Arabs as supreme.245 The government applied policies that spread hatred. During the 
1990s, Khartoum was arming Arab groups that were organized as PDFs and by 1996 they 
outnumbered the regular armed forces. Today PDFs constitute more than 50% of the 
Sudanese Armed Forces.246 Moreover, new administrative boundaries at the expense of 
African groups were drawn. Darfur was politically divided in three provinces (wilayat) in 
1994, namely Northern Darfur, Southern Darfur and Western Darfur, and new capitals 
were selected although they were ethnically heterogeneous with an Arab elite on top of the 
social strata. Darfur became even more marginalized, the whole region was stigmatized as 
violent and frustrated. In addition, the civil war in neighboring Chad affected Darfur as the 
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Arab tribes got support from clans ethnically related to them and seized land from Fur and 
Masalit tribes. Khartoum ignored the local conflicts, even distributed weapons, and 
between 1996-1998 Arab militias were raiding villages and displaced tens of thousands 
civilians.247 In the late 1990s, Hassan al-Turabi was excluded from the ruling National 
Congress Party of Omar al-Bashir. With his influence an unknown group called ‘The 
Seekers of Truth and Justice’ published The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth 
in Sudan in May 2000. This pamphlet declared al-Turabi’s political aims and while it was 
not calling for violence, it fuelled ethnic hatred nonetheless.248 
From 2001 onwards, more people joined self-defense troops because of their better 
organization and the failure of Khartoum to protect its own citizens against ongoing attacks 
of Janjaweed militias. Therefore, tribes from the Zaghawa and the Fur group started to join 
forces in the defense of their villages. With 9/11, the Bush administration changed its view 
on Sudan; suddenly they were ‘good Arabs’ because in 1996 they had offered to deport 
Bin Laden.249 
Lusk points to the fact that already in November 2002 the GoS committed atrocities in 
Darfur. The international community, however, was concerned with the peace talks 
between the GoS and the SPLM in Kenya. It permitted Khartoum to relocate the Sudanese 
Armed Forces from the South of Sudan to Darfur.250 
 
4.3. ‘Arab’ vs. ‘African’ 
 
Darfurians, like other Sudanese, define themselves primarily according to tribal or ethno-
cultural terms. During the 1990s, the incompatibilities between settlers and nomads 
witnessed an increased politicization of ethnic lines: ‘Arabs’ versus ‘Africans.’ Daly put it 
bluntly: “While for outsiders all Darfuris might seem just ‘black’, the Arab identity 
through imputed Arab blood now became the decisive factor in excluding the Other.”251 
Although it is not possible to draw a line on racial or religious grounds, the government 
recruited marginalized ‘Arabs’ while ‘non-Arab’ respectively ‘African’ groups fight on the 
rebel’s side. The attacks by the Janjaweed rest upon a racial reasoning because they are 
zurga, which means ‘blacks’ or ‘Africans.’ More important are facial features because 
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from both, also the ‘Arabs,’ the skin color is black. Yet, this differentiation is not always 
the case either as the ethnic background is crucial.252 
A differentiation can be done on the grounds to differentiate the ethnic groups between 
farmers and nomads. While farmers are tied to a certain place, nomads are characterized by 
an errant life style with their camels. Therefore the conflict mirrors scarcity of farming and 
grazing land but not yet reflects the whole picture either, because ‘Arabs’ are only semi-
nomadic in Darfur.253 Prunier observes an “increasingly racialized battleground between 
Khartoum, Tripoli and N’Djamena.”254 The 1970s mark the start of a process to construct a 
new Arab identity for nomadic tribes in Darfur that continued to grow throughout the 
1980s. In comparison to the North-South conflict in Darfur, which was based on racial and 
religious reasons, ‘Arabs’ and ‘Africans’ in Darfur were distinguished on a constructed 
ethnical basis. For many tribes it is hard to claim their Arab descent: often ‘Arab’ just 
refers to the mother tongue instead of using an indigenous language.255 But also some 
African ethnic groups lost their indigenous languages a long time ago; today most 
communities speak a Sudanese-Darfuri Arabic that is called rutana by the ‘Arabs,’ which 
is an expression meaning “incomprehensible, nonsensical articulations.”256 
In terms of religion, both Arabs and non-Arab Africans belong to the religious 
denomination of the Muslim Tijaniyyah sect.257 For a long time inter-marriages have taken 
place, which makes it very hard to distinguish the different groups on their physical 
appearance. The polarization of identity is consequently not an implication of the physical 
violence in Darfur, because identities actually overlap each other and individuals shift 
easily from one group to the other.258 Moreover, ‘Arabs’ in Darfur have often been victims 
of Khartoum as well. Many ‘Arab’ tribes have started to distance themselves from the NCP 
because they felt used by Khartoum reaping the rewards they hoped for. Some ‘Arab’ 
groups even established ties with non-Arabs or joined ‘Arab’-led rebel groups fighting 
against the government.259 
The reason why parts of the groups want to be referred to as Arabs is that being Arab 
is a sign of ‘civilization’ for them. This stands in contrast to a so-called African ‘savagery.’ 
At the same time it also distinguishes nomadic from sedentary people.260 What makes it 
even more complicated is the fact that ‘Arabs’ in the whole Sudan are seen as “mongrels 
                                                
252 Prunier 2005:4-5. 
253 Hermanson, Judith A. 2007. “Violence, Poverty and Survival in Darfur, Sudan”, Development Vol. 50(2), p. 154. 
254 Prunier 2005:47. 
255 Lusk 2008:168-169. 
256 Ibrahim 2006:12. 
257 HRW (2004), “Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan,” Report Vol. 16(5A), April 2004, p. 6. 
258 De Waal 2004; Prunier 2005:4-8. 
259 ICG (2007), “Darfur’s New Security Reality”, Africa Report No. 134, p. 2. 
260 Prunier 2005:5. 
- 69 - 
who hardly deserve their name” by the Arab world.261 The identification of a person in 
Sudan is determined by a social and cultural context. A person from the North of Sudan is 
considered Arab in the South, while the same person in the North is considered to belong 
to a local tribe. In the end, the different groups are in various ways related to different 
political movements and have ties to numerous warlords, who benefit economically from 
their banditry.262 
The economic motivation of different groups should not be disregarded although 
factors like politics or ethnicity, as we have seen in this sub-chapter, are important in the 
first place. Ethnicity still dominates the distinction in Darfur artificially because of the 
perceived racial differences between ‘Africans’ and ‘Arabs,’ which dominate the politics 
and sociology in Darfur. It is the underdevelopment in Darfur and the promotion of ‘Arab’ 
governance by Khartoum that has fuelled this ‘ethnic conflict’ until today. 
 
4.4. Darfur’s Genocidal Conflict in 2003 - 2004 
 
The conflict in Darfur can be explained by the changing ecological reality and the resulting 
hardship for the Darfuris as covered in chapter 4.2. Marginalization, the lack of identity 
and economic hardship characterize this remote part of Sudan,263 which led to “a series of 
struggles of the inhabitants of a formerly autonomous entity reduced to a periphery of the 
riverain elites of Khartoum and their clients.”264 Hence, the alienation of Darfurian rebels 
in 2003 has old roots; its origins are entrenched in relations of inequality between its 
multiethnic inhabitants, which led to the outbreak of widespread violence. 
On 26 February 2003, the SLA attacked with 300 well-armed men the garrison town of 
Golu, the district headquarter of Jebel Marra in central Darfur, and killed 200 Sudanese 
soldiers.265 The reaction of the GoS was confusing because they declared the wish for 
negotiations with the rebels. The governor of Northern Darfur was sent to London to meet 
Khalil Ibrahim of JEM but achieved no outcome.266 In March, the rebels were able to take 
the border town of Tinay and seized arms and ammunition. The SLA and JEM even went a 
step further on 25 April 2003, when they attacked government troops at Al Fasher airport 
in the night and destroyed military aircraft and captured the base commander. In the course 
of the following three months the SLA killed hundreds of soldiers and took hundreds of 
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prisoners as well.267 Apparently the rebels were better equipped to some extent than the 
Sudanese Armed Forces. In Khartoum the ruling elite got afraid that its own army was 
undermined by Islamist and rebel forces and launched crackdowns of the ‘African’ 
populations. Instead of a negotiated settlement that the governors of North and West 
Darfur wanted to negotiate, they were fired and the devastating counter-insurgency 
campaigns of the GoS continued.268 It is described as the bursting of a ‘time bomb’ that 
was waiting to explode since 1985.269 According to Idris, the eruption of violence 
happened because of ecological factors such as droughts which increased the potential for 
crisis in a region where tensions have existed since decades. Moreover, the attack was 
linked with socio-political problems, notably increase in population, grazing rights and 
land distribution.270 
Already before 2003 Darfur had been characterized by insecurity but from then on the 
conflict escalated dramatically. From then on, violence was not constrained to Darfur 
anymore but extended the broader region because the GoS not only responded by its 
regular armed forces but also with militia. These attacks of the militia on the ground were 
accompanied with the aerial bombardments of the Sudanese Air Force in late July 2003. 
The bombs used of the air force were “primitive free-falling cluster bombs” that had a 
deadly effect against civilians but were useless in military terms.271 The conflict therefore 
took on a dramatic scale, unprecedented and unpredicted. 
Prunier argues that Khartoum wanted a solution before the start of the delicate 
negotiations with the SPLA/M started but did not have the military means to respond 
accordingly.272 The GoS thus exploited the existing tensions in Darfur by mobilizing 
thousands of men who mostly identified themselves as Arabs. They were desperate 
because their land was devastated by desertification and water shortages.273 Those men 
were easily recruited to what is widely known as Janjaweed militias. ‘The devil on the 
horseback,’ as the Janjaweed are also known, committed widespread atrocities against the 
largely non-Arab communities of settled farmers. The GoS already had experience with 
this strategy having used militia in the North-South civil war very effectively with the 
Murahaleen, as the Arab bands were known. The militia was stirred up against innocent 
civilians arguing that those locals were suspects supporting the rebels which fought against 
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the government.274 From the beginning of the conflict, it can therefore be seen that the 
government has strived for a military solution to fight the insurgency.  
Consequently, the repeated attacks from the SLM/A since the beginning of 2003 have 
rarely been responded by attacks of GoS troops as they have been engaged in the South of 
Sudan. The government rather took advantage of the Janjaweed to raid the rebels, whereby 
no difference was drawn between insurgents and innocent civilians. On the contrary, while 
at the beginning the rebel camps were attacked, soon the unarmed sedentary population 
became the target of attacks most of the time.275 Hence, it was the civilians in Darfur that 
had to suffer when Janjaweed combated the rebels and left sheer devastation behind them. 
The militias used the tactic of scorched earth and burnt down villages, even mosques; 
civilians were terrorized, raped, abducted, displaced and killed. In return, young desperate 
‘African’ men were motivated to join the rebels and take revenge because their houses and 
the farming had been burnt down. 
A vicious circle started that was fuelled by the GoS. The government decided to 
withdraw the local police and other officials arguing that their safety was not guaranteed 
any longer. In fact many policemen were ‘African’ and some were killed while others fled 
to neighboring Chad. With the disappearance of the local legal authority, the Janjaweed 
filled the empty space with banditry, executions and kidnapping.276 In early 2004, it was 
estimated that some 80,000 people were killed and more than one million displaced 
including 100,000 refugees.277 In comparison to the events in Rwanda or Srebrenica, 
however, some observers concluded that “Rwanda in slow motion”278 was reappearing in 
Sudan because of the relatively slow unfolding of events. The tactics of the militias and the 
Sudanese Armed Forces were characterized by rape, abduction, aerial bombardment, mass 
execution and the destruction of food and water resources. At this stage Darfur was 
“commonly described within the UN system and Western states as ‘the most serious 
humanitarian emergency in the world today.’”279 The UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees found in a report, “[i]t is the manner of the response to this rebellion by the GoS 
which has led to the current crisis in Darfur.”280 
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There were first attempts to negotiate a ceasefire by the AU, but the government 
started a ground and air offensive in early 2004, followed by Janjaweed that terrorized the 
local population. In April 2004, the Chad-mediated ceasefire agreement was signed in 
N’Djamena, the capital of Chad, between the GoS and SLA/M and JEM. Humanitarian 
organizations were assured to access to the area and the African Union Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS) was as a result established. The accord was criticized as a “rushed agreement” 
because two versions were distributed, as there was no agreed text.281 Hence it was 
unsurprising that the ceasefire was broken within hours after signing. In July 2004 it is 
estimated that the Darfur conflict destroyed at least 400 villages; moreover 1.2 million 
IDPs were uprooted, among them 800,000 living in camps and 120,000 refugees in 
Chad.282 Overall, the UN estimated that a third of approximately six million Darfuris was 
affected by the violent conflict, in particular in Northern Darfur while in the Western and 
Southern province the situation was relatively calm at that point of time.283 The GoS, 
however, tried to block all humanitarian help from outside and called for “purely 
Sudanese” solutions. Prunier comes to the conclusion that Khartoum was aware that it 
would not be able to deny the scale of the emergency and refuse access to humanitarian 
organizations. The GoS wanted to create an irreversible situation that would prevent a 
military intervention in Darfur because no prevention would be possible anymore except 
for dealing with the devastating consequences.284 
The GoS denied any involvement in the atrocities. Many observers described the 
behavior of the GoS as cynical because Khartoum denied the facts they created themselves 
in Darfur and argued that any such information was Zionist propaganda, Western media 
bias and the neighboring countries whereas no fault was attributed to the government’s 
own behavior. The GoS could not deny the insecurity in Darfur but the happenings were 
solely blamed on the rebels and the age-old tribal conflicts that have always characterized 
this frontier region.285 
The UN Security Council approved the deployment of AMIS in resolution 1566 on 30 
July 2004. AMIS should observe the N’Djamena ceasefire, although the force of 60 
military observers and 310 protection troops was too small and inadequately equipped. At 
the beginning, the troops only had the mandate to protect the observers. Although AMIS 
exceeded the mandate authority and had some success, a larger number of personnel, better 
logistics and more finance would have been needed. This was promised by the AU and the 
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international community but often it was not delivered and when it did, it was often too 
late.286 In October 2004 and April 2005, the AMIS mandate was strengthened and the force 
expanded to all in all 6,171 military personnel and 815 civilian policemen. 
In the meantime, UN Special Representative Jan Pronk and the Sudanese Foreign 
Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail were optimistic that their ‘Darfur Plan of Action’ would 
bring progress and ‘safe areas’ in early August 2004. In the same month the rains started 
and the Janjaweed felt no necessity to attack anymore, the Darfuri population died in any 
case.287 Peace negotiations started in Abuja and the GoS proposed that AMIS should 
disarm the rebels while Khartoum would disarm the Janjaweed. According to Prunier, no 
one could have taken this suggestion seriously because it was obviously flawed and soon 
the talks collapsed on 15 September 2004.288 
The Red Cross announced an “agricultural collapse” in Darfur in a report on 19 
October 2004, stating that the situation was worse than during the 1984 famine in Darfur. 
During December the GoS resumed peace talks in Abuja with the rebels. During the talks, 
insurgencies were started by Khartoum. During 2004, no ceasefire or peace agreement had 
been reached. The lack of progress was also blamed on the disorganization of the rebels.289 
On 9 January 2005 the CPA with the SPLA/M was announced, bringing an end to the 21-
year civil war between the North and the South of Sudan, and the international community 
was satisfied – but Darfur was left out of the agreement. This got also clear by the report of 
the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur presented to the Secretary General on 
25 January 2005 that “strongly recommended” the Security Council to refer the matter to 
the ICC.  
 
4.5. Negotiations Without Result: 2005 - 2006 
 
Two years after its outbreak, the Darfur conflict changed its character. HRW concluded: 
„In 2005, the pervasive pattern of government and militia attacks on villages subsided in 
relation to previous years, but an increasing number of armed actors added to the 
complexity – and danger – of the situation.“290 Four different patterns of violence are 
identified between 2005 and 2006: 1) military operations by the Sudanese Armed Forces 
and rebel groups; 2) ethnic inter-tribal clashes on land and at water; 3) banditry and crime; 
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and 4) cross-boarder tensions linked to internal politics in Chad.291 Although the military 
operations of the GoS and its militias declined in comparison with the time period of 2003-
2004, the same mechanisms remained to leave civilians insecure und vulnerable. 
The GoS continued with its strategy to pretend complying with negotiations although 
the commitments were usually not taken seriously by Khartoum. New peace talks started 
in the beginning of 2005. In July 2005, a declaration of principles was agreed on in Abuja, 
Nigeria, where also the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue was started. One of the points was to 
establish a Peace and Reconciliation Council, another that robustly resourced UN 
peacekeepers would replace AMIS and enforce the peace agreement that should have been 
signed soon but the talks lasted until May 2006. 
As time passed it became more obvious that AMIS was not able to protect the civilians 
in Darfur and encounters increased again. In October 2005, the Janjaweed attacked an IDP 
camp for the first time leaving 32 people dead. In the end of 2005 there was no truce to 
keep anymore because of the ongoing bloodshed. The ICG concluded about 2005 that “the 
situation has the potential to become another never-ending ‘low-intensity’ conflict in 
which the international community spends large sums each year keeping IDPs and 
refugees alive but otherwise fails to protect civilians and to address the underlying political 
causes.”292 This reflects the situation that AMIS brought some relief of excesses that had 
taken place during the first one and a half years, but effective civilian protection was not 
possible and insecurity remained. 
In 2006, the chaos in Darfur started to affect the neighboring Chad seriously. For a 
long time tensions between Chad and Sudan have been existing and both have been using 
the different parties in Darfur for their own interest. With the so-called Tripoli Agreement 
in February 2006, Colonel Gaddafi was able to settle an agreement between Sudan and 
Chad to disarm their cross-border insurgents. It needed the help of Saudi Arabia to ease the 
tensions 15 months later in a reconciliation agreement between Sudan and Chad in May 
2007.  
An AU-led peace settlement called Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was reached in 
early May 2006 in Abuja, Nigeria.293 It was the result of extensive preparation, intensive 
and long discussions and an enormous effort of international experts and diplomats. It was 
hoped that the DPA was not a mere ceasefire but a framework for peace and security in the 
region with a fair share of Sudan’s resources for Darfur. Daly summed up the three main 
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points of the DPA: security, rehabilitation and political development.294 The DPA is 
widely perceived as a failure today, it was too limited in signatories and scope. The 
SLM/A became prone to internal divisions during the negotiations for the DPA and finally 
only one of the three main rebel factions, the Sudan Liberation Army of Minni Minawi 
(SLA/MM) signed the agreement with the government. This complicated the overall 
situation even further, because the rebels themselves started to attack each other, 
denouncing each other as traitors. Minawi, however, was incorporated in a new 
‘Government of National Unity’ together with groups from the South. The strategy of 
‘divide and rule’ was successfully embarked by Khartoum. The GoS already had a long 
experience of negotiations because of the North-South conflict and successfully played off 
the inexperienced representatives of the rebels against each other. In fact, the ceasefire “led 
to a worsening situation on the ground.”295 This is related to the fact that not all armed 
groups in Darfur were present because they were excluded like the Movement for Reform 
and Democracy or not able to be present like the commander of the ‘Group of Nineteen.’ 
The biggest mistake according to De Waal was the decision of the international community 
to ostracize the rebels that refused to sign the DPA from the Ceasefire Commission.296 
Also in scope the DPA failed to address all issues at hand, particularly land tenure, grazing 
rights and the reform of local government and administrative structures. An agreement on 
these matters is considered crucial for any sustainable solution. 
Neither the rebels nor the government were in favor of the DPA because it was seen as 
a threat. Therefore it is not a surprise that violence took a sharp rise prior to and after the 
signing of the DPA. On the one hand, the GoS feared that the Darfur-Darfur-Dialogue 
might result in unity among Darfuris and weaken its own position. On the other hand, the 
rebel leaders were timid of a situation that would have removed them as legitimate 
representatives of Darfur.297 In August 2006, the GoS started to launch major attacks again 
to secure victory in the region, which contributed to a worsening of the humanitarian 
situation.  
 
4.6. The Main Parties of the Conflict 
 
Two opposing belligerents characterized the Darfur crisis at the beginning: the GoS and 
the Janjaweed militia against ‘African’ rebel groups. While the first were rather coherent, 
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the latter were hard to discern as a group because the two rebel factions split many times at 
the beginning. In addition some insurgents have discovered the benefits of being a rebel 
group and thus being taken seriously by African and Western mediators although their 
gang existed in fact only on paper or a website. As pointed out in the subchapter above, it 
is not possible to claim that all ‘African’ groups are involved with the rebels or that all 
‘Arabs’ are connected with government militias. 
 
4.6.1. The Government of Sudan 
The GoS, based on the elites in Khartoum, has managed to retain power through violence, 
control of resources and a policy of divide and rule. Outside of the capital, the support is 
relatively weak and therefore the security apparatus tried eagerly to control local groups in 
the periphery. The Islamist regime has taken over Sudan in 1989 and holds power by 
maintaining an Arab supremacy. The GoS kept Sudan in a context of permanent war that 
has been accompanied by ‘negotiations’ with rebellious groups what actually represents 
the pursuit of war by other means.298 
Until today it is not clear to which extent the GoS has been actively involved in the 
atrocities in Darfur. This is also a reason why the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur did not state that genocide is going on in Darfur to the UN Secretary-General in 
January 2005.299 The GoS denies until today that large killings in Darfur have taken place 
and in particular it has been involved itself in any atrocities. Khartoum denies any support 
of the militia because it cannot control them. In addition it downplays the conflict as a 
solely tribal dispute about the distribution of land, which is carried out by bandits and was 
started by “rebels.”300 Interestingly, Khartoum has been suspicious towards its own regular 
military forces because many of its members are Darfuris and the GoS feared that it could 
not trust them. In general, a climate of mistrust, confusion and contradictions characterized 
the atmosphere in Khartoum and inside the GoS.301 
The GoS has accused the West, and notably the United States, that wrong information 
was spread on purpose to undermine the regime. This interference was perceived as a 
threat to the sovereignty of Sudan, which is an independent nation state. Such rhetoric is 
characteristic for many states which do not protect their own citizens. The ICISS tried to 
overcome that by establishing the idea of R2P as pointed out earlier. Moreover, the GoS 
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argues that the attacks of the Janjaweed are a mere response to the cruelties that at first 
were committed by the rebels. 
President al-Bashir knows that in case an equitable peace agreement would be obtained 
in Darfur, a serious loss of power for his loyal groups would be the consequence. In other 
parts of Sudan, like in the Nuba mountains, the Blue Nile province or in Eastern Sudan, 
there have been upheavals as well. Fouad Ibrahim believes that those riots would worsen in 
that case because those regions would see a motivation to fight more intensively.302  
 
4.6.2. Janjaweed militia 
Popular defense forces, border intelligence, nomadic police, popular police or foreign 
combatants compose the Janjaweed militia. Moreover, nearly all ‘Arab’ militia groups in 
northern and western parts of Darfur can be added. Also some other tribal ‘Arab’ groups 
were included to the Janjaweed militia as they were either armed by the GoS and were 
involved in attacks or got weapons by other means303 in principle to defend themselves.304 
A racial discourse about Arab identity was fuelled by Khartoum; this narrative united 
Darfur’s ‘Arabs’ and led to a self-fulfilling prophecy in the construction of identities.305 
The roots of the Janjaweed who were also referred to as PDFs date back to the 1980s, 
when they raided ‘African’ villages in order to make sure that their cattle had enough 
grazing lands. In the 1990s, the GoS established the Janjaweed as paramilitary forces. 
Salih argues that the monopoly over the use of force was given away by Khartoum on 
purpose and it is almost impossible to differentiate between the Sudanese Armed Forces 
and the Janjaweed.306 When the violent conflict in Darfur started, at first the Janjaweed 
attacked rebels but soon their main target became civilians, causing high death tolls in 
2003 and 2004.307 In 2004 it was estimated that the Janjaweed amount to 20,000 personnel. 
Typically, the Janjaweed ride horses or camels although they are equipped with modern 
technology and arms, provided most probably by Khartoum. According to Prunier the 
army provided the militias also with uniforms, on which some of the Janjaweed put a patch 
showing an armed horseman.308 The government allegedly provided ideological and 
tactical support but also material help like shelter, cars or satellite phones for the ethnic 
cleansing operation of the militia.309 Often, the Janjaweed are seen as a prolonged arm of 
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Khartoum; the GoS is accused of aktul al-abid bil abid (“kill the slave through the 
slaves”)310 by arming ‘Arabs’ to fight the rebels. Instead of disarming the Janjaweed, 
which was often promised during the last years, the training of the militia continued. 
The policy of the Janjaweed is to combat rebels and civilians in Darfur alike. They 
either occupy fertile land of ‘African’ farmers or leave scorched earth behind them. This 
strategy is also referred to as ethnic cleansing,311 because new ‘Arab’ settlements are 
replacing the former ‘African’ villages. In the course of the last years the GoS has 
integrated parts of the militia into army or police units, in particular to boarder guards to 
reward the militia and strengthen the own forces.312 
 
4.6.3. Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) 
The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) derives from the Fur self-defense 
militias from the late 1980s, which were set up to handle the raids of ‘Arab’ tribal militias. 
It consisted of the major ethnic groups, principally non-Arab, although some ‘Arabs’ were 
included as well. After a peace conference in 1989, which officially dissolved the militia, 
they went underground. Although the SLA was disarmed officially, only the old guns were 
handed over while the best weapons remained in the hands of the SLM/A. The SLA was 
successfully including deserted Fur soldiers and additionally trained young recruits with 
the support of the SPLA. Secularism helped to attract a broad range of tribes, including the 
three main ‘African’ tribes in Darfur: the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa.313 
In summer 2001, a meeting of Fur and Zaghawa leaders took place which later formed 
a bloc that was joined by Masalit fighters in November. This bloc was called Darfur 
Liberation Front (DLF) and started to operate in spring 2002 with the aim of secession 
from Sudan. The way to achieve this aim, the strategy that should be used, was reason for 
disagreement; right from the beginning unity was missing. To get broader support they 
renamed themselves to SLM/A and issued their manifesto on 16 March 2003.314 At the 
beginning of the conflict in 2003, the SLM/A embattled a significant military force, but 
from the very first day it was divided along clan lines. The rebel soldiers were extremely 
young and sufficient enough in numbers so no child soldiers were recruited. They were 
semi-educated and without respect to traditional authorities administered by Darfur.315 As 
the name already suggests, they were inspired by the manifesto of John Garang, the 
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founder of the SPLA/M.316 Garang’s manifesto stresses unity, democracy, secularism and 
equality of all citizens. The ethnic differences in the SLM/A, out of intra-sectional and 
even intra-clan reasons, have caused difficulties in finding a common political line and 
summing up the demands. This problem became worse with the lack of political 
experience, the lack of internal solidarity between clans in the movement and a bottom-up 
structure that degraded the political authority of representatives of the SLM/A. The GoS 
has used that situation shrewdly to weaken the rebels during peace negotiations.317 At the 
dawn of the violent conflict, the SLM/A aimed for socioeconomic development in Darfur 
and a better political representation in Khartoum. Later, the rebels also included as well 
marginalization, racial discrimination, exclusion and exploitation in their claims. The early 
aim of the DLF of separation was removed from the agenda and replaced by the objective 
of “creating a united democratic Sudan”.318 
As a consequence the SLM/A split into several factions, whereby a cleavage along 
tribal lines can be observed. One of these lines is led by Minni Minawi (SLA/MM), who 
signed the DPA in May 2006. While most rebel groups left the negotiation table in Abuja, 
Minawi agreed with the GoS to cooperate and since then has partly been in compliance 
with the national government. Some former rebels got jobs in the government and were 
given land. In return they show up as spoilers during negotiations to undermine any serious 
outcome. In addition, Minawi’s SLA has committed atrocities against civilians in the north 
of Darfur and locally became known as “Janjaweed II.”319 Moreover, SLA/MM is accused 
of having attacked AMIS and of having fuelled violence in IDP camps. 
Another big faction of SLM/A is under control of Abdul Wahad al-Nur who is living 
in exile in Paris. There are estimates that he is commanding about a quarter of the rebel 
forces. Al-Nur was a main opponent of Minawi in Abuja 2006 and refused to sign the 
DPA, which increased his popularity. In 2007 the SLA/Unity, another faction of the 
SLM/A, appeared to be the largest rebel group. Moreover, an SLA splinter of Ahmed 
Abdelshaafie exists, a former associate of al-Nur. Many SLA factions which also separated 
existed only for a short time like the ‘Group of 19’ or the ‘National Redemption Front’ in 
Northern Darfur, which has made it even harder for the international community to 
determine whom to bring to the negotiation table. The situation of split-offs from the 
SLM/A became that bad and complex that many observers of the situation lost track. 
Therefore there were a couple of efforts made to reunite the different splinter groups again 
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but this aim has not been achieved yet and it does not seem likely to happen soon because 
of rising hatred between the rebels. 
The absence of leadership on part of the rebels led to disturbing reports of rebel attacks 
on humanitarian convoys and international aid workers. The rebels are fighting among 
themselves for power and control over strategy and resources. The failure to comply with 
international humanitarian law has undermined the rebels’ credibility in the eyes of the 
international community, which certainly serves Khartoum’s purposes.320  
 
4.6.4. Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is commonly linked to Sudan’s Islamist 
movement. JEM is not an ordinary opposition group as it emerged from the National 
Congress (NC), the ruling party in Sudan. The radical Islamism spreading from Khartoum 
was therefore not opposed by JEM. This rebel group was concerned about the racism of 
the Arab regime with their rhetoric against inferior Africans although JEM had been part 
of the regime earlier and did not do much about it.321 
JEM is a smaller insurgent group than SLM/A and is mainly composed by Zaghawa 
tribes. The medical doctor Khalil Ibrahim, who is described as “a veteran Islamist and 
former [Sudanese] minister,”322 founded the rebel movement in August 2001. Ibrahim, a 
disciple of Hassan al-Turabi who is an old opponent of President al-Bashir, asserted that 
the ‘Black Book,’ mentioned earlier, was written by him and should be considered to be 
the manifesto of JEM.323 As the name of JEM already suggests, this movement strives 
against marginalization, impoverishment, ethnic oppression and tribal favoritism. JEM had 
the character of a regional party, uniting disillusioned Islamists and Darfur intellectuals 
with their aims of a fairer share of Sudan’s resources.324 At the beginning of the violent 
conflict, JEM left the fighting to the SLA but was still in the headlines and connected with 
business interests.  
Either faction of the SLM/A was suspicious of JEM because of its alleged links to al-
Turabi and the accusation of an Islamist agenda. Only at the very beginning of the conflict 
the rebels fought together but it was mainly based on financial and logistic cooperation, an 
area where the SLM was weak. Soon, however, they turned against each other and a united 
political front could not be formed. Internal divisions as well as fights against the SLM/A 
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have weakened JEM. With the DPA breaking-apart of the rebel groups was fuelled. It led 
to a rise in banditry and warlords spread in the region.325 Like the other rebels, JEM is 
concerned about influence and power and consequently seeks a good position before 
negotiations to sell itself to the international community as positive as possible. 
In summer 2004 Jibril Abd al-Karim Bari set up the National Movement for Reform 
and Development (NMRD) as breakaway faction from JEM. This movement demanded its 
own place at the conference in Abuja but the AU rejected its demand fearing that further 
splits would be prompted with an approval. 
In May 2008, JEM succeeded in attacking the Sudanese capital with a military strike 
that left 200 people dead. This was exceptional as it was the first raid on Khartoum in 30 
years, an event which has not been seen during the whole civil war between the North and 
South. 
 
4.7. A Difficult Road to Peace since 2007 
 
Since 2007 the situation in Darfur has changed substantially. The number of casualties has 
decreased in comparison to the other two periods of the crisis which have been identified 
in this research paper. Some grassroots peace initiatives started in 2007. An example is the 
reconciliation talks in West Darfur with tribes from Fur and Masalit groups organized by 
several ‘Arab’ communities in June 2007.326 The GoS undermined those initiatives 
because Khartoum had no interest in an ‘Arab/non-Arab’ alliance. To come to terms with 
the international community, the GoS agreed to new peace talks in Sirte, Libya, which 
began in the end of October 2007 but were – as so many other endeavors – not crowned 
with success. 
The situation in IDP camps has worsened because of a rise in insecurity since 2007 
which is captured by MSF noting that, “[i]n fact, for most people things have got 
worse.”327 First attempts of the GoS to empty IDP camps in Darfur were taken in 2005 
because they were aware that the international community and the world public would 
keep Darfur in the spotlight as long as dramatic pictures from those camps could be 
broadcasted. Already in 2005 al-Bashir had offered the tribal leaders his support as long as 
the IDPs would leave the camps; in 2007 the Sudanese President even instructed IDP 
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return programs – but such efforts of Khartoum failed.328 Although the GoS claimed 
‘voluntary returns’ of IDPs to their villages, IDPs lacked the trust to do so. Such returns 
would have additionally contradicted the situation on the ground because there would be 
not many places in Darfur where the IDPs could safely return.329 Moreover, humanitarian 
workers were regularly under attack by militias or rebels; in June 2007 every sixth relief 
convoy was hijacked or ambushed and some areas could not been accessed.330 
In 2008, violence increased again. Darfur remains plagued by conflict and the GoS has 
been more complacent to claim that the conflict in Darfur is inherently tribal. JEM carried 
out attacks in West Darfur in December 2007 and January 2008, which were responded by 
major offensives of the GoS. The conflict between Khartoum and JEM further exacerbated 
further when the GoS supported an attempted coup d’état in Chad in early February 2008. 
Since many rebels from JEM belong to the same ethnic group as the ruling elite in 
N’Djamena, they supported their Chadian ethnic connections. The GoS itself responded 
with large-scale military campaigns themselves,331 and appointed the Janjaweed 
commander Musa Hilal as a high-level government advisor although Hilal is a notorious 
war criminal.  
The government but also the rebels discovered that they could make political use out 
of the displaced people who were full of despair. Both parties were successful to swamp 
the camps with weapons; banditry dominates the overcrowded communities. This is used 
by the GoS to argue that IDP camps are a place of refuge for rebels, backed by the 
humanitarian relief organizations that are running the camp. In their cynical line of 
argument, Khartoum accuses the international community to undermine their sovereignty 
with the militarization and politicization of the IDP camps.332  
On 10 May 2008, JEM carried out an armed attack on Omdurman, a part of greater 
Khartoum. It was the first time during the Darfur conflict that a rebel group managed to 
come close to the capital and to launch a raid.333 The GoS responded with a strike on an 
IDP camp in Kalma in southern Darfur, killing approximately 30 IDPs. Moreover, it was 
estimated that the GoS detained up to 3,000 people in an arbitrary manner by claiming that 
they were responsible for the armed attack of JEM.334 
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The GoS still denies atrocities in Darfur and disavow the gravity of the humanitarian 
situation in the western province. The request of Luis Moreno-Ocampo, prosecutor of the 
ICC, for an arrest warrant against president al-Bashir triggered strong international 
pressure on Sudan. In June 2008 a new AU/UN mediator was appointed, the former 
foreign minister of Burkina Faso, Djibrill Bassolé. The Arab League defended the 
Sudanese President but also proposed an initiative in September 2008 to bring the GoS and 
the rebel groups together in Doha, Qatar. Khartoum argued several times that it was 
serious about its commitments and launched a “Sudan People’s Initiative” (SPI) in 
November 2008 to mobilize the support from the African, Arab and Muslim world against 
the ICC decision. Moreover, the GoS tried to show that they were committed to a broad-
based consultation and came up with solutions for Darfur. Yet, International Crisis Croup 
(ICG) criticized that the GoS controlled the proceedings and that its own recommendations 
were not fulfilled.335 Reality proved ICGs concerns true because attacks from the 
government as well as from rebels have continued. 
In 2009 the GoS continued with their air raids with ill-equipped Antonovs, which do 
not allow precise targeting and therefore kill civilians, which is against humanitarian 
international law and moreover violating UNSC resolution 1591 (2005).336 Bassolé was 
able to bring progress in the peace talks between JEM and the GoS but the talks were 
nevertheless suspended on 18 June 2009 to be continued in Qatar in October 2009. 
From the beginning the GoS has refused to cooperate with the ICC. The first two 
warrants issued by the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber against suspected war criminals in April 
2007, Ahmed Haroun and Ali Kosheib, were not responded to. In March 2009 another 
warrant was issued, this time against the Sudanese President al-Bashir himself, and the 
antagonism of the GoS towards the ICC hardened. Instead of collaboration with the court, 
Khartoum expelled aid agencies from Sudan so they could not inform the world public and 
paid lip-service to investigate war crimes but to date only investigated low ranking 
criminals up to now.337 Moreover, the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security 
Services (NISS) arrested national and international aid workers and NGO staff between 
April and June 2009. As a consequence the number of aid workers had dropped from 
17,700 to 12,658 in Darfur by the end of June 2009. 
Between June and September 2009 fewer clashes took place in Darfur. Although the 
head of UNAMID already declared that the war “is over,”338 the fighting has proceeded 
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because the rainy season had ended. The peace process in Doha, supported by the UN, AU 
and Qatar, is still going on, but a meaningful outcome remains doubtful. Low-level 
violence, menace and sexual harassment continue to take place on a daily basis.339 Ever 
since the outbreak of the conflict in 2003, it is estimated that “more than 200,000” civilians 
in Darfur have died,340 some 2.7 million people have been displaced internally; in addition 
200,000 refugees in neighboring Chad and Central African Republic are the outcome. 
As the conflict is still ongoing currently (January 2010), the center of attention moves 
back to the South. The Sudanese national elections in April 2010 and the 2011 referendum 
about the self-determination of the South will determine the future of Sudan. Among 
others, ICG fears that both events the GoS might undermine and neither a meaningful 
political reform will take place nor will an eventual secession of the South be allowed.341 It 
is currently unclear which impact a fraud election will have on Darfur in the short run but 
also in relation to the whole conflict. 
The only chance for successful peace talks is a broad participation of all actors 
involved in the conflict. The weight of the participants has to be apportioned fairer and 
should not be that centered on the government and the rebels. Moreover, negotiators 
should be aware of accountability, a concept that is not only referring to ICC prosecutions 
or locking people in jail but also includes an independent judiciary, professional and 
capable police and reconciliation initiatives.342 Otherwise the GoS will continue to respond 
to its human rights abuses with defiance and obfuscation. 
 
4.8. Reactions of the International Community to the Conflict 
 
Darfur was not been an issue in the international community until late 2003 or even spring 
2004. This can be explained with the peace negotiations in Naivasha which devoted a lot 
of efforts to end the conflict between the North and the South of Sudan. The international 
community therefore only became active when the disaster was already on its way. This 
was the case in early 2004 when there was no possibility anymore to take solely preventive 
measures. Thus it was clear from the beginning that reactive measures would have to be 
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taken and not some kind of prevention efforts. For Darfur the first and immediate aim was 
to provide protection for two million IDPs and the 200,000 refugees in Chad. 
 
4.8.1. Emergence in the International Consciousness 
Africa Confidential reported on the situation in Darfur since mid-2003. Advocacy 
organizations like Amnesty International and the International Crisis Group followed with 
articles or reports about the Darfur crisis. In summer 2003 first attempts failed miserably to 
mediate the conflict in a regional frame. The Chadian president Lieutenant General Idriss 
Déby offered his good offices as a mediator although it was clear from the beginning that 
he had his own agenda in the conflict. 
The UN Human Rights Coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, was the first UN 
official to raise the question of Darfur together with Tom Vraalsen, Special Envoy of the 
Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs in Sudan. Together, they launched the ‘Greater 
Darfur Special Initiative’ on 15 September 2003 due to the fact that the “humanitarian 
situation in Darfur has deteriorated over the past six months [… which] has resulted in the 
displacement of large numbers of civilians.”343 Between September and November 2003, a 
series of meetings took place, which bargained a 45-day agreement for the allowance of 
humanitarian assistance in Darfur – but the accord ultimately failed. The GoS tried to 
appear as a serious actor and promised to comply while in fact the number of refugees 
grew by tens of thousands every month in Darfur. This policy from Khartoum can be 
observed until today: promising various points during negotiations and trying to be taken 
seriously as an actor although no agreement has been complied with. In early November 
2003, OCHA stated that the humanitarian situation in Darfur became the worst in Sudan 
since 1988.344 A month later, Jan Egeland, UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, was quoted 
that Darfur quickly became one of the worst humanitarian situations in the world.345 Yet 
the world was not listening. 
In January 2004, negotiations took place in Geneva and in the following month, the 
Sudanese President al-Bashir promised a peace conference, full amnesty and complete 
access for humanitarians.346 In early 2004, French media covered Darfur – mainly because 
of the French interest in Chad. Yet, for a long time the international reaction to the Darfur 
crisis was negligible. Ironically, the hopes of parts of the international community 
increased that the conflict in the South could be settled because the GoS was focusing 
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more on Darfur. Sudanese reporters who reported about attacks of rebels were arrested, 
restrictions and the denial of visas for Western journalists followed soon – even the Arab 
network Al Jazeera had to shut down their office in Khartoum.347 
Mukesh Kapila spoke of “the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis” in the end of March 
2004 and the “only difference between Rwanda and Darfur now is the numbers 
involved.”348 According to Kapila it was not just a conflict anymore, but rather an 
organized attempt to drive away people from their homes. As Kapila was present during 
the time of genocide in Rwanda, “newspapers went wild, and the New York Times started 
to write about ‘genocide’”349 in Darfur as well because they reasoned that ten years later 
history repeated itself. The New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof was the first to 
introduce Darfur to a broader public by an op-ed on 25 March 2004, later Kristof 
continued to write a series of articles about genocide in “slow motion” in Darfur.350 
In April 2004, the UN Secretary-General addressed the situation in Darfur by making 
it an issue at a memorial ceremony on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the 
Rwandan genocide.351 Later, also Samantha Power, a popular US-Irish journalist and 
writer, spoke out loud for Darfur,352 followed by many celebrities from music and movie 
business. This was problematic because in the US the debate was led to a direction that the 
common view of the crisis was ‘Blacks’ against ‘Arabs,’ not having in mind that the Arabs 
could not be that easily differentiated in comparison to the North-South conflict. This is 
why, in the same year, the common Western idea of genocide in Darfur was also 
contrasted. In particular the AU disagreed that the Darfur crisis constituted genocide and 
was supported by the respected humanitarian organization MSF. 
The peace talks in Naivasha between the South and North lost its appeal for the 
Western media, the ‘new’ conflict in Darfur, labeled as ‘genocide’ and illustrated by 
conscience-shocking pictures, attracted the attention. The media coverage of the situation 
in Darfur led to a public outcry in the quality press as well as in mass media. Prunier 
argues, however, that with the Asian tsunami on 26 December 2004, Darfur disappeared 
largely from the headlines because the media would only present one emotional story at a 
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time.353 The loss of media attention also represented a sort of unease of Western media 
about the Darfur conflict. Unlike the North-South conflict it was not based on religion, and 
the complexities in Darfur were hard to explain. Indeed, many people in this area were 
killed but the question whether this was genocide or not, overshadowed the debate. For the 
people in Darfur it made little difference whether they were killed because of genocidal 
intent or any other; their suffering continued. In the media, however, the question of 
genocide was of utmost relevance. 
The Darfur conflict is often linked to South Sudan, which is argued by the fact that 
other disadvantaged regions in Sudan also want to have a stronger say in Khartoum. The 
international community decided to prioritize the North-South conflict to leave Darfur out 
of negotiations. The troika – comprising the US, UK and Norway – decided to take this 
approach in the first half of 2004 thus Darfur was excluded in the Naivasha talks that tried 
to settle the North-South conflict. Indeed, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
between the South and Khartoum was reached but the Darfur conflict remained unsolved. 
De Waal criticizes that it should have been a pre-condition to “at least stabilize Darfur 
before concluding the talks.”354 Ibrahim argues that until 2006 the EU alone has pledged 
itself to 4.3 billion Euro of aid to Sudan in connection with the peace accord.355 The GoS is 
aware of the difficult situation for Western diplomats and disregards the threats they are 
confronted with. During the period between 2004 and 2007, the international community 
tried to improve the area by a multifarious range of goals that led to an incoherent strategy 
because the actors were overstrained. Ever since 2004, the international community has 
noticed a couple of objectives: (1) improving security and guarantee humanitarian access; 
(2) seeking justice at the ICC; (3) negotiating a peace agreement; and (4) dispatching a 
military force. Little progress was achieved because impossible aims were declared and 
unrealistic deadlines were set.356 
Soon it was clear that military action would be impossible to use as a tool in Darfur to 
settle the conflict. Many observers argue that a military intervention would have made the 
situation even worse in a short run and new seeds of possible conflict would have been 
spread in the long run, since the international community would have had a hard time to 
remain impartial.357 A robust international force would be pressured by all sides: Khartoum 
would claim that the troops are siding with the rebels while the rebels would accuse the 
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force on the opposite that they are siding with the Sudanese Armed Forces. Moreover, 
international media would broadcast the atrocities that would happen besides the presence 
of the international force. It is therefore a political fact that the UNSC could not support an 
intervention and a robust military operation without a broad international legitimacy. The 
poor infrastructure and the vast size of the region posed additional difficulties, making it 
almost impossible to appease the whole area and keep it safe over a longer time. The 
number of soldiers would have to be about 50,000 – nearly the double size of the biggest 
UN peacekeeping mission so far. This approach has been unrealistic because the West was 
occupied with Iraq before and now Afghanistan needs more attention again. Therefore it is 
neither for political nor for practical reasons suitable to send in troops to intervene. 
Lee Feinstein identifies four major problems that the international community is 
facing: (1) states continue to pursue ethnic cleansing as a national security strategy; (2) 
current international rules are an obstacle for international action and in case no national 
interest is at stake there will not be an adequate response; (3) the international capacity to 
act is limited; and (4) public support to prevent mass atrocities is nearly non-existent which 
correlates with a lack of political leadership.358 These four points addressed by Feinstein 
can also be found in the following two subchapters about AMIS and UNAMID. 
 
4.8.2. AMIS 
From an African point of view it is seen as a “fundamental shift from the principle of non-
interference in the internal conflicts of member states [… to] the right to intervene in such 
crisis to prevent or stop mass atrocities.”359 As the predecessor of the AU, the OAU, did 
not work very efficiently, there was hope that the new organization would change the 
African continent in a positive way. Clearly, conflict management is one of the big tasks 
that the AU has to fulfill and it is judged upon. The first major crisis the AU had to deal 
with was Darfur. The peacekeeping mission in Darfur depended, however, completely on 
foreign donors and AMIS, therefore, was dependent on the good-will of Brussels, New 
York and Washington. In July 2004 it was decided that the AU should send 132 observers 
to Darfur together with 300 troops to protect them. According to Prunier, the AU has 
perceived the crisis as a mass-murder without knowing who the perpetrators are, neither 
pointing at Khartoum nor at the Janjaweed.360 It helped to stabilize the overall situation to 
a certain extent that AMIS monitored the situation. Yet, both sides broke the ceasefire a 
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number of times, the violence against civilians continued.361 Therefore AMIS is also 
characterized for having “little real impact on the political, security or humanitarian 
situation in Darfur.”362 
But the AU remained limited with its capacity in Darfur that was not enough to fulfill 
the mandate. Still, the AU was in a lucky position because it did not have to pay for the 
mission as it was covered by Western donors and at the same was able to deploy soldiers 
on the ground to gain experience. A peacekeeping mission of more than 3,300 personnel 
was decided on, but only 597 soldiers were deployed to protect observers in October 2004. 
Thus AMIS was put in the untenable position to enforce an agreement that had no backing 
and could not be hold. In addition, AMIS never reached its authorized troop strength. 
In January 2006, the AU called upon the UN to take over its role in Darfur because of 
its limited mission mandate and the lack of financial and logistical support. In March the 
AU Peace and Security Council extended the mandate for AMIS for another six months, 
which suited all sides. After a subsequent coup d’état attempt in Chad, the relations with 
Sudan were broken off. Daly argues that this potential collapse ironically was an impetus 
to reach a deal over Darfur between the GoS and the rebels. From the beginning of its 
mandate in 2004 until the end of 2007, AMIS was hamstrung in Darfur because of its lack 
of resources, the poor organization and a loss of credibility.363 The overall performance of 
AMIS, therefore was not successful. 
 
4.8.3. The UN Security Council and Darfur 
The UNSC has been reluctant in putting pressure on the GoS. The Darfur crisis was first 
recognized in UNSC resolution 1547, which addressed the North-South peace process but 
also demanded to “bring an immediate halt to the fighting in Darfur.” The first resolution 
dealing solely with Darfur was only passed in July 2004, 17 months after the violent 
conflict had started. UNSC resolution 1556 called for an arms embargo on the Janjaweed 
and the rebels. The resolution was meaningless for the situation on the ground, because the 
twelve-point Darfur Action Plan, which resulted from talks between the GoS and the UN 
special representative Jan Pronk removed the threats of sanctions against the government. 
UNSC resolution 1564 called for robust action on legal grounds, the UN International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur was set up to investigate violations of human rights. As 
mentioned earlier it is important to understand that the CPA has not addressed Darfur. This 
                                                
361 Belloni 2006:327-328. 
362 Terrie, Jim (2006), “Military Options for Darfur”, in: Mepham, David/Ramsbotham, Alexander (eds.), Darfur: The 
Responsibility to Protect. London: Institute for Public Policy Research, p. 30. 
363 HRW 2008a:8. 
- 90 - 
decision also had an impact on the UNSC, because the most powerful institution in the UN 
system believed that the peace agreement with the South would automatically bring a 
resolution for Darfur.364 
Later, the GoS was requested to disarm the militia, but resolution 1591 in March 2005 
failed to have the desired effect as well. Only at that point of time, the UNSC thought 
about a broader range of sanctions, in particular targeted sanctions on specific persons, and 
a Panel of Experts was established. Yet, no instruments have been applied to fulfill the 
sanctions. In UNSC resolution 1593, the Council adopted a resolution to refer Darfur to the 
ICC and “bring all those responsible to justice,” an unprecedented step of taking an 
ongoing conflict to the ICC. Yet, it took time until a report was published and sanctions 
were still missing by the end of November 2005. The problem of the UNSC was that the 
first resolution came far too late. One could not speak about preventive actions anymore, 
rather about the scope, frequency and seriousness of the conflict as well about the 
measures that should be taken.365 
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Figure 3: UNSC Resolutions on Darfur until September 2007 
 
 
 
Source: Watson, Shari (2007), “The Responsibility to Protect in Darfur: A Critical Analysis of the 
International Response”, Working Paper Series in Intercultural Conflict Management No. 6, Berlin, pp. 29-
30. 
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The pressure on the UNSC grew in 2006 and all SC members visited and investigated 
the situation in Darfur and Chad in June 2006. Once more the result was poor. UNSC 
resolution 1706 in August 2006 proposed to expand UNMIS to Darfur, which was never 
implemented. The resolution also stressed the consent of the GoS, which led Weiss to 
conclude that the values of the emerging R2P norm were “mocked.”366 Instead, resolution 
1778 in September 2007 authorized a French-led EU peacekeeping mission (EUFOR 
Chad/RCA) in Chad and the Central African Republic to protect refugees from Darfur. 
EUFOR operated in the framework of MINURCAT and this multidimensional mission 
took over the control from EUFOR in March 2009. 
When it became clear that AMIS would not be able to fulfill its mandate and a stronger 
force on the ground was necessary, diplomats tried to win Khartoum’s agreement for a 
hybrid AU-UN force to protect civilians and deter rebel attacks and spoilers. In the end of 
July 2007, a combined peacekeeping force was authorized in UNSC resolution 1769, 
which should deploy 31,000 UN and AU personnel. Grünfeld has called it “very sad to 
observe” that the peacekeepers lack the authorization to disarm the militias and have to use 
all necessary men to protect civilians. He draws the conclusion that policy makers have not 
learnt their lesson from Rwanda and Srebrenica to deal appropriately with Darfur.367 
UNAMID started to deploy on 31 December 2007 but had to face difficulties from the 
beginning on. The biggest problems were staff shortages and attacks on its personnel like 
the one on 9 July 2008 where seven peacekeepers were killed. Countless envoys or 
emissaries from the AU or UN tried to bring the ‘Arab’ militia and the ‘African’ rebels 
together. They have one thing in common: they failed. 
The criticism of the UNSC also has to be seen in the context of how the council was 
created. It was mainly the US, in consensus with the other great powers that the UNSC 
should not get too strong and act without consent of its most prominent members.368 In 
comparison to genocides in the 1990s, the UNSC has been fully aware of and has been 
briefed about the atrocities in Darfur from the beginning on in 2004.369 Nevertheless, the 
GoS was able to resist the pressure from the council and with the support of two P5 states, 
China and Russia, Sudan had not much too fear. Also the indictments to the ICC have not 
been taken seriously by Khartoum and any cooperation has been steadfastly refused. 
Ironically, the former interior minister Ahmed Haroun, he of all people who is warranted 
by the ICC, was appointed as minister of humanitarian affairs and adviser on human 
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rights.370 Also the Janjaweed commander Ali Khosheib, who is sought by an arrest 
warrant, has not been extradited to The Hague.  
All in all, the UNSC has always been looking for the consent of the GoS concerning 
all measures taken in Darfur.  
 
4.9. Conclusion 
 
The GoS has tried to create ethnic constructs in Darfur, artificially summing up different 
ethnic groups to either being ‘African’ or ‘Arab.’ The reason of the Darfur crisis is thus not 
based on ethnic lines but is rather based on power and influence in Darfur and Sudan as a 
whole. Alex de Waal wondered not why the conflict broke out “but why it took so 
long,”371 bearing in mind the grievances of so many marginalized groups and people in 
many areas of Sudan. The GoS, constituted of the NCP since 1989, feared to lose control 
over Darfur and responded disproportionately to the attacks of rebels in the first half of 
2003. In a military campaign, carried out by the Khartoum-sponsored Janjaweed, ten 
thousands of civilians had to die and many more were displaced during the last years of the 
Darfur conflict. 
Murder, rape and hunger have been daily routine since 2003 in Darfur. The GoS has 
not tried to improve the situation for the people of Darfur, on the contrary the Government 
is responsible for the deteriorated situation because it is backing the militia and hampered 
and sometimes even blocked the access for humanitarian organizations. The rebels also 
have contributed to the anarchic situation in Darfur and at least since the fragmentation of 
the two main rebel groups after the DPA committed serious crimes during their fights 
between the different rebel splinters. The Darfur conflict was first addressed by the AU, 
which ultimately failed their litmus to solve an African conflict with an African force. 
AMIS was too weak to have a serious impact on the situation in Darfur, but also the AU-
UN hybrid peacekeeping force UNAMID is limited in its capabilities because the UNSC 
has not provided the mission with a strong enough mandate. The road to peace will still 
take a long time in Darfur. 
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5. Should R2P Be Applied in Darfur? 
 
The case of the Darfur crisis proves that some members of the UN Security Council like 
China and Russia have invoked a primacy of the domestic responsibility of the state. Those 
members have argued for a long time that it would be premature to take collective action in 
Sudan because the GoS had not manifestly failed to exercise its responsibility to protect 
the people in Darfur. The Darfur conflict indicates the ambivalence of the principle of 
complementarity because domestic ownership is preserved and people still cannot be 
protected. 
In this chapter, it will be discussed whether R2P should have been exercised in Darfur. 
To answer this question, firstly the debate of genocide in Darfur will be revisited by 
discussing the concept of genocide and the controversy over the numbers of people having 
been killed in the Darfur crisis since 2003. Moreover, the role of UNAMID will be debated 
to understand the role of the peacekeeping mission in Darfur, which tries to protect 
civilians in the region. Finally, it will be mooted if the international community’s response 
to the Darfur crisis has been a “failure to protect.” 
 
5.1. The Debate on Genocide in Darfur 
 
Khartoum believed to triumph over Western states in January 2005. The UN International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur reported to the UNSG that not enough evidence of 
genocidal intent had been found in Darfur, although the Commission blamed the GoS of 
committing crimes against humanity and war crimes. The UN findings ran contrary to 
Western allegations, in particular to those of the US, stating that since spring 2004 the 
ruling elite in Sudan had been responsible for genocide in Darfur. It therefore came as no 
surprise that Evans noted, “labeling can be counterproductive, particularly regarding 
allegations of genocide.”372 Instead of focusing on the crimes taking place on site in 
Darfur, the debate shifted to a controversy about numbers. In such a debate it is difficult to 
keep on track when hypocrisy outweighs a fact-based and knowledge-driven approach. 
Differences in the numbers of body count are a given fact and the estimation of how 
many people were killed in wars, pogroms and genocides in the 20th century varies 
significantly. Steven Pinker presents a number of 100 million people,373 while Rudolph 
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Rumble estimates 217 million people being killed in the 20th century.374 This enormous 
difference in numbers can be explained by the definition that is used for the calculations. 
Are the numbers including only death tolls that are directly related to war or violent 
conflict? Or are the consequences of war, such as famine or diseases, included as well? 
Most commonly it is difficult or even impossible to gather exact numbers, they will always 
remain speculative. In the case of Darfur, too, the numbers of killed people vary 
considerably between 9,000 and 400,000. To clarify this huge gap, the term genocide will 
be discussed and the debate about the body count in Darfur will be presented in the 
following section. 
 
5.1.1. What is Actually Genocide? 
In 1933, Raphael Lemkin, a young Polish lawyer of Jewish descent, suggested to declare 
the extermination of national, ethnic or religious groups an international crime. Lemkin 
referred in particular to the 1915 mass killings of Armenians by the Young Turks in the 
Ottoman Empire. After escaping to the United States, Lemkin coined the term ‘genocide’ 
in his book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe in 1944, suggesting that the systematic and 
deliberate destruction of people is a crime against international law. The international 
community accepted Lemkin’s idea of genocide whereupon the Nuremberg Trials 
considered the Holocaust not as a distinct crime committed by individuals but as an 
aggressive war on a global scale. Lemkin continued to campaign for a universal acceptance 
to forbid genocide, which in 1948 resulted in the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) passed by the newly established UN and 
entering into force in 1951. Soon, the Convention was classified as pre-existing customary 
international law and as an obligation erga omnes.375 The CPPCG should investigate 
crimes committed with the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. 
Five characteristic points can be identified: (1) killing members of a particular group; (2) 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (3) forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group; (4) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions 
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction; and (5) imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group.376 At the same time, due to a lack of guidance, 
relevant organs of the UN have not applied the Convention for a long time. With a 
judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the attitude of turning a blind eye on 
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genocides changed, as specific obligations of the state to prevent and punish genocide were 
pointed out in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro.377 Based on 
the decision taken by the ICJ, member states have specific obligations to prevent and 
punish genocide and make sure its own organs or officials are not involved in committing 
genocide. States are furthermore requested to establish jurisdiction over all acts of 
genocide occurring on their territory. 
In general, the CPPCG focuses on the punishment and not on the prevention of 
genocide. With the establishment of ad-hoc tribunals in the 1990s, such as the ICTY and 
the ICTR,378 there was hope that the preventive effect of international courts would be 
strengthened. The other side of the coin was the disturbing fact that after the establishment 
of the ICTY in 1993, ethnic cleansing was used as a deliberate strategy by the three 
nationalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ad-hoc tribunals were nevertheless a way to fill 
an institutional gap in international law tackling war crimes and sentencing war criminals 
on an individual basis. Therefore, seen in an optimistic way, justice has been brought to at 
least some victims, several perpetrators have been sentenced and international law has 
been strengthened. Facing up to the facts though, jurisdiction has been slow and expensive 
and, in addition, many victims have not experienced justice being done to them. 
An important step was taken with the creation of the ICC-based Rome Statute in 1998. 
As Strauss points out, R2P could be the frame of reference for the ICC for preventing and 
halting crimes.379 State parties have an obligation to cooperate with the ICC and to arrest 
the culprits when the UNSC refers a matter to the ICC under Chapter VII of the Charter. It 
was the first time in history that the ICC issued an arrest warrant against a president in 
office, namely the Sudanese President al-Bashir, causing worldwide attention.  
The problem remains that despite the development in international law, history has 
been paved with failures to halt genocide or crimes against humanity since World War II. 
Ten years after the Rwandan genocide, Kofi Annan established an Office for the Special 
Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide in July 2004 and appointed the Argentine Juan 
Méndez first. The purpose of the Special Adviser is to put a specific focus on genocide in 
order to prevent failures of the UN like those of the 1990s. The task of the office is to 
provide information about states where the risk of mass atrocities is the highest. So far, the 
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office has identified different types of assistance it can provide and is especially in favor of 
a cooperative approach because the state at stake knows that a proper behavior and 
complicity is expected. Most effective action is therefore undertaken in cooperation with 
the government and not against it. If the state does not comply with its humanitarian duties, 
more robust international action becomes necessary. During his tenure Méndez traveled 
twice to Darfur but some members of the UNSC were not willing to invite the Special 
Adviser – among them China, Russia and also the US. Also Méndez’s successor, Francis 
Deng, has dealt intensively with Darfur. Deng convincingly argues that the debate on 
massive human rights violations should not be about labels, but that the focus has to be put 
on the action that actually stops the crimes being committed. The problem for Deng, 
however, is the fact that he is not able to settle this issue in the UN because it depends on 
the member states to set up a body that would specify whether genocide occurs. 
Furthermore, the ICC can only arrest individuals that are found guilty after genocide has 
already taken place. 
Matthew Lippman speaks about a ‘genocide denial syndrome’ of global powers 
concerning the use of the term genocide because of reluctance to invoke the moral and 
political implications of the conception. Moreover, African victims, like in the case of 
Darfur, do not appeal in the same way to the Western mind than European ones.380 
Lippman further argues that the relation of genocide and the Holocaust “provided the term 
with enormous moral weight. […] Our image of genocide remains identified with the 
‘Nazi Super State.’ The acknowledgement of genocide at times seems more a matter of 
politics than analytical precision.”381 Following this line of argument, the international 
community has a hard time to avoid the term genocide because otherwise the states would 
have difficulties to explain why they are bystanders to yet another catastrophe. 
 
5.1.2. The Fight about Numbers in Darfur 
A dispute about numbers soon began to arise after the Western world had taken notice of 
the conflict in 2004, and indeed very different statistics are given. The GoS has claimed 
that only 9,000 people have died although international organizations have presented 
different numbers. The UN usually refers to more than 200,000 Darfuris who have 
perished since 2003. NGOs like Amnesty International estimate that 300,000 people have 
been killed although it is differentiated between 95,000 people killed and 200,000 conflict-
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related deaths like hunger or disease. On the top of the estimates is the US-based NGO 
network Darfur coalition, which gives a total of 400,000 people having been wiped out 
since the outbreak of the conflict in 2003. Generally speaking, it is not possible to give 
exact numbers not least because in many areas access for humanitarian workers is not 
possible. Such an ambiguity over numbers was also the case in the North-South civil war 
in Sudan, which started in 1984. For a long time, Western media gave the number of one 
million deaths. The consensus later jumped to two million deaths – but no one really 
knows the actual toll until today.382 The same fate goes for the Darfur victims, as their 
exact number is not close to be known. 
 
Figure 4: Estimated Number of Deaths in Darfur until Mid 2008 
 
Source: Grünfeld, Fred (2009), “Failures to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda (1994), Srebrenica (1995), and 
Darfur (since 2003)”, Genocide Studies and Prevention Vol. 4(2), p. 230. 
 
As can be seen above in Figure 4, Grünfeld tried to estimate the number of persons, 
who have been killed due as direct and indirect influence of the miserable consequences 
since the beginning of the Darfur conflict in February 2003. It was the international 
community’s failure to put the GoS under strong pressure with UNSC resolutions during 
the second half of 2004, which led to a sharp rise in the number of killings and a 
deterioration of the situation.383 The data given by Grünfeld, however, does not seem to be 
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very reliable because he indicated a linear development in the number of dead people from 
2005 onward, a trend which does not correspond to reports of HRW or ICG.384 
There remains the problem to know where statistics on death tolls derive from and 
how they are put together because the time frame and the areas included vary for different 
studies. The impact of the kind of death causes included into the statistic is important. 
Numbers based on minimalist estimations easily lead to inaction, because the international 
community would not address a humanitarian crisis adequately on its agenda. On the 
contrary, credibility is lost in case the numbers given can easily be questioned. It would 
therefore be necessary to establish an international authority, which, on the basis of 
standardized data, could bring more reliability in the current confusion of statistics. 
Currently, however, precise data on death tolls in ongoing violent conflicts does not seem 
to be available currently or in the near future. 
 
5.1.3. No Genocide in Darfur? 
Those who doubt that during the Darfur conflict the GoS committed genocide, often refer 
to the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, which noted that no genocide 
has taken place. This result was achieved because the intent of the GoS to destroy the 
whole or a part of an ethnic group was not seen. Moreover, the ICC has not issued any 
warrants to genocide so far with their indictments against Sudanese officials. The same can 
be said about Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, who refrain from speaking 
about genocide in this case. Nevertheless, the GoS is accused by HRW of war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and a systematic failure to protect civilians.385 
Pressure groups in the US have used the term genocide quite often to mobilize civil 
society and gain donations. They were successful in terms of the speech of the US 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, in September 2004 claiming that genocide is going on in 
Darfur in front of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations – the first time in history 
that the US government declared that a conflict was ‘genocide’ while the events were still 
ongoing. Ironically, the statement of Powell had no practical consequences on the US 
policy on Darfur. Prunier argues that Powell was advised to use the term genocide and 
satisfy the Senators but not to take any military action as a consequence.386 In June 2009, 
General Scott Gration, Obama’s Special Envoy for Sudan, characterized the situation in 
Darfur not as genocide, but he stated that remnants of genocide can be seen.387 In general, 
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parallels were drawn between the framing of the Darfur conflict as ‘genocide’ and the 
Rwandan genocide. In 2004, particularly with the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan 
genocide, “Darfur became an occasion to vent ruminations for failing to act in genocides 
past, and expressed the fear of failure in genocide present.”388 
The atrocities in Darfur are rightly labeled as ‘genocide,’ argues De Waal – as long as 
the interpretation of the ICTR is taken as given.389 In comparison with many other 
conflicts, like the civil war in Sudan between the South and the North or the events in the 
DRC, which involve a much higher number of deaths, the killings in Darfur are 
comparatively few. For an event to count as genocide, however, does not necessarily imply 
an absolute annihilation of a group but the deliberate damage to the group as a whole. 
Indeed, enough evidence of physical attacks, ethnic cleansing and the policy of scorched 
earth, which ultimately leads to famine and people dying of hunger, has been collected.390 
Following the reasoning of the ICTR, the ideological construct between ‘Arabs’ and 
‘Africans’ would be overcome by defining genocide victims as “a stable and permanent 
group, whose membership is defined largely by birth.”391 The problem arises that many 
more events would have to be called ‘genocide’ as well, and the reservation of this term for 
the most extreme cases would get lost. 
Many actors – among them the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 
the AU, HRW and Amnesty International – neglected the use of the term ‘genocide’ with 
regard to Darfur. What they have in common is that they shy away from the label 
‘genocide’ although they are aware of the atrocities on site. As the Commission of Inquiry 
stated, the “crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing at least as far as the 
central Government authorities are concerned […] and does not evince a specific intent to 
annihilate, in whole or part, a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious 
grounds.”392 
So far, only two incidents are generally recognized as genocides – the Holocaust and 
Rwanda.393 The events in Armenia, Bosnia, Cambodia or the DRC – to name just a few – 
are largely recognized as horrible mass killings but not all refer to them as genocide 
because the convention is not applied. The same problem occurs with the Darfur conflict 
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because crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansings clearly took place on a 
large scale. For all those crimes the GoS and the Janjaweed are claimed to be responsible 
for, but also the Darfur rebels committed horrible crimes against civilians. Anyhow, the 
events in Darfur are termed, the atrocities committed – whether labeled genocide or not – 
should have been tackled immediately by the UNSC to enforce human rights; enough 
evidence has been collected to proof what had happened. It would not have mattered in 
practical terms if the UN International Commission of Inquiry would have used the term 
genocide, because China and Russia as well as the non-permanent members of that time, 
Algeria and Pakistan, would have rejected the findings and calls for a robust intervention. 
Hence there was a necessity of Western states to gain the upper hand against allegations 
from Muslim and African countries that a neo-imperial and anti-Islamic agenda was 
pursued. 
Darfur was framed in the Western debate as ‘genocide,’ which had the positive side 
effect that it was not neglected as a marginal humanitarian crisis, like so many others in 
sub-Saharan Africa are, but seen as a prominent human rights disaster. The international 
consciousness was directed towards Darfur; during 2004, media and civil society in Europe 
and the US focused a lot on the events in Darfur. The Western ignorance to the 
complexities of the Darfur conflict, however, has induced a decrease of Western media 
attention and the events in Sudan were forgotten again. Instead of debating possible 
measures to repel the atrocities in Darfur, many Western policy makers were occupied 
with the debate whether or not genocide had occurred. Hence, no action like effective 
sanctions or military campaigns could be taken because P5-members blocked the UNSC. 
 
5.2. UNAMID 
 
With UNSC resolution 1769 of July 2007, a 26,000 strong African Union-UN force, the 
biggest UN peacekeeping operation in history, was supposed to be established to protect 
IDPs, civilians and humanitarian workers by “all necessary means” within the beginning of 
2008. In comparison to AMIS, UNAMID has to be seen as an improvement, at least in 
theory. The mandate of the mission is under Chapter VII and there was hope that the AU 
peacekeepers would be able to protect civilians effectively thanks to the additional UN 
troops. Reality proved to be different because additional capacity in Darfur has been 
deployed very slowly and in minor steps, and the provided resources have remained 
insufficient. 
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By 1 January 2008, only about a third of the promised force was on the ground in 
Darfur; equipment and training did not have enough funding. Sudan insisted that 
predominantly African troops and police should be sent to Darfur. Western actors therefore 
claimed that the GoS was undermining the efforts of the international community. Among 
others, Khartoum rejected Scandinavian engineers to be deployed. UN member states with 
existing military means, however, did not provide the equipment, like helicopters or trucks, 
which would be required by UNAMID to fulfill its mandate. As long as African and Arab 
states do not pressure Sudan with sanctions and incentives to reach an agreement with the 
rebels, Khartoum remains in a comfortable position. Also the UNSC was not able to 
impose targeted sanctions against Sudanese key officials although they did not comply 
with the UNAMID deployment, which had often been seen as a vital component to 
pressure Sudan. Hence the GoS was able to delay visa applications, especially for Western 
staff, and the custom procedure of critical equipment was deferred as well.394  
UNAMID has an enormous budget of 1.6 billion USD from 1 July 2009 until 30 June 
2010. Yet, only 70% of the 20,000 troops and 6,000 policemen are on the ground395 and 
critical equipment like tactical helicopters are still missing two years after UNAMID’s 
establishment, although the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of the UN 
tried hard to convince governments to provide the equipment.396 Harsh criticisms against 
UNAMID from various sides saying that civilians were not protected was answered late, 
but it was reacted to it, after all, in August 2009 in form of 24/7 patrols across Darfur. The 
protection mandate is used more immediately and effectively in terms of preventive 
patrolling because it provides safety for civilians fleeing from fighting, or allows stronger 
advocacy for the different parties.397 
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Figure 5: UNAMID’s Deployment in Darfur in July 2009 
 
 
Source: UN Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section in July 2009. 
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5.3. The Failure to Protect 
 
Many civilians died in the course of the Darfur conflict since 2003. Nevertheless, the 
international community has not been able to protect the local population. At first, it was 
simply not aware of the atrocities on site, and afterwards because it proved unable to 
condemn the GoS strongly enough and finally because of an under-resourced UN 
peacekeeping mission. Thus, the international community has failed during all those years 
of the conflict to adequately respond to the Darfur crisis. 
 
5.3.1. Need for Proper Peace Talks 
One of the biggest problems that the international community faced in dealing with Darfur 
was the scope and inclusiveness of peace talks. Often enough, it was stated that the 
AU/UN mediation teams would be prepared for inclusive negotiations but in the end they 
always faced the dilemma of whom to invite. Which rebel group was big enough to be 
representative on the negotiation table and bring in its interests? There were rebel groups 
which only existed in the internet or had a charismatic person in the lead but no vigilantes. 
Another problem was that the Arab tribes often have a different stance than the GoS, but 
no obvious representative. Although the main targets of violence in Darfur were non-Arab, 
also ‘Arab’ tribes suffered from violence of Khartoum or their supporters. 
The main aim is to reach sustainable peace, hence the GoS must address long-term 
grievances of Darfurians and the power issue between Darfur and Khartoum must be 
clarified. Clearly, it very much depends on the scope of negotiations and which issues are 
to be addressed to bring stability in the long run. It is recognized that those who have 
committed crimes since 2003 have to be held accountable, in particular the Janjaweed. 
Similarly, it has to be sure that the militias as well as the rebels are disarmed. There also 
has to be found a solution for giving new grazing areas to the ‘Arabs,’ who have to return 
land to the former settlers. 
 
5.3.2. Military vs. political solutions 
From the very beginning, actors in the West, particularly politicians and humanitarians, 
have called for military action. They have argued that without an armed intervention, lives 
will be lost on a massive scale. Khartoum will continue its path of indifference or even 
involvement in the mass atrocities. In the long run, the security situation would be 
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improved. A flight ban, for example, could be achieved by destroying or disabling the 
aircraft on the ground.398 
Opponents argue that no-fly zones, air strikes or a non-consensual NATO-intervention 
would cause more harm than help. No-fly zones would be very costly and it would be 
difficult to run them effectively without troops on the ground. Moreover, such no-fly zones 
would also interrupt humanitarian flights.399 The Muslim world and the global south would 
understand and interpret a military interference as a ‘Western imperialist intervention.’ 
Moreover, it is said that only limited results are possible, because military interventions 
would not solve any deep-rooted problems. Relief organizations argue that a deterioration 
of the humanitarian situation would be followed by an intervention because the GoS, that 
would evict humanitarian workers, and the suffering of civilians would become even 
worse. 
Whatever position is taken, neither the UN nor a ‘coalition of the willing’ will 
undertake coercive military action in Darfur. The national interest of Western states is not 
threatened by the Darfur conflict. In comparison to Iraq or Afghanistan, Western leaders 
cannot sell to their electorate that soldiers are dying in Sudan. Any military action would 
as well need a broad military consensus in the UNSC but Sudan can rely upon China, 
Russia and the Arab League to safeguard robust international action. 
In the US more than 100 NGOs have united in the SaveDarfur coalition with the aim 
to help the people of Darfur. The campaign Million Voices for Darfur was launched in 
January 2006 and by the end of June of the same year a million postcards were collected 
and delivered to US President George W. Bush.400 Such campaigns of SaveDarfur had a 
strong impact on the debate in the US about the policy towards Darfur, grass root 
movements tried to pressure the government. The US administration was, however, 
reluctant of a robust military intervention that SaveDarfur asked for. 
The scale of the tragedy in Darfur is enormous and it is often said that Darfur 
constitutes the worst humanitarian crisis so far in the new millennium. Important political 
actors in the West even called the atrocities ‘genocide.’ Nevertheless the Darfur conflict 
was not sufficient enough for the international community to intervene, in particular for the 
West. A key influence was the US-led humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1993, 
which ended as a disaster for the US army. Thenceforward, the US has hesitated to be 
actively engaged with military personnel on the African continent; neither in Rwanda nor 
                                                
398 Feinstein 2007:45. 
399 Feinstein 2007:45. 
400 Hehir 2008:82. 
- 106 - 
in Darfur the US stopped the atrocities on site because national interest favored the aim of 
decreasing human suffering. 
 
5.4. Conclusions 
 
Darfur has been an evident R2P situation since 2003. According to R2P standards, as 
outlined in Chapter 3, the Darfur crisis was an ‘extreme case’ involving large loss of life. 
Nevertheless the UNSC was not able to address the Darfur conflict before summer 2004, 
one and a half years after the outbreak of the fighting. The response of the Council towards 
the actors, especially the GoS, was weak and insufficient. The African Union reacted 
quicker but their peacekeeping troops were inadequately equipped. Eventually, AMIS was 
expanded to a hybrid AU/UN mission with the start of 2008 – the biggest peacekeeping 
deployment of the UN in history. At least in theory, because until today the mission is 
understaffed; and in addition, tactical equipment has not been provided. 
Since 2003, the GoS and its militia have killed thousands of Darfuris during the course 
of the conflict. Many more people have suffered from the consequences of rape, expulsion 
and the destruction of crops, which led to famines. Refugees and IDPs all over the region 
identify a policy of ethnic cleansing. Overall, five million Darfurians have been affected by 
the conflict. Nonetheless, the term genocide does not seem to be appropriate in the narrow 
legal understanding. No clear distinction between the different groups in Darfur can be 
drawn, whereas an artificial distinction between ‘Africans’ and ‘Arabs,’ an ideological 
construct of Khartoum, has been made. 
The international community has failed to take up the responsibility to protect the 
people of Darfur. Clearly, the GoS was not only unwilling to protect its own citizens but 
there is a lot of evidence that Khartoum concerted the atrocities. Therefore, it was up to the 
international community to fulfill their duty to react – as prevention efforts would have 
been already too late. The setup of the UNSC with the veto power of the P5, however, 
prohibited mutual understanding between the powerful members in the Council. Hence, 
neither effective sanctions nor military action was possible. Although resolution 1769 
(2007) passed in the UNSC to establish UNAMID, the consent of Khartoum for every 
major step taken was necessary. As a consequence the mandate of the peacekeeping 
mission is rather weak and the suffering of the people in Darfur, although on a lower level 
now, continues. 
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6. Systematic Failures of R2P? 
 
R2P is a concept with limited applicability. It is a principle that will be not applied 
uniformly around the globe – power and circumstance will determine the decision whether 
and how the international community will act in case of gross human rights violation. A 
particular difficulty is the use of last resort, military action, in case all other political or 
diplomatic efforts have failed. States often do not use their force because it is not in their 
national interest to provide the necessary resources. Another remaining challenge is the 
fact that R2P may be used as an excuse for an intervention primarily based on economic 
interests. This chapter firstly sums up again why the international community has not 
interfered actively until 2008 in Darfur despite an R2P situation had been assessed earlier. 
Secondly, other cases of possible or alleged R2P cases are briefly introduced to look for 
systematic failures of R2P. Finally, alternatives to R2P will be presented. 
 
6.1. Why R2P Has Not Been Applied in Darfur 
 
Khartoum has the responsibility to protect its citizens, but it has willfully and impudently 
not done so. Atrocities against civilians have taken place constantly since 2003. Although 
the GoS promised at numerous times to stick to peace negotiations, cease-fires and the 
disarmament of the militia, it has failed to comply with these commitments. Despite the 
pressure from the international community and various UNSC resolutions, Khartoum has 
continued with its brutal policy in Darfur. Clearly, the international community would 
have had the responsibility to protect the civilians in Darfur, but has not done so. As 
Chapter 5 of this research paper showed, the UNSC was not able until summer 2004 to 
address the Darfur crisis at all. Later, the Council was not able to pass a meaningful 
resolution to either impose targeted sanctions against the GoS or disarm the Janjaweed 
militia, let alone to deploy troops in Darfur. After an unsuccessful attempt of the AU to 
control the situation in the Western provinces of Sudan, UNAMID took over the lead in 
2008. The hybrid peacekeeping mission of AU and UN forces was established too late and 
until today has not been equipped adequately. Moreover, the peak of the atrocities was 
already over when the troops were deployed. Today the clashes continue, but on a lower 
level of intensity. China and Russia were able to block the UNSC, thus the architecture of 
the UN institutional set up would have had to be changed if R2P should have been applied 
in the case of Darfur. Not only in Darfur atrocities on a large scale were committed – a lot 
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of other mass killings can be identified in the 21st century where the question arises 
whether it was an R2P situation or not. 
 
6.2. An R2P Case or Not? 
 
Several humanitarian crises have been referred to as a ‘R2P situation’ since 2001, when the 
term R2P was introduced. Although R2P supporters argue that only few cases should be 
classified as being of R2P concern, there is a long list of countries that have been identified 
as R2P cases since 2001: Burma/Myanmar, China, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Russia, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe. These 
countries either were no R2P cases (Burma, Georgia and Iraq), the threshold was not 
reached (Israel/Gaza Strip, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe), the UNSC would have been blocked 
(China and Russia) or the international community failed to react (DRC, Somalia and 
Sudan). The only exception where R2P was applied is the case of Kenya, where the 
international community took the ‘responsibility to prevent’ to stop the Kenyan post-
election crisis in 2008. In general, however, the international community continues to fail 
in its effort to protect civilians suffering repression in their country. The following cases 
briefly present the debate on R2P in other cases than Darfur. 
 
6.2.1. Wrong Claims of R2P 
Since the 1962 coup d’état, the Burmese people had suffered from constant human rights 
violations. The military junta cracked down brutally the ‘Saffron revolution’ of peaceful 
Buddhist monks in 2007 and brought the country back to the international attention. One 
year later, cyclone Nargis destroyed vast parts of Burma and affected an estimated 1.5 
million people but the junta neglected international aid and did not permit humanitarians to 
enter the country. Therefore, some humanitarian organizations like the International 
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) advocated R2P,401 but were abandoned by R2P 
proponents because any intervention in the aftermath of cyclone Nargis would be 
counterproductive for the Burmese people, who would suffer even more.402 
Russian politicians referred the crisis between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 to 
R2P because of an alleged imminent threat of genocide to the South Ossetians and to 
Russians in Georgia. Thereby Russia pleaded R2P, thus legitimizing its own intervention 
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in South Ossetia. The events around the 2008 South Ossetia War was no R2P situation, 
however, because Russia has to protect the people within its own borders. When Russia 
wants to shield vulnerable people, whether they live in a neighboring country like in 
Georgia or not, a concerted approach in the UNSC is needed to respond to the crisis, but 
not a unilateral intervention.  
Like Russia, also the US tried to invoke R2P to legitimate the 2003 Iraq War. 
Although President George W. Bush was able to form a ‘coalition of the willing,’ no 
UNSC authorization was obtained and therefore the US-led intervention ‘Operation Iraqi 
Freedom’ was not in accordance with international law. Although Saddam Hussein 
committed crimes against humanity, like the gas attack in the Kurdish city of Halabja in 
March 1988, and can be described as a dictator, no imminent threat against an ethnic part 
of the population in Iraq was on hand in 2003. 
 
6.2.2. Unreached R2P Threshold 
Sri Lanka had faced continued violence with more than 100,000 victims since the civil war 
between the Tamil Tiger (LTTE) and the government had started in 1983. In 2006, the Sri 
Lankan army started massive attacks against the Tigers, which eventually led to a victory 
for the Sinhalese government after a 30-month-long military campaign eventually. During 
the last months of the brutal fighting, civilians were trapped between the battle lines. 
Between May and December 2009, 280,000 civilians were detained in IDP camps in the 
North of the island whereby 100,000 people remained in camps by the end of 2009.403 
Thakur argued that R2P was not pleaded during the violent conflict because Sri Lanka had 
the right to defend its own citizens against “one of the most ruthless terrorist 
organizations” also by military means. Nonetheless, the Sri Lankan government has the 
responsibility to rebuild and reconstruct the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka.404 
The Gaza War, lasting for three weeks in December 2008 and January 2009, was also 
referred to as an R2P situation. The Hamas ended the ceasefire with Israel and fired 
rockets on Israeli territory, which was responded by an offensive of the Israeli Armed 
Forces into the Gaza Strip. According to the UN, over 1,300 lives had to be claimed in the 
Gaza Strip during the three weeks of the conflict.405 In particular Richard Falk, UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, claimed that “no world circumstance 
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combines the misery and vulnerability of the people more urgently than does the situation 
of the people of Gaza living under occupation since 1967” and made reference to R2P 
because of the crimes committed in the Gaza Strip by Israel.406 The US, however, blocked 
any proposal for a resolution condemning Israel in the UNSC. The Independent Fact 
Finding Committee on Gaza produced the report On Gaza: No Safe Place in February 
2009 for the Arab League accusing the UNSC of having failed in protecting civilians in 
Gaza. On 15 September 2009, the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 
mandated by the UN Human Rights Council and headed by Justice Richard Goldstone, 
released its report on the investigation of crimes committed in Gaza and found evidence of 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by Israel. The Fact Finding 
Mission also found evidence that Palestinian armed groups had committed war crimes. 
Nonetheless, the threshold of R2P was nonetheless not reached and the claims of R2P were 
rather based on ideology, formed during the decade-long Middle East Conflict, than on 
facts  
 
6.2.3. The Failure to React 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo four million lives during the civil war, which ended 
in 2003, were claimed. Although ‘Africa’s First World War’ is officially over, crimes like 
rape, murder, forced displacement and the use of child soldiers have continued on a daily 
basis in the DRC, especially in the northeast. Deng found at a visit in the North Kivu 
region in late 2008 that in the DRC “massive violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law were being committed on the basis of ethnicity and national origin.”407 
Also in Somalia, commonly referred to as a ‘failed state,’ the insecurity of civilians 
continues because of the escalating clashes between the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) and Ethiopia with its anti-government elements. Both parties in the conflict are 
responsible for numerous attacks against civilians, which in some cases were classified as 
war crimes. The security situation in Mogadishu, the Somali capital, is particularly bad 
because of constant violence, and in south-central Somalia more than a million people 
have been displaced. The problem in Somalia is the lack of state authority; rebels or state-
like entities control major parts of the country. Hence, the TFG clearly fails to protect its 
citizens, but the international community fears to plead R2P because of the shameful 
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experience in the first half of the 1990s with UNOSOM I and II and the US-led robust 
intervention with UNITAF. Since 2005, Somalia has made the headlines again because of 
the rise of Somalia pirates and their ship hijackings in the Gulf of Aden. Although a naval 
force tries to protect vessels, the international community neglects the humanitarian 
situation. 
 
6.2.4. One Successful Example 
On 30 December 2007, it was announced that Mwai Kibaki had won his second term in a 
contested Kenyan presidential elections. The result was a political crisis on a scale not seen 
in Kenya since its 1963 independence. Ethnic violence started to spread from the Rift 
Valley Province to other parts of the country and parallels were drawn to the 1994 situation 
in Rwanda shortly before the outbreak of the genocide. In Kenya, more than 1,000 people 
were killed in ethnic-related violence, in a few weeks an estimated 300,000 people were 
displaced, and churches were burnt down.408. 
In the end of January 2008, former UNSG Kofi Annan arrived in Kenya and 
successfully mediated and negotiated a political settlement that was achieved on 28 
February 2008. Since April 2008, politics are again relatively calm again in Kenya and 
hence Evans claimed that the easing of the situation in Kenya was a successful example of 
how R2P can succeed – in particular the responsibility to prevent.409 A BBC investigation, 
however, found that Kenya remains a ticking time bomb and ethnic communities in the 
Rift Valley are rearming for the upcoming election 2012 – on this occasion with 
sophisticated weaponry, which might cause even more bloodshed.410 Officially, Annan’s 
preventive efforts have rescued the country from wide-spread violence and the formation 
of a unity government. Nonetheless, as the BBC article shows, Kenya’s peace remains 
fragile. 
 
6.3. Inherent Problems of R2P 
 
In Section 6.2. it was shown that the international community does not yet know how to 
deal with the R2P concept. In some cases R2P was either misused by major powers like the 
US or Russia, in other cases the R2P threshold was not reached. As soon as an event would 
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have been declared an R2P case, the international community would not have been able to 
deal successfully with the humanitarian crisis. One of the biggest problems of R2P are the 
various understandings of the concept by different states and scholars. Moreover, the R2P 
concept failed to include a sanction regime because neither the ICISS nor the Outcome 
Document included any kind of penalization in case UNSC members or regional actors do 
not follow the duty to protect civilians. 
This section discusses inherent problems related to the R2P concept. Firstly, non-UN-
led humanitarian interventions as a last resort will remain fraught with problems. 
Secondly, Western countries with military might do not intervene in areas like Darfur 
because there is no national interest at stake. Thirdly, international humanitarian law is not 
strong enough to commit the international community, in particular the UNSC, to the 
protection of civilians. Fourthly, oppressed groups are ultimately encouraged to take up 
arms and start a rebellion knowing that R2P might help their cause. Finally, the threshold 
by which an R2P situation has been reached is not obvious. 
 
6.3.1. Discussion on Intervention Revisited 
In Section 3.1. of this research paper it was shown that a humanitarian intervention is a 
two-edged sword. The legitimacy of the interveners’ intent is questioned not least within 
the country of the intervener because even in democratic states the government is 
unrepresentative of its citizens, in particular regarding foreign policy issues.411 Chandler 
argued that by circumventing the international legal system, an illegal humanitarian 
intervener reintroduces chaos into international affairs and fundamentally challenges the 
pre-existing structures of international order. This leaves the judgment to an individual 
state, rather than having it referred to the UN, thus withdrawing consensus and reliability 
from international law.412 Although R2P has tried to overcome such constraints it has not 
yet been able to turn the tide of the debate and a lot of questions remain open. As long as 
the UNSC may get blocked also regional alternatives are of interest. In the Western world 
there are actually only two organizations that can be mentioned, NATO and the EU. 
In 2005, NATO identified “oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse 
of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” as threats to the 
member states of the organization. NATO has the military capacity to act against mass 
atrocities against civilians but with the exception of Kosovo has not used its military might 
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in any other case. In Darfur, NATO airlifted around 16,000 troops into and out of Darfur 
for AMIS. Moreover it provided training in operational planning to AU officers on an ad-
hoc basis.413 Otherwise, the main concern in the last couple of years was the focus on 
Afghanistan.  
Another actor whose importance has grown significantly during the last decade is the 
EU, which set itself a goal in 1999 to raise 60,000 troops that could be deployed within 60 
days to carry out humanitarian or peacekeeping operations to prevent or stop atrocities. 
Later, this initiative was pushed back and the focus was given to the creation of two 1,500-
person battle groups as a short-term measure in December 2004. The first experience 
outside Europe was gained at the short-term military mission called Operation Artemis in 
the DRC in 2003 securing the situation for MONUC. 
A robust intervention with ten thousands of soldiers in Darfur was never a realistic 
option for Western policy makers as it would have cost additional lives of thousands of 
people and the overall chaos in Sudan would have been fortified. Moreover, the 
international community would not have had the capacity for rebuilding Darfur because of 
the lack of knowledge how to address the grievances of the heterogeneous groups in the 
region. It would have been important to negotiate an open outcome agreement with all 
rebel groups and also non-violent representatives of Darfur. 
The two most important goals would be a viable cease-fire between Khartoum and the 
rebels and the firm promise of the GoS to commit itself to a fair wealth sharing with the 
neglected region. Hence, the biggest problem for the international community is the slow 
and inadequate international response to gross human rights violations. If the international 
community relies only on diplomatic efforts to repel violence, it might not be taken 
seriously by an abusive state that might misconstrue this as a weakness. Nonetheless, a 
multilateral military action without a valid post-conflict reconstruction plan would not 
bring success either; on the contrary, it would worsen the situation on site. 
 
6.3.2. Why the West Will Not Intervene in Darfur 
The international community has failed to address the humanitarian issues in Darfur. 
Western policy circles have often condemned the situation in Sudan and provided 
humanitarian assistance to Darfur. Nonetheless, no real efforts were taken over a long time 
to pressure Khartoum to a valid peace agreement with the rebels or deploy troops in Darfur 
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to rescue civilians. The killings in Darfur did not harm the national interest of powerful 
states, which reduced the political motives of an intervention enormously. 
Humanitarian interventions take place when states feel obliged to it, either out of 
humanitarian reasons or self-interest. The will of political actors and not considerations on 
sovereignty ultimately leads to the decision to conduct an intervention.414 An intervention 
to rescue civilians appears as ‘unvarnished good’ because of the alleged altruistic motives 
of the intervener, although economic and geo-strategic motives are decisive.415 As the case 
of the 2003 Iraq War proves, the US-led intervention force was mostly interested in 
securing access to resources – in this case it was oil. Also, an intervention is more likely 
when no P5 member has a strong national interest in the country and one powerful state 
pressures for action.  
During the civil war in Bosnia, the international community made an effort to provide 
humanitarian relief although more costly steps were avoided. Instead of reducing the 
tensions and bringing about a recovery of the situation, the conflict was fuelled. It even 
encouraged the rebels to sustain their engagement, and a compromise between the fighting 
parties was delayed. Refugees and IDPs assumed that they could rely on the humanitarian 
efforts of the international community and would be secured. The reality of the 1990s 
showed that also IDP camps and convoys of humanitarian organizations and the UN were 
attacked. Instead of bringing the conflict to an end, yet another humanitarian catastrophe 
was erupting.416 
Actors in the humanitarian community often criticize countries which divide their 
population on an ethnical basis and identity. At the same time the idea of separating 
different groups in the post-conflict process is popular because perpetrators and victims do 
not have to live next to each other. Such a separation, however, goes in line with the aim of 
many perpetrators of mass human rights violations – ethnic cleansing.417 
 
6.3.3. Enforcing International Law 
The vast majority of legal scholars consider interventions that are not sanctioned by the 
UNSC illegal. In international law, however, there are many treaties that entitle the 
individual to basic human rights. The UN Charter outlines in Article 55(3) and Article 56 
the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which should be defended. The 
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provisions of the Charter are vague and open to different interpretations, which causes the 
dilemma that there is no guidance on how the international community should sanction a 
state in case it fails to commit to human rights. Some legal scholars thus argue for a reform 
of the UN Charter to close the legal loopholes. 
Hehir points out two key deficiencies of the current view on sovereignty, which have 
to be addressed by the international community. Firstly, objective assessments must 
identify cases in which a state forfeits its sovereignty. Secondly, automatic action and 
intervention in intra-state crises at a certain level has to be possible. To reach this aim, an 
international body with officials elected by the UNGA would have to be set up, 
determining whether intervention is recommended or not.418 Hence, the doctrine of the 
superiority of state sovereignty would have to change further. There are a number of 
scholars, like Cohen, who argue that limited sovereignty is not contradicting 
constitutionalism and the rule of law.419 Yet many ‘developing states’ are hostile to the 
idea of a Western military intervention and accuse the US and the EU of applying double 
standards and politicization of human rights abuses. The fear of the ‘global south’ could be 
reduced by clear guidelines that constitute a framework for an external military 
intervention. The principle of non-interference would remain in principle, but when states 
commit serious crimes, the state is losing its absolute domestic autonomy. Such a 
restriction of sovereignty is only possible when a state neglects codified criteria and is 
inactive in the face of humanitarian crises outlined by the ICC. Otherwise a politicized 
UNSC will prompt other unilateral interventions like the US-led invasion in Iraq in 2003. 
Due to its structure, the UN is not able to compel states to act in case of humanitarian 
emergencies and form peacekeeping operations, in particular with a robust mandate. 
Moreover, the UN cannot act quickly enough on its own in cases like Darfur. Certain 
powerful states, especially the P5, do violate human rights considering situations in Tibet, 
Chechnya and Guantánamo Bay. A non-reformed UN system will always remain limited in 
terms of treating all member states on an equal basis. In the center of UN reform would 
have to be the UNSC, whereby four main issues would have to be addressed regarding 
R2P: 1) objective and practical criteria have to be established to guide decision-making on 
when the threshold to intervene is reached; 2) the responsibilities of R2P must be 
understood as an obligation in international law 3) a code of conduct has to be introduced 
in the UNSC in case the veto right for the P5 remains in force; 4) regional organizations 
like the EU, AU or ECOWAS should be enhanced to take coercive measures. 
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6.3.4. The ‘Moral Hazard’ with Rebels 
With the shift to the human security paradigm, the attention has focused on the individual 
or on vulnerable groups. It remains a problem, however, that the individual is not seen as a 
complex actor but rather as either a victim or a perpetrator, in other words either good or 
bad, which is not reflecting reality.420 Victims of human rights abuse have to organize on 
their own social movements in order to acquire the skills to ‘frame’ the ongoing events in a 
way that they will get international attention and consequently international support and 
resources.421 Hence, gross violations of human rights occur for the most part when a 
vulnerable group challenges the state’s authority by violent means and the state responds 
disproportionately.422 It has to be kept in mind that most groups suffering from 
discrimination and oppression do not launch rebellions.423 Alan Kuperman argues that the 
chance to reinforce the own grievances or greed increases with attacking state officials, as 
it provokes retaliation against civilians from one’s own group because the state fears the 
attention of the international community will be attracted. Thus, the likelihood for rebels to 
achieve their political goals with the help of an international intervention fuels genocidal 
violence that would not occur otherwise as it shown in Figure 6.424 Kuperman further states 
that R2P and its desire to protect civilians can provide strategic benefits to rebels. 
 
Figure 6: Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention 
 
Kuperman, Alan J. (2008), “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Interventions: Lessons Learnt form the Balkans”, 
International Studies Quarterly Vol. 52(1), p. 51. 
 
When an abusive state perceives an intervention as a credible threat, there are 
commonly two options. Either any responsibility for violence against civilians is denied, 
blaming the rebels to prohibit an intervention, or the violence is even intensified to 
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eliminate the rebellion at first hand and decide facts on the ground.425 In the case of Darfur 
it can be seen that the GoS applied both options, denying any involvement in the conflict 
and denouncing the atrocities as ‘tribal wars’ but at the same time supporting the 
Janjaweed to establish facts of ethnic cleansing on site. Moreover, resolutions in the UNSC 
were successfully delayed by China and Russia and consequently a robust humanitarian 
intervention did not make sense in 2007 when UNAMID was established. Posen describes 
a phenomenon as the case of Darfur as a ‘security dilemma’ because the central authority 
does not provide the protection for all groups in a state.426 
Thus, the moral hazard is widespread and persistent, as the case of Darfur also proves. 
After the attacks by the Darfur rebels on Sudanese military camps, the GoS responded 
brutally but also predictably because Khartoum feared another secessionist movement. The 
rebel factions in Darfur rejected the 2006 DPA because the peace agreement with Sudan’s 
South, the CPA, had involved many more concessions of the GoS to the SPLM/A. With 
the deployment of AMIS or also UNAMID, and the ICC indictments, the rebels 
successfully pressured Khartoum and gained concessions by the international community. 
Nevertheless an intervention by the international community in Darfur would have 
been justified because of the grossly disproportionate retaliation of the GoS in Darfur. 
Effective policy options have to consider the complex local and also regional context in 
which Darfur is situated. In a war-torn area like Darfur it is important that accountability of 
the actors is achieved and impunity is stopped. The following three points are important for 
the UN to avoid similar rebellions: 1) substantial financial resources should be expended to 
urge states to address the legitimate grievances of nonviolent domestic groups; 2) coercive 
regime change or surrender of sovereignty are weak options without deterrence or actual 
robust preventive military intervention to protect civilians from a violent backlash; and 3) 
humanitarian aid like food, water or medical care should be delivered directly to civilians; 
any possible benefits of the rebels have to be minimized.427 
 
6.4. Conclusions 
 
R2P as a concept adopted at the 2005 World Summit Outcome has failed as a practical 
tool. Although R2P has constituted the moral commitment of many Western states and also 
from other parts of the world, powerful states like China, India or Russia still have 
                                                
425 Wagner, R. Harrison (2005), “The Hazards of Thinking About Moral Hazard”, Ethnopolitics Vol. 4(2), pp. 243-244. 
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constraints. Legally speaking, R2P is a concept and not a norm and consequently it is not 
binding. In comparison to the proposals of the ICISS, the version of R2P that is today 
referred to is weak. To actually be able to function, R2P would have to rest on a reformed 
and non-politicized UN Security Council. In the near future, no changes in the institutional 
set up of the strongest UN body seem to be likely. Consequently it is the R2P concept that 
would have to adapt to reality and not the other way around. Regional organizations must 
have a stronger influence and a better legal grounding when they intervene militarily as a 
last resort to stop mass violence. 
Concerning potential interveners, who act on the grounds of R2P, it is important to 
bear in mind that they do not act on behalf of rebel groups but remain impartial. Although 
sovereignty of states does not constitute a dogma anymore, interveners should not fight 
side by side with non-state actors. A risk assessment what may be achieved by the 
interveners has to be conducted. The case of Darfur proves that potential interveners have 
to act rapidly, because otherwise they are confronted with even more complicated facts on 
the ground. It has to be repeated yet another time: prevention of abuses of human rights is 
of foremost importance. Without better prevention efforts, the international community 
will be overloaded with serious human rights abuses. R2P cases have to remain a high 
threshold to mark it as a priority on the international agenda. 
So far, R2P has not worked and will not in the future. In contrast to the findings of 
UNSG Ban Ki-moon in January 2009 that it would be counterproductive to revisit articles 
138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome,428 the author of this research paper argues that 
indeed changes have to be taken because so far inherent problems remain within the 
concept and its understanding. Without major changes in the concept, R2P will fade in the 
discourse as so many other popular terms in the past decade. It would be of particular 
importance to look again on the proposals of the ICISS and reconsider the suggestions of 
the Commission to broaden the concept. The future of R2P is not a gloomy one, but 
important changes have to be made to prevent another Darfur from taking place. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
The concept of military intervention for humanitarian purposes has caused intensive 
debates in international relations. Discussions on whether there is a legal right to 
humanitarian intervention are important to address the widespread suffering and death 
among civilians. Notably many policymakers, scholars and humanitarians agreed on 
protective intervention as a last resort to prohibit a tragedy after the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide. With the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect in 2001, humanitarian 
interventions should get a legal basis on which the international community can act. The 
shift to the term ‘R2P’ was a conceptual move because of the more positive framing in 
comparison to the negative connotations of humanitarian intervention.  
From the beginning, R2P has had its critics among states as well as analysts. In 
particular developing states429 along with the P5 powers China and Russia have been 
among the loudest critics. The criticism comes as no surprise taken into account the human 
rights record of these countries and their apprehension of increased public awareness about 
it. Also scholars criticize the concept, ranging from those who fear it will become an 
instrument of abuse by powerful states430 to others who worry that it will give the powerful 
states an excuse to avoid international action.431 
Nonetheless, R2P has moved in remarkably short time to an important concept in 
world politics. The international community, however, has failed to commit itself to its 
own standards because it has not yet been able to operationalize the concept after the 
endorsement at the World Summit in 2005. R2P has redefined the debate on the prevention 
of gross human rights violations, locating the responsibility first within the affected state. 
In case the state is unable or unwilling to repel the atrocities, it is the duty of the 
international community to act through the UN and comply with its obligation to prevent 
mass atrocities. 
Thakur and Weiss, two leading supporters of R2P, wrote, “[s]overeignty no longer 
implies the license to kill.”432 Reality, however, proves that the world stands on the 
sidelines of mass atrocities like in the case of the Darfur conflict, although the atrocities 
and the sufferings shocked the conscience of humankind. As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, 
the situation on site makes Darfur an obvious contemporary example of an R2P situation, 
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hence approving the first research question. At the same time, the debate of a need for R2P 
in the Darfur crisis is polarized by “the stark options of ‘Doing Nothing’ and ‘Sending in 
the Marines,”433 which does not contribute to a solution. 
Addressing the second research question, the UN was very slow to address the Darfur 
crisis, which was an obvious R2P situation in the first years of the conflict. Although the 
R2P concept was at hand, the international community failed to respond quickly and 
effectively to the mass atrocities in Darfur. As the UNSC reflects the power structure of 
1945 and not 2010, the P5 can follow their own national interests. In the case of Darfur, 
China had economic interests in Sudan – namely oil. The US has a mixed record on 
Darfur. In comparison to Rwanda 1994, where the US actually was reluctant to use the ‘G-
word,’ Bush and Powell publicly called the Darfur crisis genocide. At the same time, the 
US was not prepared to threaten the GoS with a robust intervention force. Hence, Darfur 
was not significant enough for powerful states to actually take action. By and large, the 
conflict has been ignored by many states because the relations to Sudan have been seen as 
more important than the humanitarian situation in Darfur. 
Proceeding with the third research question, a duty to intervene in abusive countries 
can only be successful with objective criteria. The 2005 World Summit Outcome was not 
able to provide a practical framework for R2P because no agreement was reached on how 
to break a deadlock in the UNSC. Therefore, the ICISS proposals of R2P should be 
reconsidered to make the concept more applicable. A central issue is the reform of the 
UNSC, which has to be adjusted to the 21st century. Current reservations on R2P may be 
overcome by plain policy guidelines on if, when and how to use the concept. Of utmost 
importance remains a high threshold for using force in humanitarian emergencies. In 
addition, military force always has to be taken as a last resort to halt mass slaughter. The 
moral consequences of using force has to outweigh the moral costs of inaction, 
consequently the responsibility to react is limited to extreme cases of humanitarian 
emergencies like the one in Darfur. 
So far, R2P is still a political catchword and not a legal norm. Ending impunity and 
promoting accountability is an achievable goal with R2P, but the concept has to be further 
advanced to be a liable tool halting gross human rights violations. There is thus still a long 
way to go until the aim of the ICISS report will be reached which stated in 2001 that, 
“[t]he most compelling task now is to work to ensure that when the call goes out to the 
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community of states for action, that call will be answered. There must never again be mass 
killing or ethnic cleansing.”434 
                                                
434 ICISS 2001:70. 
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Abstract (English) 
 
The present thesis assesses the concept of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) based on the 
case study of the Darfur conflict. R2P was introduced to overcome the ‘dilemma of 
intervention’ of the 1990s, to shift the terms of the debate from the ‘right to intervene’ to 
the ‘responsibility to protect.’ The paradigm change from a traditional understanding of 
security towards the concept of human security played a crucial role. This thesis examines 
the development of R2P and critically reflects on the substance of R2P. The Darfur crisis 
illustrates that the R2P concept is entrenched too weakly in the international community. 
Lip service is often paid to the will of halting mass atrocities, yet national interest and state 
sovereignty proves to be stronger. An important factor is the failure of the most powerful 
UN body, the Security Council, to prevent crimes against humanity or genocide. To avert 
crimes like those in Rwanda, Bosnia or Darfur in the future, R2P has to renew its basis and 
has to refer back to the 2001 recommendations of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Security again. 
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Abstract (Deutsch) 
 
Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit untersucht das Konzept der “Schutzverantwortung” (R2P) 
anhand der Fallstudie Darfur. Um das so genannte Interventionsdilemma der 1990er Jahre 
zu überwinden, sollte ein Wechsel vom “Recht zur Intervention” zur 
“Schutzverantwortung” bewirkt werden. Dabei spielt der Paradigmenwechsel im 
Sicherheitsverständnis hin zum Konzept der „menschlichen Sicherheit“ nach dem Kalten 
Krieg eine entscheidende Rolle. Diese Arbeit zeichnet die Entwicklung von R2P nach und 
beleuchtet kritisch die Kerninhalte der Schutzverantwortung. Wie das Beispiel Darfur 
zeigt, ist das Konzept R2P noch zu schwach in der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft 
verankert. Es gibt zwar das Lippenbekenntnis, Gräueltaten Einhalt zu gebieten, tatsächlich 
sind aber nationales Interesse und staatliche Souveränität noch stark ausgeprägt. Ein 
wichtiger Faktor ist dabei das Versagen des mächtigsten UN-Organs, dem Sicherheitsrat, 
Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit oder Genozid zu verhindern. Um künftige 
Verbrechen wie jene in Ruanda, Bosnien oder Darfur verhindern zu können, muss R2P auf 
eine neue Grundlage gesetzt werden und sich stärker an die Überlegungen der 
International Commission on Intervention and State Security orientieren. 
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